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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 In this dissertation, I develop a line of thought that Berkeley had only started to develop 
in his published works and in his personal Notebooks.  This line of thought concerns the role 
played by Spirit, or active volitional awareness, in the cognition of everyday objects, and also in 
the meaning of any given Sign, whether Natural or Artificial.  Berkeley began to develop this 
line of thought in his earliest publication, As Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision (1709), when 
he wrote of a “prejudice” that must “insinuate itself” into one’s understanding.  This “prejudice” 
transforms raw sense-data into ‘qualities’ or ‘properties’ of underlying ‘objects.’  According to 
Berkeley’s New Theory of Vision, it is the active volition of the perceiver that makes this 
transformation possible; it is also what gives meaning to any Natural Sign.  Extending this to 
Artificial Signs, we may conclude that artificial signs acquire meaning by serving as signs for the 
regulation of volition according to various sensory-motor expectations, just as with Natural 
Signs.  Therefore, words may me meaningful without calling forth any associated ideas, provided 
words serve to regulate volition/behavior, which is a view that Berkeley held, but again, failed to 
fully develop.  Several criticisms of Berkeley’s overall approach can be addressed with this 
developed doctrine of spirit.  First, Berkeley’s treatment of ideas as ‘mental images’ is required 
to distinguish ideas from active know-how, which is often mistaken for an ‘idea’ (according to 
Berkeley).  Second, any claim that Berkeley’s “Master Argument” commits him to solipsism can 
be addressed by pointing out that our knowledge of other minds is an active volitional awareness 
and, thus, not relevant to the “Master Argument.”  Finally, the cost of this extension is that 
Berkeley’s argument for God-as-Perceiver must be jettisoned, for reasons already put forward by 
John Stuart Mill.  	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CHAPTER 1 
 
BERKELEY’S INCOMPLETE WORKS 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 In this dissertation, I shall identify and elaborate upon a line of reasoning that can be 
found in George Berkeley's published works as well as in his personal Notebooks.  This line of 
reasoning is one that concerns the important role played by active volition in the cognition of 
everyday objects and also in the function and mechanics of language and meaning.  Berkeley 
failed to fully develop and then capitalize on this line of reasoning, and I shall argue that this was 
unfortunate for Berkeley, as developing this line of reasoning may have answered many of the 
common criticisms that have been leveled against Berkeley's overall philosophical position.   
Of course, I do not pretend to be able to salvage all of Berkeley's arguments from criticism, as 
there are many serious difficulties and problems to be found in Berkeley's various arguments.  
However, we will achieve a different and hopefully clearer view of Berkeley's fundamental 
insights, and one that I hope will bolster the viability of his overall philosophical position.   
 First, then, I shall present a brief summary of Berkeley's published career, followed by an 
explanation of some key terminology used by Berkeley.  In Chapter II, I shall examine 
Berkeley's arguments for rejecting the philosophical doctrine of Abstract Ideas, and I will also 
examine a particular argument against Material Substance.  I shall also examine some of the 
common criticisms of these arguments.  In Chapter III, I shall explore Berkeley's New Theory of 
Vision and then re-examine Berkeley's writings, so that we may tease out this hidden line of 
reasoning concerning the role played by active volition in cognition and language.  Finally, I will 
attempt to show how recognizing, and then further developing, the role played by active volition 
in Berkeley's New Theory of Vision can resolve the criticisms addressed in Chapter II.   
 I have chosen to embark on this re-examination of Berkeley's philosophical arguments 
and overall project because I find Berkeley to be a most curious and puzzling figure in the 
history of Western Philosophy.  On the one hand, he is lauded as having been a genius; while, on 
the other hand, his arguments have never been fully embraced or accepted by the philosophical 
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community in general, and at least some of his arguments have been met with extreme hostility.1  
Hence, he can be seen as having been something of a brilliant failure.  Berkeley's case is made 
more intriguing by the fact that his published philosophy is incomplete, which I shall elaborate 
upon in a moment.   
 What I find most curious about Berkeley, however, is the fact that he anticipated that his 
views and arguments would be grossly misunderstood, and he often attributed this to a fault in 
language.  Moreover, his stated target was often treated as being something more akin to a 
linguistically inculcated "delusion" rather than relatively simple mistakes of reasoning.   
 Berkeley is, of course, most well-known for denying the existence of what philosophers 
called "Material Substance" and for claiming that the existence of any unthinking thing is 
synonymous with its being perceived, that its esse is percipi.  Moreover, Berkeley claimed that 
God somehow maintains the existence of things when they are not being perceived by any finite 
mind(s).  If there is any overall position that Berkeley is (in)famous for, that's the one, and I shall 
discuss this in detail in Chapters II and III.   
 However, a careful reading of Berkeley's various writings (both published and 
unpublished) reveals a persistent undercurrent of thought regarding a problem inherent in 
language.  For example, in §6 of the Introduction to his 1710 Treatise Concerning the Principles 
of Human Knowledge, Berkeley wrote:  "[i]n order to prepare the mind of the reader for the 
easier conceiving of what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of introduction, 
concerning the nature and abuse of language."  He then went on to denounce the philosophical 
doctrine of abstract ideas, which I shall discuss in detail in Chapter II.  We may also consider 
Berkeley's Notebook entry 642:  "[t]he chief thing I do or pretend to do is only to remove the 
mist or veil of words” (§642).  We may also consider the following from §24 of the Introduction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See e.g., J.S. Mill, "Berkeley's Life and Writings" in Mill, Collected Works, Vol. vii, J.M. Robson (ed.), (Toronto, 
1978), p. 451, where Mill refers to Berkeley as "one of greatest philosophical genius."  We may also consider 
Hume's description of Berkeley's rejection of Abstract Ideas as being "one of the greatest and most valuable 
discoveries that has been made of late years."  Treatise of Human Nature, I vii, (1739).   See also K.R. Popper, "A 
Note on Berkeley as Precursor to Mach", The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 4, No. 13, George 
Berkeley Bicentenary (May, 1953), pp. 26-36, at p. 26:  "I admire Berkeley without agreeing with him."  See also 
Margaret Atherton, "The Coherence of Berkeley's Theory of Mind", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
Vol. XLIII, No. 3, March 1983, pp. 389-399, at p. 389:  "Berkeley's theory of mind has not, in the general run of 
things, commanded much respect.  In fact, it has, more often than not, been perceived as something of an 
embarrassment."  For examples of extreme hostility, consider J.F. Thompson's description of one of Berkeley's 
arguments as "contemptible" and J.O. Wisdom's description of the same argument as "entirely specious and not 
worth a moment's academic discussion."  These are both quoted in Tipton's Berkeley, The Philosophy of 
Immaterialism (Methuen & Co Ltd, London:  1974), at p. 160.  The argument Thompson and Wisdom were deriding 
is commonly known as the "Master Argument" and I shall discuss it below, in Chapters II and III. 
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to the Principles:  "we need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of 
knowledge, whose fruit is excellent and within the reach of our hand."  Statements such as these 
can be found throughout Berkeley's published works, but it is not at all clear what Berkeley 
intended by these statements, as he never fully developed an account of meaning.        
  Nevertheless, statements such as these hint at a deeper issue at work in Berkeley's 
thinking, one intimately related to the logic of language.  Therefore, I have chosen to follow 
Alan White's suggestion, that we take a "linguistic approach" to understanding Berkeley.2   
Before exploring this in more detail, I shall first briefly describe Berkeley's published career, 
since it is important that we recognize that Berkeley's published philosophy is incomplete.    
    
1.2 BERKELEY’S MAJOR WORKS 
 
 Berkeley's earliest major work, entitled An Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision, was 
first published in 1709 when Berkeley was only twenty-one years old.  In that work, Berkeley 
argued, inter alia, that the distance, magnitude, and situation of objects are not immediately 
perceived by vision; instead, Berkeley argued, visual sense data should be treated as signs in a 
language (the author of which is God) that indicate what non-visual (e.g., tactile) sensations we 
may encounter should we act in one way or another.  As a result of this Sign to Thing-Signified 
relationship, people come to perceive visual data as though it were one and the same with the 
various tactile, kinesthetic and other sensory possibilities signified by the operative visual signs, 
thus giving rise to an immediate sense of distance from the perception of visual data.  I shall 
discuss this theory in detail in Chapter III, since the line of reasoning I shall develop, regarding 
the role of active volition in cognition and meaning, is central to this Theory of Vision.   
 As stated above, however, Berkeley is most well-known for rejecting the philosophical 
notion of Material Substance.  He is also very well-known for rejecting the philosophical 
Doctrine of Abstract Ideas.  Both of these rejections were set forth in his second major 
publication which appeared just one year after his Essay on vision.  This was the 1710 
publication of the Introduction & Part I to what was intended to be a grand treatise, to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Alan White, "A Linguistic Approach to Berkeley's Philosophy", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
Vol. 16, No. 2 (Dec., 1955), pp. 172-187.  White's article does not set out any radical reinterpretations of Berkeley 
but merely suggests that the best way to understand Berkeley, to make his arguments more viable, is to view him as 
being interested, first and foremost, in the logic of language.  White's suggestion was that this attitude regarding the 
supreme importance of the logic of language was one that "Berkeley often, consciously and unconsciously, took, 
and also one which enable us to understand his philosophy more clearly." (p.172).   
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published in successive Parts over a period of years, entitled A Treatise Concerning the 
Principles of Human Knowledge. 
 It should also be noted that sometime between 1705 and 1708, Berkeley recorded his 
developing thoughts in two Notebooks that we still have at our disposal today.  While there is 
debate amongst Berkeley scholars and historians concerning the precise dating of these 
Notebooks, it is generally agreed, and it is clear from the content of those Notebooks, that the 
thoughts recorded therein are immediately relevant to Berkeley's two earliest major works:  the 
1709 Essay on vision, and the 1710 Introduction & Part I of the Principles.   
 In the Preface to the 1710 Introduction and Part I of the Principles, Berkeley cautioned 
his readers against passing summary judgment on the arguments contained therein.  "For," he 
explained, "there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very liable (nor could it be 
remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd consequences."  He 
further warned that if the reading of his work "be done transiently, it is very probable my sense 
may be mistaken."  With these cautionary notes in place, Berkeley maintained that "the thinking 
reader" would not only understand his arguments, but would find them "throughout clear and 
obvious."   
 In fact, Berkeley's philosophy has more often than not been "charged with most absurd 
consequences."  Consider, for example, G.J. Warnock’s description of the initial reaction to Part 
I of Berkeley’s Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge: 
 
 On the publication in 1710 of his most important book, the Principles of Human 
Knowledge, a doctor diagnosed insanity in the author; a bishop deplored his vain passion 
for novelty; some said his fantastic paradoxes were at any rate amusing, and were 
inclined to excuse him on the ground that he was an Irishman.  Even his friends, though 
respectful of his talents, were quite unconvinced.  Dean Swift is reported (perhaps 
apocryphally) to have left him standing on the door-step when he came to call, saying 
that if his philosophical views were correct he should be able to come in through a closed 
door as easily as through an open one.  This tale is indeed typical of the common view of 
Berkeley’s doctrines.3 
 
 The question should immediately arise:  who was mistaken?  Was Berkeley confused 
about the nature of his own views, or were his early critics guilty of a catastrophic failure of 
interpretation, similar to what Berkeley had anticipated and warned against?  In fact, this 
question extends to modern times as well.  As Warnock indicated in the passage above, such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 G.J. Warnock, Berkeley (Basil Blackwell, Oxford.  1982), p. 17.       
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negative reaction to Berkeley's views is "typical of the common view" of Berkeley's philosophy.  
Dr. Tipton aptly summarized the general mood amongst Berkeley scholars when he wrote that 
"the problem is that there seems at first sight to be a striking discrepancy between the judgement 
most of us want to make on his general position and the judgement he seems to have expected us 
to make on it."4   
 While Berkeley had initially anticipated some difficulty in conveying his views, he 
probably did not expect the extremely negative reactions, described above, to his 1710 
Introduction & Part I of his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.  Since this 
1710 publication contained only the “Introduction” and "Part I" of his Treatise, we should look 
to the later parts of his Treatise to further clarify his views.  Unfortunately, the 1710 Introduction 
and Part I were the only parts of the Treatise that Berkeley ever completed and published.   
We know from Berkeley's Notebooks that his Treatise Concerning the Principles of 
Human Knowledge was originally intended to be a grand work, spanning at least three separate 
publications:  the Introduction and Part I (both published in 1710), followed by a Part II, and 
then a Part III.  We also know from Berkeley's notebooks that each Part would have focused on a 
specific aspect of his whole philosophy.  Part I was to address the existence of ‘unthinking’ 
objects, or ordinary sense-objects like tables and chairs.5  Part II seems to have been designed to 
focus primarily on volition, and related topics.6  As to what Part III would have addressed, we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ian Tipton, Berkeley, The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 15.           
5  We know this because Part I was actually published, and it does, in fact, deal primarily with the existence of 
unthinking sense-objects, or "external" objects, e.g., tables, chairs, trees, cars, etc.      
6  At entry 792 of his notebooks, Berkeley recorded the following:  "The Existence of any thing imaginable is 
nothing different from Imagination or perception.  Volition or Will [which] is not imaginable regard must not be had 
to its' existence at least in the first Book."  This indicates, not only that volition would be covered in a later Part of 
the Principles, but also that each Part would focus on a specific subject.  We also have notebook entry 508: "The 2 
great Principles of Morality, the Being of a God & the Freedom of Man:  these to be handled in the beginning of the 
Second Book."  We know from his published writings, that Berkeley equated God with a Volition or Will that 
causes sense-objects to be experienced at all, and that "Freedom of Man" is a reference to issues related to free will 
(i.e., volition).  Thus, we have another indication that Part II of the Principles would have addressed issues related to 
volition.  We can also look to the following two notebook entries, in conjunction.  First, there is entry 807:  "Say 
you, at this rate all's nothing but Idea meer [sic] phantasm.  I answer every thing as real as ever.  I hope to call a 
thing Idea makes it not the less real.  truly I should perhaps have stuck to [the] word thing and not mention'd the 
Word Idea were it not for a Reason & I think a good one too [which] I shall give in [the] Second Book."  From this 
entry alone, we cannot discern what this 'good Reason' was for using the word "idea" rather than "thing" to refer to 
sense-objects.  To settle this, however, we can look to entry 644:  "Thing & Idea are much what words of the same 
extent & meaning, why therefore do I not use the word thing?  Answ: because thing is of greater latitude than Idea.  
Thing comprehends also volitions or actions.  now these are no ideas."  Thus, it would appear that Part II would 
have addressed, in detail, Berkeley's motivations for clearly distinguishing volition from idea.  All of these passages, 
then, support the conclusion that Part II would have focused on Volition, while Part I was resigned to dealing only 
with the nature and existence of (unthinking) sense-objects, or what Berkeley would refer to generally as “Ideas.”   
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can only guess; Berkeley indicated some plans for a Part III in his notebooks, but these 
indications are too vague and sparse to allow for any definite conclusions.7       
 Naturally, we would like to know why Berkeley abandoned his planned project.  While 
we cannot answer this with certainty, we do know the following.  First, in response to the 
"apparently complete failure of [Part I of] the Principles,"8 Berkeley stopped work on Part II in 
order to draft and publish his Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713). In the Preface to 
those Dialogues, Berkeley referred to the recently published Part I of his Treatise and explained 
that "before I proceed to publish the Second Part, I thought it requisite to treat more clearly and 
fully of certain Principles laid down in the First, and to place them in a new light - which is the 
business of the following Dialogues."  The Dialogues failed to remedy the negative reaction to 
Berkeley's proposals, and the philosophical community remained largely unimpressed.9 
 A few years later, during a trip to Italy, Berkeley lost the manuscript to Part II.  Several 
years later, in a letter to Dr. Samuel Johnson dated Nov. 25, 1729, Berkeley recounted this loss:  
"As to the Second Part of my treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, the fact is 
that I had made a considerable progress in it; but the manuscript was lost about fourteen years 
ago, during my travels in Italy, and I never had leisure since to do so disagreeable a thing as 
writing twice on the same subject."  
 There are some scholars who maintain that Berkeley declined to rewrite and publish Part 
II, not just because he would have had to "do so disagreeable a thing as writing twice on the 
same subject," but also because of difficulties he had discovered in his own philosophical 
approach.  For example, Tipton has argued that "it is very difficult to escape the conclusion that 
Berkeley would have found it far from easy to produce this volume, and that he was genuinely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  The only indication of Berkeley's plans for Part III can be found in Notebook entry 583:  "That which extremely 
strengthens us in this prejudice is that we think we see an empty space, which I shall Demonstrate to be false in the 
3d Book."  This is an odd entry, only insofar as it seems to address an issue related to the visual perception of 
distance, a topic Berkeley had already dealt with at length in his earliest publication of 1709, An Essay Toward a 
New Theory of Vision.  Thus, it is very hard to conclude anything from this single notebook entry, other than the fact 
that Berkeley had originally intended to include a Part III in the complete Treatise Concerning the Principles of 
Human Knowledge.    
8 Warnock, p. 146.  See also Harry Bracken, Berkeley (St. Martin's Press, New York:  1974), p.37:  "Berkeley tried 
to find out what others thought was wrong with his position, but to no avail.  If there were arguments, they were not 
revealed.  Berkeley's immaterialism was treated as a joke – and a bad one at that." 
9 See Bracken, supra n. 7, at p. 37:  "By and large, however, readers failed to take the Three Dialogues any more 
seriously.  For several decades Berkeley's philosophical reputation was primarily in the hands of people who never 
read him." 
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worried about paradoxes and serious problems arising from what he wanted to say."10  According 
to such a view, Berkeley realized that his critics were right:  that his overall approach was not as 
viable as he had once thought and, consequently, he quietly admitted defeat by simply 
abandoning the entire project.   
 I do not agree with this assessment, for three reasons.  First, there is no evidence that 
Berkeley ever came to seriously question the truth of his own views.  For example, in the same 
1729 letter to Johnson in which Berkeley recounted the loss of his manuscript, he also wrote:  
"What you have seen of mine [Part I] was published when I was very young, and without doubt 
hath many defects."  However, he immediately went on to write:  "For though the notions should 
be true (as I verily think they are), yet it is difficult to express them clearly and consistently, 
language being framed to common use and received prejudices."  So, in 1729, we find Berkeley 
still committed to the truth of the views he put forward in the 1710 Introduction and Part I of the 
Treatise, and the failure of that initial publication being attributed to a fault in language, which 
made it difficult, if not impossible, for Berkeley to clearly express and clarify his views.11  
Furthermore, in his subsequent publications, which include De Motu (1721), Alciphron (1732), 
The Essay on Vision Vindicated and Explained (1733), The Analyst (1734), A Defense of Free-
Thinking in Mathematics (1735), and Siris (1744), he continued to develop the same views he 
had put forward in his 1709 Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision and his 1710 Introduction & 
Part I of the Treatise, with no drastic corrections or reversals of position.  In fact, a copy of his 
1709 Essay on vision was appended to the 1732 publication of Alciphron. 
 If Berkeley had truly abandoned his original project, one would expect that his 
subsequent publications would advocate a different approach, or at least that they would address 
topics far removed from those addressed in his earlier publications.  Instead, we find a 
continuing development and application of the points made in those earlier works.  Granted, this 
continuing development is surely less direct than what might have been contained in Parts II and 
III of his originally planned Treatise.  Indeed, these subsequent publications seem more 
concerned with applying the points that had been put forward in his earliest publications, rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Tipton, Berkeley, The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 260.  See also J.L. Stocks, "What Did Berkeley Mean by 
Esse is Percipi?" Mind, New Series, Vol. 45, No. 179 (Jul., 1936), 310-323, at p. 319:  "it may be doubted whether 
Berkeley's failure to write [Part II] was not due more to his failure to think out what was to be said to his own 
satisfaction than to the loss of a partially completed manuscript."   
11 Recall Berkeley's statements in the Preface to Part I of the Principles:  "there are some passages that, taken by 
themselves, are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd 
consequences."  The line that should attract our attention here is "nor could it be remedied."   
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than to greatly expanding on them.  For example, De Motu (1721) represents an application of 
Berkeley's anti-abstractionist principles to the study of motion.  In Alciphron (1732), Berkeley, 
inter alia, reiterated and expanded upon views he had put forward in his earliest works 
concerning the true function and mechanics of language and meaning.  The title of Berkeley's 
1733 publication, The Theory of Vision or Visual Language, Vindicated and Explained, should 
speak for itself; in that publication, Berkeley presented a renewed argument for the same points 
he had put forward in his 1709 Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision.  Finally, in The Analyst 
(1734) and A Defense of Free-Thinking in Mathematics (1735), Berkeley launched a critical 
attack against mathematicians and philosophers who had been "wonderfully deceived and 
deluded by their own peculiar signs, symbols" into taking the Newtonian concept of an 
"infinitesimal" too literally.  (§8 of The Analyst). 
  The second reason for disagreeing with the claim that Berkeley failed to redraft the lost 
manuscript to Part II because of problems he saw in his own approach is very simple.  Anyone 
who has ever labored to produce such a work as would have been Berkeley's Part II will know 
that the loss of such a manuscript would have been nothing short of traumatic.  Imagine that you 
had "made considerable progress" on a lengthy and difficult manuscript only to have every trace 
of it destroyed by, e.g., a computer crash, with no backups.  How easy would it be to start over 
from scratch and “write twice on the same subject”?   This, coupled with the ridicule Berkeley 
was being made to suffer for his views, allows us, I think, to forgive Berkeley for abandoning his 
grand Treatise.  We should also bear in mind, as A.A. Luce has pointed out, that Berkeley "had 
other things to do in life besides philosophy."  As Luce explains, "He always remained a 
philosopher; but there was nothing of the professor of philosophy in him.  He had no motive for 
'developing' his philosophy, or for gathering round him a school of adherents."12  Indeed, 
Berkeley told Johnson that his intention was only to give "hints to thinking men, who have 
leisure and curiosity to go to the bottom of things, and pursue them in their own minds," rather 
than "trouble the world with large volumes." (Nov. 25, 1729).  
 The final reason for excusing Berkeley for abandoning his originally planned Treatise 
concerns Berkeley's repeated but cryptic references to a "delusion" tied up with language and 
meaning.  We have already seen, in his 11/25/1729 letter to Johnson, that Berkeley blamed a 
fault in language for his failure to adequately explain his philosophical position(s) in Part I of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 A.A. Luce, Berkeley's Immateralism (Russel & Russel, New York:  1968), p. 11. 
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Principles.  In that same letter, Berkeley also wrote:  "I do not indeed wonder that on first 
reading what I have written, men are not thoroughly convinced.  On the contrary, I should very 
much wonder if prejudices, which have been many years taking root, should be extirpated in a 
few hours' reading."  We may also consider the closing section of the Introduction to the 
Principles:  "Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge from the embarrass 
and delusion of words, we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw 
consequences from consequences, and be never the wiser." (Introduction, §25).13   
 Now, one could argue that Berkeley's reference to a "delusion of words" was simply 
rhetorical flourish on his part.  However, Berkeley himself confessed to having once firmly 
believed in the two doctrines that he would so confidently attack in his published works:  the 
doctrine of Abstract Ideas, and the tenet of Material Substance.  First, in an early draft of the 
Introduction to his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, we find the 
following two confessions of Berkeley's prior adherence to the doctrine of Abstract Ideas:   
 
 I am apt to think that some of those who fancy themselves to enjoy that privilege  [of 
being able to frame abstract ideas], would, upon looking narrowly into their own 
thoughts, find they wanted it as much as I.  For there was a time when, being banter’d 
and abus’d by words, I did not in the least doubt my having it.14    
 
 …whether it be that those speculative gentlemen have by earnest and profound study 
attain'd to an elevation of thought above the reach of ordinary capacities and endeavours, 
or whatever else be the cause [for adhering to the doctrine of Abstract Ideas], sure I am 
there are in their writings many things which I now find myself unable to understand.  
Tho’ being accustom’d to those forms of speech, I once thought there was no difficulty in 
them.15 
 
 Second, with regard to the tenet of Material Substance, we may consult the following 
exchange from his 1713 Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (and, keep in mind that 
Berkeley put forth his own views through the character of Philonous): 
 
Hylas:  Pray, Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed,   
  as you are now that it does not?   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See also Berkeley's Notebook entry 406:  "I know there is a mighty sect of Men will oppose me. but yet I may 
expect to be supported by those whose minds are not so far overgrown wth madness..." 
14 Fraser, Works, Vol. 1, p.412, my emphasis. 
15 Fraser, Works, Vol. 1, p.422, my emphasis. 
10	  
	  
Philonous: I was.  But here lies the difference.  Before, my positivenes was             
  founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after             
  inquiry, upon evidence.16  
  
 To better appreciate the significance of these confessions, we should take into account 
that Berkeley seemed to have prided himself on being a true "free-thinker," i.e., one who takes 
nothing on faith, or on the authority of others, but accepts claims only after thoroughly 
examining and weighing all the reasons pro and con.  Consider, for example, the following 
eloquent passage from his Notebooks:   
 
 I am young, I am an upstart, I am a pretender, I am vain, very well.  I shall 
 endeavour patiently to bear up under the most lessening, vilifying appellations the 
 pride and rage of man can devise.  But one thing, I know, I am not guilty of.  I do  not act 
 out of prejudice and prepossession.  I do not adhere to any opinion because it is an old 
 one, a receiv’d one, a fashionable one, or one that I have spent much time in the study 
 and cultivation of. 
 
 So, the young Berkeley, who prided himself on his independence of thought, came to 
realize – at some point – that two prevailing doctrines of philosophy, which he himself had 
endorsed, were completely false.  Moreover, at least in the case of abstract ideas, he seemed to 
blame language for beguiling him into accepting that false doctrine.   
 In fact, so adamant was Berkeley that "most parts of knowledge have been strangely 
perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they are 
delivered" (Introduction, §21), that he apparently felt forced to adopt a very awkward 
methodology in his Principles:  "Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the 
understanding, I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them as possibly I can:  
whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping 
out of my thoughts, as far as I am able, those names which long and constant use hath so strictly 
united with them."  (Introduction, §21).17    
 I think it is safe to conclude from these statements that Berkeley felt that adherence to the 
doctrines of abstract ideas and material substance were not mere mistakes, but were the products 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Fraser, Works, Vol. 1, p. 334.  [Third Dialogue]           
17  The line, "I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use of them as possibly I can" can only be found in the 
First Edition of Berkeley's Introduction to the Principles.  It was likely dropped from subsequent editions because of 
the sheer oddity of proposing to explain something in writing, but without using words.  Of course, Berkeley knew 
this would seem strange, and he acknowledge that if taken too literally, his method would "presuppose an entire 
deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare hardly promise myself."  (Introduction, §23).        
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of a delusion that was intimately related to language.  If this is true, then the failure of Berkeley's 
philosophical project may be blamed on Berkeley's readers, since we are each  ultimately 
responsible for extirpating our own prejudices and seeing past this "delusion of words."  Indeed, 
that readers of Berkeley need to do significant work on their own to comprehend Berkeley’s 
insights becomes a recurring theme throughout his writings.  Consider, for example, the 
following:   
 
"I desire & warn [my reader] not to expect to find truth in my Book or any where but in his own 
Mind.  whatever I see my self tis impossible I can paint it out in words." 
   - §696, Notebooks (1708-1709) 
 
"[A]s for those that will not be at the pains of a little thought, no multiplication of words will 
ever suffice to make them understand the truth, or rightly conceive my meaning." 
   - §134, An Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision (1709)                
 
"Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him that he would make my 
words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in 
reading that I had in writing them."   
   - §25, Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). 
 
"In the pursuit of truth we must beware of being misled by terms which we do not rightly 
understand.  That is the chief point.  Almost all philosophers utter the caution; few observe it. . . 
Laying aside, then, as far as possible, all prejudice, whether rooted in linguistic usage or in 
philosophical authority, let us fix our gaze on the very nature of things." 
   - §1, De Motu (1721) 
             
"As I pretend not to make any discoveries which another might not as well have made, who 
should have thought it worth his pains:  so I must needs say that without pains and thought no 
man will ever understand the true nature of Vision, or comprehend what I have wrote concerning 
it." 
   - §70, The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained (1733). 
 
"But if we remove the veil and look underneath, if, laying aside the expressions, we set ourselves 
attentively to consider the things themselves which are supposed to be expressed or marked 
thereby, we shall discover much emptiness, darkness, and confusion; nay, if I mistake not, direct 
impossibilities and contradictions.   Whether this be the case or no, every thinking reader is 
intreated [sic] to examine and judge for himself." 
   - §8, The Analyst (1734) 
 
"I entreat my reader to think.  For, if he doth not, he may be under some influence from your 
confident and positive way of talking.  But any one who thinks may, if I mistake not, plainly 
perceive that you are deluded, as it often happens, by mistaking the terms for ideas." 
   - §48, A Defense of Free-Thinking in Mathematics (1735). 
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 Of course, it is not uncommon to find philosophers pleading with their readers to pay 
close attention and to think carefully when reading their works.  Berkeley's case, however, is 
somewhat unique; for, it may have been the very nature of this "delusion of words" that forced 
him to adopt a methodology that left so much up to his readers.   
 Thus, no reader should expect to find the "delusion of words" directly exposed in any of 
Berkeley's texts.  For, we can only expose this delusion ourselves, in our own minds.18  Given 
this, it should not be difficult to accept that, after the disastrous reception of the Introduction and 
Part I of his Treatise, and the failed attempt at a remedy that was his 1713 Dialogues Between 
Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley declined to "do so disagreeable a thing" as to completely redraft 
the lost manuscript to Part II because he believed that "for those that will not be at the pains of a 
little thought, no multiplication of words will ever suffice to make them understand the truth."  
(§134, An Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision).  We should also keep in mind that despite 
abandoning further work on the three-part Treatise, he did continue, in later publications, to 
explore and apply the same topics that he had put forward in his earliest works.   
 Therefore, we should not judge Berkeley too harshly for abandoning his Treatise and for 
his failure to adequately express the nature of this "delusion of words."  At the very least, we 
should withhold judgment until we are certain that the fault is not our own.   
 Now, before examining some of Berkeley's central arguments against Abstract Ideas and 
Material Substance, as well as some of the more common criticisms of these arguments, we need 
to clarify some terminology, as these terms will be used throughout the remainder of this 
dissertation. 
 
1.3 "IDEA," "SPIRIT," "MIND” AND "PERCEPTION" 
 
 Understanding Berkeley's use of the terms "idea", "mind", "spirit" and "perception" are 
essential to understanding Berkeley's writings; therefore, to avoid confusion in later chapters, I 
shall end this chapter by explaining Berkeley's use of each of these terms.  I shall start with 
"idea" but note that in explaining Berkeley's use of "idea" I will be forced to employ the word 
"perceive."  This cannot be helped, but all should become clear by the end of this section.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  Recall Notebook entry 696:   "I desire & warn [my reader] not to expect to find truth in my Book or any where 
but in his own Mind.  whatever I see my self tis impossible I can paint it out in words." 
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  To understand Berkeley's use of "idea," we may consider John Locke's use of "idea," 
since Berkeley's use represented a subtle but crucial revision of Locke's.  In Book II, Chapter 
VIII, §8, of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke defined an "idea" as 
"[w]hatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or 
understanding."  According to this definition, whatever anyone is actually aware of at any given 
moment shall be called an "idea."    
 Locke went on to divide this most general category into the two sub-categories of  "Ideas 
of Sensation" and "Ideas of Reflection," but before discussing these, we must first be aware that 
Locke specifically distinguished "the power to produce any idea in our mind" from the idea 
itself.19  Accordingly, "ideas" are to be treated as mere passive effects, as the end-result(s) of 
whatever causal power, force, or process, is ultimately responsible for producing them.  As such, 
an "idea" is a quantum of inert experiential data, which is to say that no idea has, in itself, any 
power to do anything at all.  Thus, whatever might be causing us to experience anything at any 
moment is left out of the word “idea.”  In short, the term “idea” only refers to what we 
experience, at any given moment, and not the why or how of it.               
 Berkeley had no apparent problem using "idea" to signify "whatsoever the mind 
perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding,"20 and he 
also treated ideas as being wholly inert and passive effects of some active power that produced 
them.21  In fact, it was because of these points of agreement that he found it necessary to reject, 
or at least drastically revise, Locke's division of ideas into the two sub-categories of "Ideas of 
Sensation" and "Ideas of Reflection."   
 To understand Berkeley's motivations here, we must briefly review these sub-categories, 
as described by Locke.  The "Idea of Sensation" category was meant to encompass whatever one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter 8, §8.   
20  See e.g., Notebook entry 427a:  "The Horse it self the Church it self is an Idea i:e object immediate object of 
thought"; and, entry 808:  "Idea is the object or Subject of thought; that I think on whatever it be, I call Idea."  See 
also Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, §45:  "Note that, when I speak of tangible ideas, I take the word idea 
for any the immediate object of sense, or understanding - in which large signification it is commonly used by the 
moderns." 
21  See e.g., §25 of Part I of the Principles:  "[W]hosoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflection, 
will not perceive in them any power or activity," and one line later:  "A little attention will discover to us that the 
very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do 
anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything."  See also Notebook entry 653:  "Folly to enquire what 
determines the Will.  Uneasiness etc are Ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing therefore cannot 
determine the Will." 
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may come to be aware of through one's various senses; so, whatever one actually hears, smells, 
sees, tastes, etc. at any given moment can be called "ideas of sensation."  The other category - 
"Ideas of reflection" - Locke described as follows: 
 
 [T]he other fountain, from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is 
the perception of the operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the 
ideas [of sensation] it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on, and 
consider, do furnish the understanding with another  set of ideas, which could not be had 
from things without; and such are, perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, 
knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being 
conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings, 
as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses.22   
 
 Thus, according to Locke's scheme, whatever one comes to be aware of through any kind 
of "introspection" shall be called an "idea of reflection."  Hence, one's awareness of the content 
of one's own thoughts, including any awareness of one's own modifications or regulations of 
volition, shall be classified as "ideas of reflection."  So, variations of light and color, sounds, 
smells, tastes, etc., shall be called "ideas of sensation," while memories, daydreams, 
imaginations, thoughts, concepts, and any awareness of one's own volition (or know-how), shall 
be classified as "ideas of reflection."     
 From Locke's very general use of "idea" this all seems to follow as a matter of course.  If 
"idea" refers to whatever I may think on or be aware of at any given moment, then certainly my 
own actions, my own thoughts, etc. count as "ideas" just as much as any ache, pain, color, or 
sound.  For, I am certainly aware of myself doing things, whether I am moving some part of my 
body, or recalling the events of last week, or imagining something, or trying to solve a math 
problem.  And, my awareness of actually doing these things, and/or my awareness of how to do 
these things, is at least as clear and distinct as my awareness of whatever is thereby done.  For 
example, if I move a finger, I am distinctly aware of some active power or effort on my part; 
what I would call my "willing" or my "volition."  I am also aware that this active power/effort on 
my part bears a special relation to the pattern of visual and kinesthetic sensations that I perceive 
and describe as "my finger moving", and I would describe this special relation by saying that I  
“willed” my finger to move.          
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter I, §4. 
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 According to Locke's classification scheme, the actual look and feel of my moving finger 
would be classified as "ideas of sensation" since I become aware of these experiences through 
my visual, kinesthetic and tactile senses.  However, my awareness that I am doing something, 
my awareness of my own volition, of myself as active, is not acquired through any of my various 
senses.  Instead, I am simply aware, "immediately aware," we might say, that I am doing 
(something).   
 Since, however, there are many occasions when I act without engaging in any 
introspective reflection at all, we might prefer to say that I am "reflectively" (rather than 
"immediately") aware of my own volition.  Indeed, with regard to ideas of reflection generally, 
Locke wrote that people only come to be "furnished with" ideas of reflection "according as they 
more or less reflect on them."23  That is, "unless he turn his thoughts that way, and consider them 
attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all 
that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the 
parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts 
of it." (emphasis in original).  Now, we have already seen, from B2, C1, S4 (quoted above), that 
Locke included one's awareness of "willing" under the general sub-category of "Ideas of 
Reflection."  Thus, we become aware of our own active volition by attentively reflecting upon 
particular acts of volition, thereby perceiving that "operation of mind" we generally call 
"willing."  As a result of such reflective attention, we acquire ideas of reflection of our own 
active volition.24    
 According to Berkeley's revision of Locke’s scheme, the proper distinction to be drawn is 
not between Ideas of Sensation and Ideas of Reflection, with any awareness of one’s own active 
volition falling under the latter category; but, instead, between (1) an awareness of one’s own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter I, §7. 
24  Two problems immediately stand out from this account.  First, to say we acquire "ideas" of our own active 
volition by "perceiving" it (through an act of reflection) would seem to require that the thing we perceive (our active 
volition) actually be there to be perceived.  This would mean, however, that we can only have ideas of our own 
active volitions if we reflect upon our volition while we actually do (something).  That is, you could not reflect upon 
what you did yesterday and, thereby, acquire an idea of your own active volition (since all you would have to reflect 
upon would be relatively passive and inert "ideas of memory" of what you did yesterday).  Second, if we must 
engage in an act of reflection in order to acquire any idea (of reflection) of the operations of our own minds, it 
follows that we cannot have any "idea" of the act of reflection itself, unless we reflect upon that act of reflection by 
engaging in a second act of reflection so as to acquire an idea of that operation of mind we are calling "reflection."  
But, then, of course, this second act of reflection would require another act of reflection, and so on, ad infinitum.  
Accordingly, to acquire an idea of myself doing X, I must:  (1) actually be doing X; and, (2) if X is that operation of 
mind we call "reflecting" then I must engage in an infinite series of reflections - or, rather, I simply cannot have any 
"idea" of that operation of mind we call "reflecting."                 
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active volition or "active being," and (2) an awareness of anything and everything else.  For 
Berkeley, then, the proper distinction is not between Ideas of Reflection and Ideas of Sensation, 
but between Active Volition and Passive Ideas.    
 Therefore, Berkeley used "idea" to refer to immediately experienced sense data (which he 
calls "Ideas of Sense" generally, or more specifically, "visual ideas", "tactile ideas", "auditory 
ideas", etc.), and whatever one may become aware of through imagination and memory ("Ideas 
of imagination and memory").  This latter category can include ideas of reflection since Berkeley 
was not completely opposed to that class of ideas; his complaint was only that active volition is 
not to be included in that class of ideas, since, according to Berkeley, we can have no ideas 
whatsoever of active volition.   
 For the remainder of this dissertation, then, please be wary of confusing Berkeley's very 
technical use of "idea" with the many ways in which this word is used in common speech today, 
e.g., "I have an idea of what you mean" or "I have no idea where my keys are" or "I have an idea 
for how we might sell this house" or "do you have any idea how much that cost?" or just simply, 
"I just had an idea!"  None of these expressions accords with Berkeley's use of "idea."  For 
Berkeley, "ideas of sense" are mere fleeting sensations; a pattern of light, a noise, a feeling of 
cold wind on your face, the smell of coffee, etc.  As Berkeley wrote, at §26 of Part I of the 
Principles:  "We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are 
changed or totally disappear."  Moreover, "[w]hen in broad day-light I open my eyes, it is not in 
my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall 
present themselves to my view."  (§29, Part I).  Thus, ideas of sense are continuously 
experienced (as long as one is conscious or aware), and are independent of our own volition, i.e., 
we have no direct control over the stream of sense-data that assaults us whenever we are 
conscious.         
 Now, the reason Berkeley refused to allow that we know of our own active volition, or 
willing, as ideas of reflection was his insistence that our awareness of our own active volition is, 
as Berkeley said, "toto coelo different" from our awareness of anything else.  As Berkeley wrote, 
at entry 643 of his Notebooks: 
 
 The grand Cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we Imagine it to 
be an object of thought (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, 
contemplate & view it like any of our Ideas whereas in truth 'tis no idea.  Nor is there any 
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Idea of it.  tis toto coelo different from the Understanding i.e. from all our Ideas.  If you 
say the will or rather a Volition is something I answer there is an Homonymy in the word 
thing when apply'd to Ideas & volitions & understanding & will. all ideas are passive, 
volitions active.   
 
 To clarify this "toto coelo difference," we could start by distinguishing any sensory 
"feedback" that might attend an act of volition from the exercise of volition itself.  For example, 
imagine that your hand is temporarily paralyzed; you try to move a finger, and nothing happens.  
Suppose now that a person, observing you sitting motionless, asks, "what are you doing?"  And, 
you reply, "I'm trying to move my finger."  Now, compare this to a case where your hand is not 
paralyzed:  you try to move a finger, and it moves just as you expected it to move.  An observer 
asks, "What are you doing?"  You reply, "I'm moving my finger…" You then direct the 
observer's attention to your moving finger, saying, "look here!  This is what I'm doing."                         
 In both cases, you would be clearly and distinctly aware of your own active "trying."  In 
fact, the difference between these two cases lies entirely in the presence or absence of sensory 
feedback that can be correlated with your efforts.  For, if you did not know that your hand was 
paralyzed, you would set out to move your finger (i.e., regulate your volition) according to the 
expectation that your finger would move as a result.  Only upon becoming aware of a lack of 
movement in your finger(s) would you modify the description of what you were doing from 
"moving a finger" to merely "trying" to move a finger.25  Thus, even when your hand is 
paralyzed, as far as your volition is concerned (so to speak), you would still be "moving your 
finger."  That is, you would be exercising your volition in the same 'way', whether your finger 
moved or not.   
 At a more general level, consider what it takes to become aware of your own active 
volition, as compared to becoming aware of any "ideas."  To become aware of some idea of 
sense, it need only happen that you become aware of it.  In other words, it is out of our control; 
we are assaulted with a constant barrage of ideas of sense, as long as we are conscious.  For, 
even sitting still in a dark and silent room, one still breathes, one's heart still beats, one still 
receives kinesthetic sensations from the position of one's body, etc., and normally, of course, we 
do not sit in silent, dark rooms.  By comparison, to become immediately aware of your own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  Berkeley expressed this as a difference between "power" and "volition" rather than between "doing" and "trying."  
In Notebook entry 699, for example, Berkeley wrote:  "There is a difference betwixt Power & Volition.  There may 
be volition without Power.  But there can be no Power without Volition.  Power implyeth volition & at the same 
time a Connotation of the Effect's following the Volition." 
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active volition, you must actively modify or regulate or exercise your volition.26  Hence, we 
become aware of our own volition or "active being" only by being active, and for Berkeley, as 
long as we are conscious, we are active.  For, even when we might describe ourselves as "doing 
nothing" we are still active, i.e., remaining still is a form of action.  As Berkeley stated in 
Notebook entry 791:  "my acquiescing in the present State is willing.”  So, for Berkeley, a living, 
conscious human being is continually active (in some way or another), and also continually 
assaulted (so to speak) with ideas of sense (again, in some form or another).  As Berkeley 
recorded in Notebook entry 673:  "The Existence of active things is to act; of inactive to be 
perceiv'd."27      
 The general term Berkeley employed to describe one's volition or "active being" was 
"spirit," and he described this most directly in the following Notebook entries: 
              
828 The Will is purus actus or rather pure Spirit not imaginable, not sensible, not 
 intelligible, in no wise the object of the Understanding, no wise perceivable.  
 
829 Substance of a Spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid 
 the quibble that may be made on the word it) to act, cause, will, operate it's [sic] 
 substance is not knowable not being an Idea.   
   
 Note the care that Berkeley took in entry 829; he was uncomfortable with even using the 
word "it" to refer to "spirit."  The fear here is that we will slide into the mistake of treating 
volition as some sort of passive 'object' or inert 'thing' to be viewed or examined "at arm's 
length,” i.e., as an idea.  In fact, however, volition is what does any viewing or examining, or 
rather it is whatever we mean by "viewing" or "examining."  It is "purus actus," as Berkeley 
says, and as such, you cannot "view" it, you can only do it, or rather, be it.28   
 When Berkeley describes "spirit" as being "not knowable," we must not read this as 
implying that volition is in any way occult, mysterious, or ineffable.  Instead, the point is simply 
that one's awareness of one's own active volition is a fundamentally different kind of awareness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The terminology here is difficult.  See infra. n. 28. 
27 The latter part of this statement is synonymous with Berkeley's (in)famous esse est percipi principle, which I shall 
discuss in Chapter II. 
28  Note that saying you could “become” your own active volition is itself a misleading expression.  For, to say you 
could “become” your own active volition implies a possible state wherein you are not your own active volition.  
According to Berkeley’s approach, volition, being “purus actus,” is never dormant; the existence of volition is 
synonymous with its activity.  See e.g., Notebook entry 673:  "The Existence of active things is to act, of inactive to 
be perceiv'd."  Moreover, according to Berkeley, the ‘self’ just is this active volition; thus, you cannot, strictly 
speaking, “become” your own active volition; instead, you simply are your own active volition.  As Berkeley 
recorded in Notebook entry 499a:  "it should be said nothing but a Will, a being wch wills being unintelligible."   
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than that of ideas.  For Berkeley, "language & knowledge are all about ideas"29 so it would 
constitute an abuse of language to say that we could "know" that which is toto coelo different 
from any idea.  In fact, so adamant was Berkeley about the toto coelo difference between our 
awareness of our own volition and our awareness of any ideas that he wrote, in §142 of Part I of 
the Principles, "[s]pirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say 'they exist,' 
'they are known,' or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to 
both natures."  Thus, Berkeley wrote, at §139 of Part I of the Principles, “[I]t is therefore 
necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and 
unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea.”   
 In fact, spirit and idea are so “perfectly disagreeing and unlike” one another that it may 
be misleading to say even that one is “aware of” one’s own volition.  For, this way of speaking 
might imply that spirit, which is purus actus, could be, if only grammatically and entirely for the 
sake of discussion, a relatively inert and static object of awareness, i.e., that spirit could be (like) 
an idea.  Therefore, instead of saying that one is “aware of” one’s own volition, or that one 
“perceives” or even “knows” one’s own volition, Berkeley chose to say that one just “is” one’s 
own active volition.  As Berkeley explained in §2 of the Principles: 
 
 But, beside all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise 
something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, 
imagining, remembering, about them.  This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, 
spirit, soul, or myself.  By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing 
entirely distinct from them.30 
 
“What I am myself – that which I denote by the term I,” he later explained, in §139 of the 
Principles, “is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance.”  He went on to 
explain that “[i]n a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea [or rather a notion] of 
spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny 
anything of it.”  (§140, Principles, emphasis and brackets in original).  The bracketed text in this 
passage, in which Berkeley referred to having a “notion” of spirit, was added in the second 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Notebook entry 312. 
30  See also Notebook entry 362a:  “Qu:  whether I had not better allow Colours to exist without the Mind taking the 
Mind for the Active thing which I call I, my self.”  See also Alciphron VII, §8:  “I understand what is signified by 
the term I, or myself, or know what it means, although it be no idea, or like an idea, but that which thinks, and wills, 
and apprehends ideas, and operates about them.”  (stated by Euphranor).  
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edition of the Principles.  The following was also added in the second edition, by way of further 
explanation, at §142:   
 
 We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea of an active being, or of an action, 
although we may be said to have a notion of them.  I have some knowledge or notion of 
my mind, and its acts about ideas – inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by 
these words.  What I know, that I have some notion  of.  [emphasis in original] 
             
 Here we see Berkeley wrestling with language; on the one hand, it would be an abuse of 
language to say we "know" our own active volition (since "knowledge is all about ideas"), but on 
the other hand, it would be foolish to deny that we know nothing of our own actions, our own 
active selves.  To cut through this, Berkeley suggested using the word "notion" instead of "idea" 
when referring to our awareness of our own active selves.31  It should be clear, however, that 
Berkeley was not attempting to introduce “notion” as denoting some discrete object of 
awareness, i.e., as being some newly identified category of “idea.”  It would defy all that has 
been advanced thus far to say that one perceives “notions” of one’s own active self, just as one 
perceives “ideas” of sense, or even that one is "aware of" volition as one might be aware of ideas 
of memory and imagination.  Instead, as Berkeley indicated in the above-cited passages, we 
simply are our active selves, and as such, while it would be absurd to say we are entirely 
oblivious of ourselves as active beings, Berkeley felt that it was dangerously misleading to say 
that we are “aware of” or that we "perceive" ourselves as active beings, inasmuch as this would 
imply a Subject-Object relationship and, thus, would threaten to convert spirit into a passive 
object of awareness and, thus, into an “idea.”  Consequently, when Berkeley wrote that “we may 
be said to have a notion” of our active selves, he could not have been attempting to name some 
reflective item, or object, of experience; for, that would be tantamount to saying we have "ideas" 
of our own active selves.32   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Margaret Atherton, "The Coherence of Berkeley's Theory of Mind", Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research Vol. 43, No. 3 (March 1983), 389-399, p. 396:  "'Notion' is not a word invented to get him out of 
difficulties in talking about minds.  He suggests the use of the term, 'notion' because he thinks people have been 
misled by the word 'idea' into drawing some unacceptable conclusions."  
32  But see, Daniel E. Flage, "Berkeley's Notions", Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 45, No. 3 
(Mar. 1985), pp. 407-425.  Flage attempts to use Thomas Reid's use of "direct" and "relative" conception to give 
content to what he calls Berkeley's "doctrine of notions."  He interprets Berkeley as having held that we only know 
our own mind by a relative notion (similar to Reid's relative conception), as 'that which thinks, wills, and perceives.'  
While Flage makes an interesting case and is aware of Berkeley's insistence that we know of our active selves 
immediately and without the need for any "ideas" of our active selves, he reads too much into Berkeley's suggested 
use of "notion."  The passages I have cited represent all that Berkeley had to say regarding this particular use of 
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 Finally, we may address "perceive" and "mind."  In his Notebooks, Berkeley wrote:  
"Whatsoever has any of our ideas in it must perceive, it being that very having, that passive 
reception of ideas that denominates the mind perceiving.  that being the very essence of 
perception, or that wherein perception consists."  We may also consider Notebook entry 582:  
"The having Ideas is not the same thing with Perception. a Man may have Ideas when he only 
Imagines. But – then this Imagination presupposeth Perception."  These entries tell us that 
Berkeley uses "perceive" synonymously with the passive reception or 'having' of ideas (of 
sense).  Entry 582 makes it clear that "perceive" does not apply to ideas of imagination 
(presumably, the better term here would be "imagine" rather than "perceive"), and the reference 
to "passive reception" in entry 301 reinforces this, since we do seem to have some control over 
what we imagine, whereas we have no control over what ideas of sense we may experience at 
any time.33  While Berkeley may at times use "perceive" in a wider sense, to refer to one's 
awareness of ideas of imagination and memory, the key point is that "perceive" is used to 
indicate our awareness of "ideas."             
 Finally, there is "mind."  Berkeley tends to use this term a bit haphazardly, but it is 
generally synonymous with "spirit" or "self."  Recall Notebook entry 362a:  "Qu:  whether I had 
not better allow Colours to exist without the Mind taking the Mind for the Active thing which I 
call I, my self.”  Recall also §2 of Part I of the Principles:  "[t]his perceiving, active being is 
what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself."  However, there does seem to be a subtle distinction in 
how Berkeley uses "mind" and "spirit."  Berkeley tends to use "mind" when discussing the 
passive 'having' or perception of ideas; and, he tends to use "spirit" when discussing active 
volition.   
 There is one final point about "mind" that we must appreciate, and this point is made by 
Philonous in the Third Dialogue:  “when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, or imprinted 
on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense – as when bodies are said to 
exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax.  My meaning is only that the mind 
comprehends or perceives them.”  (Fraser, V. I., p. 346).  Thus, "mind" is not some metaphysical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
"notion."  Thus, it seems very unlikely that Berkeley was proposing anything like a "doctrine of notions."  In fact, 
pluralizing this term, speaking of "notions", seems to unavoidably convert 'them' back into "ideas."  Thus, Flage's 
argument threatens to contradict Berkeley's insistence on the toto coelo difference between our awareness of active 
volition and passive idea.   
33 See also Notebook entry 286:  "Thoughts do most properly signify or are mostly taken for the interior operations 
of the mind, wherein the mind is active, those [that] obey not the acts of Volition, & in [which] the mind is passive 
are more properly call'd sensations or perceptions."   
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'space' for Berkeley, nor is it a 'container' of ideas, etc.  It is merely a word, and it is used to 
indicate the having of (or perception/awareness of) ideas.  Moreover, when Berkeley speaks of 
things "existing in the mind" or "existing without the mind" he is merely referring to the 
perception or awareness of things, in the former case, and things existing unperceived (or "in and 
of themselves" we might say) in the latter case.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
ABSTRACT IDEAS AND MATERIAL SUBSTANCE 
 
 
 While there are many arguments on various topics to be found in Berkeley's published 
works, the two issues which have received the most attention from philosophers are: (1) 
Berkeley's rejection of Abstract Ideas; and, (2) Berkeley's rejection of Material Substance, which 
is commonly referred to as Berkeley's "immaterialism."   
 These two issues were first addressed by Berkeley in the Introduction and Part I of his 
1710 Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.  However, as also stated above, 
this was not Berkeley's first major publication.  In fact, his 1709 Essay on vision was his first 
major work, and the precise relation between these two publications has been a subject of some 
debate amongst Berkeley scholars.34   
 This debate revolves around the questions of which work had greater influence on the 
other (since it is an open question which publication was drafted before the other), and whether 
or not Berkeley, when drafting the 1709 Essay on vision, had fully embraced the immaterialism 
that he would argue for in Part I of the Principles.  The main reason for this debate is that 
Berkeley treated tangible bodies as existing independent of perception in the 1709 Essay on 
vision, but then treated all sensations (whether visual or tactile) as existing "only in the mind" in 
the 1710 Part I of the Principles.  So, the issue that has been debated is whether Berkeley was 
only a partial idealist when he drafted the 1709 Essay on vision.  While there are legitimate 
historical reasons for engaging in this debate, Berkeley explained why he treated tangible bodies 
as existing independent of perception in his earlier work, in §44 of Part I of the Principles:   
 
 That the proper objects of sight neither exist without the mind, nor are the images of 
external things, was shewn even in that treatise [i.e., in the 1709 Essay on vision].  
Though throughout the same, the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects:  not that 
to suppose that vulgar error, was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down; 
but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning 
vision.  [Berkeley's emphasis].35 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See e.g., Thomas M. Lennon, "The Historical Consistency of Berkeley's Idealism", British Journal for the History 
of Philosophy, 16(1), 2008, pp. 101-124.  See also C.M. Turbayne, "The Influence of Berkeley's Science on His 
Metaphysics", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, V.16, No. 4 (June 1956), pp. 476-487. 
35 Since the debate concerning the precise relationship between the 1709 Essay and the 1710 Introduction & Part I of 
the Principles is not terribly relevant to this dissertation, Berkeley's stated explanation will have to suffice. 
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 In Chapter III, I will explore in detail the New Theory of Vision put forward in 
Berkeley's 1709 Essay, but in this chapter, I wish to focus only on Berkeley's arguments against 
Abstract Ideas, and also to introduce two of the more notorious arguments Berkeley made 
relative to Material Substance.  I shall also examine some common criticisms that have been 
made regarding each of these arguments.      
 
2.1 ABSTRACT IDEAS 
 
 The Introduction to the Principles is a relatively short tract, and it is devoted almost 
entirely to denouncing "the opinion that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas." (§6, 
Introduction, emphasis in original).  Berkeley attacked this opinion because he believed it to be 
false, but more importantly because, as he observed, abstract ideas were "thought to be the object 
of those sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, and of all that which passes 
under the notion of the most abstract and sublime learning, in all which one shall scarce find any 
question handled in such a manner, as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is 
well acquainted with them."  (§6).  Thus, if there are no such things as abstract ideas, these 
sciences may be in desperate need of re-examination.  As Berkeley wrote, in an unpublished first 
Draft of the Introduction, "those parts of learning must of necessity be overrun with very much 
useless wrangling & jargon, innumerable absurdities & contradictions, if so be that abstract 
general ideas are perfectly inconceivable."36 
 Berkeley presented two primary arguments against this "opinion."  As a prefatory matter, 
however, it must be understood that there existed no 'official' doctrine of abstract ideas; indeed, a 
great many philosophers before Berkeley had written of "abstract ideas."  As Berkeley was an 
ardent fan of John Locke, he chose Locke's descriptions of abstract ideas as his target, since he 
held Locke to be the "ablest patron" of that doctrine.37    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Luce & Jessop, Works, V. 2, p. 123.  In the Draft Introduction, Berkeley also wrote that the doctrine of abstract 
ideas  was not "confined to" the sciences of logic and metaphysics, but that "[t]he contagion thereof has spread 
throughout all the parts of philosophy.  It has invaded and overrun those usefull studys of physic and divinity, and 
even the mathematicians themselves have had their full share of it."  (ibid, p. 133). 
37 Though Berkeley frequently used Locke as a target for various arguments, Berkeley seemed to idolize Locke.  For 
the truth of this, one need only consult Berkeley's notebooks, which are replete with glowing praise for Locke's 
writings, even when claiming that Locke had made mistakes.  Consider, for example, Notebook entry 567:  
“Wonderful in Locke that he could when advanc’d in years see at all thro a mist that had been so long a gathering & 
was consequently thick.  This more to be admir’d than that he didn’t see farther.”  We may also consider Notebook 
entry 688, regarding those philosophers who had come before Berkeley:  “They give good rules tho perhaps they 
themselves do not always observe them. they speak much of clear & distinct Ideas. tho at the same they talk of 
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 Before examining Berkeley's arguments, we must acquaint ourselves with the doctrine 
Berkeley was attacking.  To understand the doctrine of Abstract Ideas, we may start with any 
day-to-day object, e.g., an eight-ball (billiard ball) rolling across the green felt of a pool table.  
Now, there are many properties or qualities that can be predicated of this billiard ball.  For 
example, it is in motion, it is spherical, it is black, it is extended (i.e., takes up space), etc.  
According to Berkeley's understanding of the doctrine of abstract ideas, there are three types of 
so-called "abstract idea."  Note that apart from citing Locke's description of an abstract idea, 
which I shall discuss in a moment, Berkeley merely prefaces his discussion of these putative 
types of abstract idea with "[i]t is agreed on all hands..."  Thus, one could argue that even if 
Berkeley was successful against his described target, there may be legitimate theories of abstract 
ideas that Berkeley missed.     
 In any case, in §7 of the Introduction, Berkeley explained the first type of supposed 
abstraction:  "...we are told, the mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted 
from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to it self abstract 
ideas."  So, for example, one could form an idea of the blackness of the billiard ball, or of its 
motion, or its shape, or its extension, etc.  The key point is that this type of abstract idea would 
be an idea of a single quality of some particular object, and nothing else.  So, it may be an idea of 
the blackness of the eight-ball, but not of its motion or its extension or its shape, etc.  Or, it may 
be an idea of the motion of the eight-ball, but would not include its shape, extension, or color.  
Remember that "idea" (as used by Berkeley and Locke and which was, according to Berkeley, 
the prevailing use38) refers to whatever one is immediately and actually aware of, so this doctrine 
entails that one can become aware of the color of some object, but that this awareness will be of 
a color with no shape and that occupies no space (no extension).  So, it would not be an 
awareness of a "patch" or even a "blob" of black, but just an immediate awareness (i.e., an 
"idea") of the specific blackness of the target object, the eight-ball in this case, and nothing else.   
 In §8, Berkeley described the second type of abstract idea:  "...the mind by leaving out of 
the particular colours perceived by sense, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
General, abstract ideas etc I’ll instance in Lockes opinion of abstraction he being as clear a writer as I have met with.  
Such was the Candour of this great Man that I perswade [sic] my Self were he alive. he would not be offended that I 
differ from him seeing that even in so doing. I follow his advice viz. to use my own Judgment, see with my own 
eyes & not with anothers.”   
38 See e.g., An Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision §45:   "I take the word idea for any the immediate object of 
sense, or understanding - in which large signification it is commonly used by the moderns."  
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an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate 
colour."  So, where the first type of abstract idea isolates some quality of an object, the second 
type generalizes that quality.  Accordingly, we should be able to frame an idea of color that is not 
the specific blackness of the eight-ball, but just an awareness of color, in general.  Note that this 
would not be awareness of any particular color, but just an awareness (i.e., an "idea") of color.  
Or, again, one could – according to this type of abstraction – form an awareness of just generic 
motion without any determinate shape or extension, or generic extension without any 
determinate shape or color, or generic shape without any determinate color or extension, etc. 
 In §9, Berkeley described the third type of abstract idea:  "...as the mind frames to it self 
abstract ideas of qualities or modes [i.e., the second type of abstract idea], so does it, by the same 
precision or mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings, which 
include several coexistent qualities."  In this case, then, we would frame an idea of a rolling 
eight-ball, but it would not be an idea of the particular eight-ball that we started with, but an idea 
of any eight-ball, or just an idea of rolling billiard balls in general.     
 As stated above, any object will do.  So, for example, we could start with an actual 
human male.  According to the doctrine of abstract ideas, as Berkeley understood it, we could 
frame an idea that is only of that man's height, or stature, or hair-color, etc.  This would be an 
abstract idea of the first type.  From there, we can frame an idea of height in general, or stature in 
general, or hair-color in general, which would be abstract ideas of the second type.  Finally, we 
can frame an idea of just man, or humanity, in general.  I say "in general" because, according to 
the doctrine of abstract ideas, the idea framed cannot be identical with any particular object, else 
it would no longer be an "abstract" idea.  I shall return to this point later on.  For now, consider 
Berkeley's account of this third type of abstract idea, specifically of man or humanity:  "...after 
this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of man or, if you please, humanity or human 
nature; wherein it is true, there is included colour, because there is no man but has some colour, 
but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular colour; because there is no one 
particular colour wherein all men partake.  So likewise there is included stature, but then it is 
neither tall stature nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from all 
these."  (§8).  According to the doctrine of abstract ideas, we need not stop with the abstract idea 
of man, but can abstract even further, e.g., to the abstract idea of animal "which abstracts not 
only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects."  Eventually, I 
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suppose, we would hit some most general limit, perhaps with the abstract idea of thing, or just 
existence in general, which would presumably be an awareness of anything and everything, but 
not of any particular thing.             
 Now, the first point that Berkeley makes against this doctrine is exceedingly simple, and 
it follows directly after Berkeley's description of the abstract idea of man.  Berkeley states, in 
§10:  "[w]hether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell:  
for my self I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to my self the ideas of 
those particular things I have perceived and of variously compounding and dividing them. . . 
[but] I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea [of man] above described."  
Berkeley admitted in §10 that he could "abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular 
parts or qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in some object, yet, it 
is possible they may really exist without them."  I take Berkeley to be saying, here, that he can 
imagine or conceive of, e.g., the roof of a house and only the roof, or only a person's arm, or just 
the trunk of an elephant, or a patch or blob of red or some other color, because these things could 
actually be experienced, by themselves; so, it should be a relatively simple task to imagine or 
frame ideas such things.    
 However, we must recognize that Berkeley was not, in §10, making a logical argument 
from premises to conclusion.  He was simply reporting what he found himself capable of doing, 
and he found that he was incapable of forming any ideas of the three types described in §§7-9 of 
the Introduction to the Principles.  Curiously, after making this report, he immediately moved on 
to "examine what can be alleged in defence [sic] of the doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can 
discover what it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion, so far remote from 
common sense as that seems to be." (§11).  So, after reporting his own inability to frame any 
such ideas, Berkeley seemed to be finished; it would seem that he felt he had demonstrated the 
impossibility of abstract ideas.  Of course, the term "impossibility" is vague here, since one could 
interpret this to mean either "psychological impossibility" or "logical impossibility."  Berkeley's 
own inability to frame any such ideas would be relevant to the question of the psychological 
possibility of framing such ideas, but it would be irrelevant to the question of the logical 
possibility of such ideas.  I shall return to this point in a moment. 
 Meanwhile, it should be noted that toward the close of Berkeley's 1709 Essay Toward a 
New Theory of Vision, Berkeley did present an actual argument against abstract ideas, but that 
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argument was directed specifically at Locke's own descriptions of abstract ideas.  So, in §125 of 
the 1709 Essay, Berkeley explained that if anyone could make clear the nature of abstract ideas it 
would be John Locke, the “deservedly admired author of the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding.”  Berkeley then cited Locke’s description of the abstract idea of a triangle which, 
according to Locke, “must be. . . neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor 
scalenum; but all and none of these at once.”  “In effect,” Locke explained, “it is somewhat 
imperfect that cannot exist; an idea, wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent 
ideas are put together.”39  After citing these passages, Berkeley then referenced another passage 
from Locke’s Essay:  “ideas of mixed modes wherein any inconsistent ideas are put together, 
cannot so much as exist in the mind, i.e., be conceived.”40  Had Locke considered these passages 
together, Berkeley argued, “he would have owned it above all the pains and skill he was master 
of, to form the above-mentioned idea of a triangle, which is made up of manifest staring 
contradictions.”  Based on Berkeley's Notebook entry 687, it seems that Berkeley placed a great 
deal of stock in this argument:  "Mem: to bring the killing blow at the last v.g. in the matter of 
Abstraction to bring Lockes general triangle at the last."       
 In §13 of the Introduction to the Principles, Berkeley cited the same tract from Locke's 
Essay, and then asked:  "What more easy that for any one to look a little into his own thoughts, 
and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the 
description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle, which is, neither oblique, nor 
rectangle, equilateral, equicural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once?"  (emphasis in 
original).  Many philosophers (especially Locke scholars) have argued that Berkeley 
misunderstood Locke's overall position regarding abstract ideas and abstraction.41  Therefore, if 
the only argument Berkeley could bring to the table was essentially an ad hominum directed at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Ch. 7, §9, cited by Berkeley in §125 of the 1709 Essay 
Toward a New Theory of Vision, my emphasis. 
40 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Ch. 10, §33, cited in §125 of the Essay on vision, my 
emphasis. 
41 See e.g., George Pitcher, Berkeley (Routledge & Kegan Paul, Boston:  1977), p. 66-67; Kenneth Winkler, 
Berkeley, an Interpretation, (Clarendon Press, Oxford:  1989), pp. 37-43; Ian Tipton, Berkeley, The Philosophy of 
Immaterialism, pp. 138-9; G.J.Warnock, Berkeley (Basil Blackwell, Oxford:  1982), p. 63:  "it has often been 
objected that the view which Berkeley attributes to Locke and demolishes is not, in fact, a view which Locke ever 
held."; Margaret Atherton, Berkeley's Revolution in Vision (Cornell University Press:  1990), p. 182:  "Berkeley's 
alleged argument against Locke has been treated with varying degrees of respect and is often said to misrepresent 
Locke's views."  
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Locke's perhaps unfortunate choice of words in that particular passage, then the accuracy of 
Berkeley's overall interpretation of Locke would be relevant.     
 However, Berkeley's attack on Locke's choice of words is not the only reason Berkeley 
offered for rejecting the doctrine of abstract ideas.  In fact, we should notice a shift in emphasis 
from §125 of the Essay on vision to §13 of the Introduction.  In §125 of the 1709 Essay, 
Berkeley points to an apparent contradiction in Locke's description, but in the Introduction to the 
Principles, Berkeley uses the same text from Locke to ask his readers to see for themselves 
whether or not they can conceive of the triangle so described.  So, the former is an argument 
based on the law of non-contradiction, while the latter is an appeal to what David Berman refers 
to as Berkeley's "subjective empiricism,"42 i.e., an appeal to the psychological possibility of 
framing the proposed idea.  Granted, the §13 appeal to subjective empiricism is still couched in 
Locke's choice of words, and so, in deference to Locke and Locke scholars, we can simply 
ignore that particular passage; for, Berkeley had still described the general process of abstraction 
by listing off the three supposed types of abstract idea, so he can still call for introspection on the 
part of his readers with regard to any of those putative ideas, without incurring any legitimate 
wrath of Locke scholars.     
 So, the issue becomes whether or not Berkeley must show the psychological 
impossibility of abstract ideas or whether he must establish the logical impossibility of such 
ideas; and, in either case, has Berkeley succeeded?  There are several philosophers who hold 
Berkeley to the higher standard of proving the logical impossibility of abstract ideas.  For 
example, Martha Brandt Bolton has argued:     
 
 Clearly, the fact that Berkeley, you or I try to frame an idea and fail does not prove the 
point, because future attempts may succeed and other minds may be better at forming 
ideas than we are.  Berkeley needs something better than the ‘try and fail’ test to establish 
the impossibility of an idea.43    
 
 Tipton has also expressed some dismay over the fact that “though Berkeley asserts that it 
is ‘impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the 
sensation or perception of it’, there is really nothing said to convince the doubter that this is true.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Berman, Berkeley (Routledge, New York: 1999), at p.10. 
43 Martha Brandt Bolton, “Berkeley’s Objection to Abstract Ideas”, in Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley, 
E. Sosa ed., (D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1987), p. 72.   
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Here again we feel the need for some argument.”44  We may also consider George Pappas’ 
summary dismissal of Berkeley’s appeal to subjective empiricism:  “The fact that Berkeley 
cannot acquire these abstract ideas, however, would hardly be a decisive or even especially 
forceful objection to them.”  Pappas goes on to claim that “it is no part of Berkeley’s case against 
abstract ideas to decry them based just on his own inability to frame them.”45  Similarly, E.J. 
Craig has observed and argued: 
 
  It should also be noted that his objections are put in empirical psychological terms, 
sometimes tinged with irony, as in: 'Whether others have this wonderful faculty of 
abstracting their ideas, they best can tell: for my self I find I have indeed a faculty of 
imagining, or representing to my self ...' [§ 10; original italics]. But they are always 
capable of translation into the logical mode as points about the a priori impossibility of 
there being images of certain kinds, and it will be more profitable for us to take them in 
this way.46 
 
Echoing this sentiment that Berkeley was being "ironic" when he referred to his own inability to 
frame abstract ideas, C.C.W Taylor has stated: 
 
 Berkeley does not of course distinguish between psychological and conceptual 
impossibility, but we are justified in interpreting him in terms of the latter, since despite 
the ironic opening of 10, "Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their 
ideas, they best can tell", Berkeley is clearly not prepared to accept that someone might, 
as a matter of empirical fact, turn out to be able to conceive abstract ideas of the 
objectionable sort.47 
 
 George Pitcher took Taylor's suggestion – that Berkeley would not accept the empirical 
possibility that someone may be able to conceive of an abstract idea – a step further when he 
argued: 
 
 One can take a first-hand survey of one's own mind, and then ask a few friends what sorts 
of ideas they find in theirs – but even if we obtained in this way a completely Berkleyan 
result, this would provide no answer at all to the abstract idea theorist when he confronts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Tipton, Berkeley, The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 157.  Tipton is speaking here of conceiving of an object 
existing without perception, and thus this statement was made in the context of analyzing Berkeley's arguments 
against Material Substance; nevertheless, the particular claim being analyzed is directly relevant to Berkeley's 
arguments against abstract ideas, since Tipton is discussing the possibility of framing an idea of something's 
existence, while leaving out of that idea the 'quality' of the object's being perceived.   
45 George Pappas, Berkeley's Thought (Cornell University Press, 2000),  p.49. 
46 E.J. Craig, "Berkeley's Attack on Abstract Ideas", The Philosophical Review, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Oct., 1968), pp. 425-
437, at p. 431. 
47 C.C.W. Taylor, "Berkeley's Theory of Abstract Ideas", The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 111 (Apr., 
1978), pp. 97-115, at p. 108. 
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us with the remark, 'Ah, but you see I do find abstract ideas in my mind.'  So more 
substantial backing is needed.48 
        
 I find Pitcher's reason for rejecting Berkeley's subjective empiricism a bit strange; for, if 
we are to simply claim something for the sake of claiming it, with no sincerity or seriousness, 
then Berkeley could have replied to such a remark by simply calling the abstract idea theorist a 
"liar", or perhaps more in keeping with Berkeley's approach, "deluded."  Moreover, one must 
wonder why Pitcher himself did not make such a claim, since that would have apparently 
represented such an easy 'killing blow' against Berkeley's position.   More to the point, though, 
Berkeley stated, in §13 of the Introduction:  “[i]f any man has the faculty of framing in his mind 
such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor 
would I go about it.  All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself 
whether he has such an idea or no.” (my emphasis).  So, Berkeley was expressly relying on his 
readers performing a candid survey of their own minds/ideas to see whether or not "the mind 
hath a power of framing abstract ideas." (§6).49  As Robert McKim has argued, since Berkeley's 
target was only to disabuse people of the "opinion that the mind hath a power of framing abstract 
ideas" (§6) Berkeley needed only to establish the psychological impossibility of any such 
ideas.50     
 Nevertheless, Monroe Beardsley took the rejection of Berkeley's subjective empiricism 
even further, when he argued:  
                  
 But even if we were to grant that he is right in holding that there are some ideas which 
are not abstractable, we would still have to enquire how we may know which ones are not 
abstractable.  The obvious reply to this is an appeal (which Berkeley often makes) to 
immediate experience; but since his whole purpose (that of removing ancient prejudices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  Pitcher, Berkeley, p. 73. 
49 Recall Berkeley's admonitions, discussed above in Chapter I, that we readers of Berkeley need to do some work 
on our own to understand his position(s).  For example, Notebook entry 696:  "I desire & warn [my reader] not to 
expect to find truth in my Book or any where but in his own Mind.  whatever I see my self tis impossible I can paint 
it out in words."  Recall also §134 of the 1709 Essay on vision:  "as for those that will not be at the pains of a little 
thought, no multiplication of words will ever suffice to make them understand the truth, or rightly conceive my 
meaning." 
50 See Robert McKim, "Wenz on Abstract Ideas and Christian Neo-Platonism in Berkeley", Journal of the History of 
Ideas, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1982), pp. 665-671, at p. 666.  To understand this we need only recognize that the 
opinion Berkeley was attacking was not that the mind could frame abstract ideas, but that it does frame abstract 
ideas.  
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about abstract ideas) presupposes that the common run of philosophers have 
misinterpreted their own experience, this appeal does not suffice.51 
 
In a footnote appended to this text, Beardsley went on to state that "Berkeley tacitly admits this, 
for example, when in writing to Samuel Johnson about the abstract idea of existence, he remarks, 
" I cannot find I have any such idea, and this is my reason against it."52  So, Beardsley is 
effectively arguing that because Berkeley claims to not be able to frame or find any abstract 
ideas in his own mind, but others seem to think they can (though, curiously, I have not read any 
scholar who addresses this, actually claim that to be the case), Berkeley's call to his readers to 
simply consult what passes in their own minds is somehow rendered inadmissible.  What is truly 
dangerous about Beardsley's approach is that it would also render inadmissible any claim 
Berkeley might have wanted to make to the effect that proponents of the doctrine of abstract 
ideas are actually suffering from some form of "delusion" in this regard.  I shall return to this 
question in Chapter III.   
 There are, of course, philosophers who have supported Berkeley's appeal to subjective 
empiricism.  For example, A. A. Luce summarized Berkeley's attack on abstract ideas as follows:  
"I have tried to frame an abstract idea after the Lockian pattern, and I cannot do so.  Can you?"53 
A little further on, Luce states:  "Try it for yourself, he says.  Try to frame this abstract idea of a 
triangle with all of these contradictory attributes and none of them.  It cannot be done.  That is 
his refutation of abstract ideas"54 and Luce held that such a refutation was a success.     
 Similarly, David Berman has argued that "Berkeley believes that language is so flawed 
that it cannot be relied upon, not even when it appears to be revealing a contradiction.  What can 
be trusted is experience, whether inner or outer.  So the only reliable test for determining whether 
an abstract idea of triangle, or any abstract idea, exists is to try to experience it by 
introspection."55    
 I must agree with Berman, McKim, and Luce on this issue, for the simple reason that the 
topic of debate concerns the existence or non-existence of a class of putative idea, and as has 
already been made plain, that term was used by Berkeley and his contemporaries to refer to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Monroe C. Beardsley, "Berkeley on 'Abstract Ideas', Mind, New Series, Vol. 52, No. 206 (Apr., 1943), pp. 157-
170, at p. 163. 
52 ibid. 
53 Luce, Berkeley's Immaterialism, p. 32.   
54 ibid, p. 33. 
55 Berman, Berkeley, (Routledge, 1999), p. 7. 
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something of which a person is immediately and actually aware.  Whatever else "idea" may 
mean, e.g., whether we can have ideas of active volition, etc., it most certainly was used by 
Berkeley and his contemporaries to refer to whatever is actually experienced, or whatever 
someone is actually aware of, at any given time.  Therefore, to ignore Berkeley's call to simple 
introspection with regard to this particular debate is truly bizarre. As Berkeley asks his reader, in 
§13 of the Introduction, "[w]hat more easy that for any one to look a little into his own 
thoughts...?" 
 Those authors who reject this approach are highly intelligent philosophers, and I do not 
mean to imply otherwise.  Indeed, since they reject this appeal to subjective empiricism, they 
each go on to set forth lengthy and complex arguments regarding the various putative types of 
abstract idea set forth in §§7-9 of Berkeley's Introduction to the Principles, in an effort to 
determine whether or not they are logically or conceptually inconsistent, and Berkeley does not 
fare very well in this regard.     
 As I shall argue in more detail in Chapter III, however, the source of the tension here may 
be due to an unnoticed category-mistake, what Berkeley called, the "grand mistake."  Consider, 
for example, Notebook entry 176a:  "[t]he grand Mistake is that we think we have Ideas of the 
Operations of our Minds."  Recall Berkeley's insistence, discussed in Chapter I, that our 
awareness of our own active selves is toto coelo different from our awareness of any idea.  
Recall also that Berkeley refused to hold that we know of the "Operations of our Minds" through 
ideas of reflection, or any ideas at all, for that matter.  Now, consider Notebook entry 660:  "[t]he 
referring Ideas to things which are not Ideas, the using the Term, Idea of, is one great cause of 
mistake, as in other matters so also in this."  The phrase "so also in this" refers to the issue of 
whether or not we have ideas of our own active volition or active selves, as the immediately 
preceding entries make clear:   
 
657  To ask have we an idea of the Will or volition is nonsense.  an idea can resemble 
 nothing but an idea. 
 
658 If you ask what thing it is that wills. I answer if you mean Idea by the Word thing  or any 
 thing like any Idea, then I say tis no thing at all that wills'.  This how extravagant soever 
 it may seem yet is a certain truth. we are cheated by these general terms, thing, is etc. 
 
 Notebook entry 176a was not the only place Berkeley referred to this "grand mistake."  
We may also consider Notebook entry 806, in which Berkeley identified Hobbes as making this 
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same grand mistake:  "The not distinguishing twixt Will & ideas is a Grand Mistake with Hobbs 
[sic].  He takes those things for nothing which are not Ideas."  We may also consider entry 847:  
"But the Grand Mistake is that we know not what we mean by we our selves, our mind etc. this 
most sure & certain that our Ideas are distinct from the Mind i.e. the Will, the Spirit."  Finally,   
we may consider the following from the Draft Introduction: 
 
 But there are some parts of learning which contain the knowledge of things the most 
noble and important of any within the reach of human reason, that have been so signally 
perplex'd and darken'd, by the abuse of words and general ways of speech, wherein they 
are deliver'd; that in the study thereof a man cannot be too much upon his guard, either in 
his private meditations, or in reading the writings, or hearing the discourses, of other 
men, to prevent his being cheated by the glibness and familiarity of speech into a belief 
that those words stand for ideas, which, in truth, stand for none at all.  Which grand 
mistake, it is almost incredible, what a mist and a darkness it has cast over the 
understandings of men, otherwise the most rational and clear-sighted.56 
  
 The problem with this intriguing line of reasoning is that Berkeley failed to develop it.   
As stated at the outset of this dissertation, I shall attempt my own development of this line of 
reasoning in Chapter III and, once that is complete, I shall re-address this debate regarding 
Berkeley's appeal to introspection to show the impossibility of abstract ideas.  For now, it is 
enough to be acquainted with the central issues in this debate over abstract ideas. 
 Another issue that must be addressed in relation to abstract ideas is Pitcher's argument 
regarding what he calls "purely intellectual, non-sensuous ideas."57  Pitcher argues that 
Berkeley's attack on abstract ideas suffers from Berkeley's over-reliance on treating ideas as 
"mental images."  Pitcher claims that "Berkeley's argument [against abstract ideas] does, after 
all, rest on the assumption that all ideas are images"58 and because of this, Berkeley misses the 
point about abstract ideas, which are actually, according to Pitcher, "non-imagistic" or "purely 
intellectual, non-sensuous ideas."  Pitcher does not go on to explain what he means exactly, by 
"purely intellectual, non-sensuous idea", but it is curious Pitcher would take this position since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Luce & Jessop, Works, pp. 141-142.  My emphasis.  Recall also Berkeley's own confessions, cited above in 
Chapter I, to once having adhered to the doctrine of abstract ideas and, thus, presumed that he himself had the power 
of framing abstract ideas:  "For there was a time when, being banter’d and abus’d by words, I did not in the least 
doubt my having it" (Fraser, Works, Vol. 1, p.412); and, "Tho’ being accustom’d to those forms of speech, I once 
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57 Pitcher, Berkeley, p. 67. 
58 ibid, p. 70. 
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Berkeley himself addressed this issue, at least in passing, in the Dialogues Between Hylas and 
Philonous (1713), and again in Alciphron (1732), and a comparison of the differing treatment 
given to this issue in either dialogue will shed some light on Berkeley's position regarding the 
proper test for the existence of abstract ideas.  First, in the Dialogues Between Hylas and 
Philonous, we find the following exchange: 
 
Hylas:   But what say you to pure intellect?  May not abstracted ideas be framed by that  
  faculty? 
 
Philonous:   Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot frame them by the  
  help of pure intellect; whatsoever faculty you understand by those words. 
 
Notice that Philonous rejects Hylas' suggestion regarding a supposed 'faculty of pure intellect' 
only because Philonous finds that he "cannot frame abstract ideas at all"; thus, inventing a name 
for a new 'faculty' of mind will not change this brute, empirical fact.  So, in 1713, Berkeley was 
still firmly committed to his own subjective empiricism. 
 By comparison, in §6 of the Seventh Dialogue of Alciphron (1732), the character of 
Alciphron argues that "[a]bstract general ideas I take to be the object of pure intellect, which may 
conceive them, although they cannot perhaps be imagined."  Euphranor (the character who puts 
forward and defends Berkeley's own views) responds by saying:  "I do not perceive that I can by 
any faculty, whether of intellect or imagination, conceive or frame an idea of that which is 
impossible or includes a contradiction."59  So, one could argue that by 1732, Berkeley had 
changed his stance from reliance on subjective empiricism to reliance on the law of non-
contradiction, i.e., he has moved from psychological impossibility to logical impossibility.     
 Such a reading would be a mistake.  To understand this, we need only consult the 
exchange that immediately precedes this portion of the dialogue.  For, Alciphron had stated, in 
§5:  "as these [abstract ideas] are not so obvious and familiar to vulgar minds, it happens that 
some men may think they have no idea at all, when they have not a particular idea; but the truth 
is, you had the abstract general idea of man, in the instance assigned, wherein you thought you 
had none."  Similarly, in §6, when Euprhanor says:  "Though I shut mine eyes, and use mine 
utmost efforts, and reflect on all that passeth in my own mind, I find it utterly impossible to form 
such ideas," Alciphron responds by saying:  "To reflect with due attention and turn the mind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Fraser, Works, V. II, p. 299. 
36	  
	  
inward upon itself is a difficult task, and not every one's talent."  So, in 1732, Berkeley portrayed 
his opponent as not only ignoring Berkeley's (or Euphranor's) own introspective claims, but as 
responding to those claims by saying something to the effect of:  "no, no, they're there... trust me, 
you're conceiving of abstract ideas, whether you're actually aware of them or not."    
 In this particular instance, then, Berkeley (through Euphranor) appealed to an argument 
based on non-contradiction because he was apparently confident that any appeal to subjective 
empiricism would simply be ignored by his opponents.  This does not mean, however, that 
Berkeley had in any way abandoned his commitment to subjective empiricism as the ultimate 
test for whether or not abstract ideas actually exist.  Indeed, it is not until Alciphron himself is 
depicted as actually stopping the conversation to consult his own mind that Alciphron begins to 
agree with Euphranor's arguments.  For example, in §8 of that dialogue, we find two instances of 
this: 
 
Alciphron: Can it be so hard a matter to form a simple idea of number, the object of a most  
  evident demonstrable science?  Hold, let me see if I cannot abstract the idea of  
  number from the numerical names and characters, and all particular numerical  
  things. –Upon which Alciphron paused a while, and then said, To confess the  
  truth I do not find that I can.60 
 
And, a few lines later... 
 
Euphranor:   Let me entreat you, Alciphron, be not amused by terms:  lay aside the word force,  
  and exclude every other thing from your thoughts, and then see what precise idea  
  you have of force... Take your own advice, and shut your eyes to assist your  
  meditation. – Upon this, Alciphron, having closed his eyes and mused a few  
  minutes, declared he could make nothing of it.61 
 
We also find this same occurrence in the Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous: 
 
Philonous:   …but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any figure,  
  abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities. 
 
Hylas:   Let me think a little -- I do not find that I can. 
 
 Thus, not only was Berkeley committed to his own subjective empiricism as the ultimate 
(if not only) test for whether or not an abstract idea (or any idea for that matter) actually exists 
throughout his published career, but he made it clear, through the characters of both dialogues, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Fraser, Works, V.II, p. 302. 
61 Fraser, Works, V.II, p. 303. 
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that until his opponents stop arguing long enough to actually consult their own ideas and mental 
abilities, they will never come to see what Berkeley held to be a plain and simple, brute fact.  
And, of course, this is directed at us, Berkeley's readers. 
 In fact, in nearly every instance where Berkeley addresses the topic of abstract ideas, he 
makes the same emphatic plea to introspection.  For example, in §13 of Part I of the Principles, 
Berkeley states, with regard to the putative abstract idea of Unity:  “That I have any such idea 
answering the word unity I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it.”  
Similarly, in a letter to Johnson dated March 24, 1730, Berkeley wrote:   
 
 Abstract general ideas was a notion that Mr. Locke held in common with the Schoolmen, 
and I think all other philosophers; it runs through his whole book of Human 
Understanding.  He holds an abstract idea of existence; exclusive of perceiving and being 
perceived.  I cannot find I have any such idea, and this is my reason against it.  
 
We may also consider the following, from §43 of Berkeley’s 1721 publication, De Motu:   
 
 There are indeed those who desire to contemplate motion as a certain simple and abstract 
idea, and separated from all other things.  But that very fine-drawn and subtle idea eludes 
the keen edge of intellect, as anyone can find for himself by meditation.  [emphasis 
added]. 
 
 Now, as a final matter regarding Berkeley's published arguments against abstract ideas, I 
would like to return to Locke's description of an abstract idea as containing "all and none" of the 
determinate features of the individuals that would populate the class of objects that are meant to 
be represented or signified by any abstract idea.  There was a reason, after all, for Locke’s 
unfortunate description of the abstract idea of a triangle as being “neither oblique nor rectangle, 
neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenum; but all and none of these at once.”  To fully 
understand this, we must acquaint ourselves with a theory of meaning that Berkeley ascribed to 
Locke, but which was also treated by Berkeley as being a prevailing view regarding language 
and meaning.  Berkeley summarized this theory of language through the character of Alciphron, 
in §2 of the Seventh Dialogue: 
 
 [§2] Words are signs:  they do or should stand for ideas; which so far as they suggest they 
are significant.  But words that suggest no ideas are insignificant.  He who annexeth a 
clear idea to every word he makes use of speaks sense; but where such ideas are wanting, 
the speaker utters nonsense. . . Men, not being able immediately to communicate their 
ideas one to another, are obliged to make use of sensible signs or words; the use of which 
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is to raise those ideas in the hearer which are in the mind of the speaker; and if they fail 
of this end they serve to no purpose.  He who really thinks hath a train of ideas 
succeeding each other and connected in his mind; and when he expresseth himself by 
discourse each word suggests a distinct idea to the hearer or reader; who by that means 
hath the same train of ideas in his which was in the mind of the speaker or writer.  As far 
as this effect is produced, so far the discourse is intelligible, hath sense and meaning. . . 
[§3]  Though it is evident that, as knowledge is the perception of the connexion or 
disagreement between ideas, he who doth not distinctly perceive the ideas marked by the 
terms, so as to form a mental proposition answering to the verbal, cannot possibly have 
knowledge. . . I say, all degrees of assent, whether founded on reason or authority, more 
or less cogent, are internal acts of mind, which alike terminate in ideas as their proper 
object – without which there can be really no such thing as knowledge, faith, or 
opinion.62    
 
 According to this theory of meaning, any word or term acquires meaning only in virtue of 
some underlying idea that is "annexed" to the word or term in question.63  At the outset of this 
section regarding abstract ideas, I stated that the Introduction to the Principles was devoted 
"almost entirely" to denouncing the opinion that we can frame abstract ideas.  The reason for that 
qualification was that Berkeley seems to have had another agenda in the Introduction, one that he 
unfortunately failed to fully develop.  Namely, he seemed intent on denying or rejecting some, or 
all, of this prevailing theory of language and meaning.   
 In §4 of the Introduction, Berkeley announced that the purpose of that Treatise would be 
“to try if I can discover what those Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and 
uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy. . . since 
there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass 
the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or 
natural defect in the understanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted 
on, and might have been avoided.”  Clearly, one of these principles was the "opinion that the 
mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas."  However, in §19, Berkeley also referred to the 
“received opinion that language has no other end but the communicating our ideas, and that 
every significant name stands for an idea.”  In §20, he announced at least a partial rejection of 
that prevailing view of language:  “the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Fraser, Works, V.II, p. 292-3.  My emphasis. 
63 Kenneth Pearce refers to this prevailing theory of meaning as "semantic atomism" and he confirms that it "was 
popular in Berkeley's day."   Kenneth Pearce, "The semantics of sense perception in Berkeley", Religious Studies 
Vol. 44, Issue 03, Sept. 2008, pp. 249-268, at p. 249.  I shall simply refer to it as the "prevailing" – in Berkeley's 
time -  theory of meaning.   
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and only end of language, as is commonly supposed.”  He went on to explain that “[t]here are 
other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting 
the mind in some particular disposition – to which the former [imparting ideas] is in many cases 
barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I 
think does not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language.”  
 I call this a "partial" rejection of the prevailing theory of meaning only because Berkeley 
claimed that "communicating ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language," 
thus implying that annexing ideas to words may still be in play, in some cases.  We should 
compare §20 from the published Introduction with the following from the Draft Introduction, 
where Berkeley addressed a "notion current among those that pass for the deepest thinkers, that 
every significant name stands for an idea":   
 
 In answer to this I say, that names, significiant names, do not always stand for ideas, but 
that they may be and are often used to good purpose [tho’ they are] without being 
suppos’d to stand for or represent any idea at all.  And as to what we are told of 
understanding propositions by [perceiving] the agreement or disagreement of the ideas 
marked by their terms, this to me in many cases seems absolutely false.64 
 
 Again, Berkeley qualified his rejection of that theory by writing, "this to me in many 
cases seems absolutely false."  Nevertheless, he clearly felt that the prevailing theory of meaning 
was deficient, and he suggested an alternative – what has come to be known as Berkeley's 
"emotive theory" of meaning.65  David Berman refers to this as Berkeley's "semantic revolution" 
and he claims that "Berkeley was the first modern philosopher to formulate and support the 
theory that words have legitimate uses which do not involve informing or standing for ideas."66   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  Fraser’s Works, Vol. I, p. 426.  Emphasis added.   
65 See Berman, Berkeley, Idealism and the Man (Clarendon Press, Oxford:  1994).  See also Colin Murray Turbayne, 
The Myth of Metaphor (University of South Carolina Press, 1970); Kenneth Williford and Roomet Jakapi, 
"Berkeley's Theory of Meaning in Alciphron VII", British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 17(1) 2009:  99-
118; Robert J. Baum, "The Instrumentalilst and Formalist Elements of Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics", 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 3 (1972), no. 2, pp. 119-134; Colin Murray Turbayne, "Berkeley's 
Two Concepts of Mind", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spet. 1959), pp. 85-92; P.J.E. 
Kail, "Berkeley, the Ends of Language, and the Principles of Human Knowledge", Meeting of the Aristotelian 
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Berkeley's Early Theory of Meaning", Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, T. 176, No. 3 (July-Sept. 
1986), pp. 319-330; E.J. Furlong, "Berkeley's Theory of Meaning", Mind, New Series, Vol. 73, No. 291 (July, 1964), 
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66 Berman, Berkeley, Idealism and the Man,  p. 144.  Bertil Belfrage also refers to Berkeley's 'emotive theory' of 
meaning as having been "revolutionary" at p. 324 of his 1986 article, "Development of Berkeley's Early Theory of 
Meaning."   
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  In Chapter III, I shall present further evidence to support the conclusion that Berkeley 
had rejected this prevailing theory of meaning, holding instead to the view that no idea at all 
need be annexed to any word in order for that word to acquire meaning.  For present purposes, 
we need only understand and appreciate that the doctrines Berkeley attacked in the Introduction 
were both the doctrine of abstract ideas, and the doctrine that every significant word acquired 
meaning only in virtue of some underlying idea that is "annexed" to the word.   
 For, with that in mind, we can now understand the diagnosis Berkeley recorded in the 
Draft Introduction of why otherwise astute and clear-thinking philosophers could be beguiled  - 
just as the young Berkeley had been67 - into adhering to the doctrine of abstract ideas.  According 
to Berkeley's Draft Introduction, “abstract ideas” were invented to solve various problems in the 
prevailing account of meaning described above, and Locke’s bizarre description of an abstract 
idea as being “all and none of these at once” was an inevitable result of the impossible role that 
abstract ideas were required to play in order to maintain that theory of meaning, in the face of 
problems internal to that account of meaning, as well as contrary evidence from direct, 
immediate (introspective) experience.     
 Recall that, according to the prevailing account of meaning, some idea must be 
apprehended by any who would understand the meaning of a given word; and, accordingly, each 
word calls up some idea in the mind of the listener.  Moreover, statements are determined to be 
true or false by comparing the ideas annexed to the words involved; and, thereby, one may 
perceive some “agreement or disagreement” between those underlying ideas.   
 Now, consider the statement, “Lassie is an animal”, and note that I am referring to the 
sable and white Collie of television fame.  According to the prevailing account of meaning, one 
comprehends the truth of this statement by comparing the idea signified by “Lassie” with the 
idea signified by “animal” and, thereby, perceiving some “agreement or disagreement” between 
those ideas.  In other words, one forms an idea68 of a sable and white Collie (“Lassie”) and 
compares this with whatever idea is annexed to “animal”, thus recognizing that Lassie is, in fact, 
an animal.  According to the Doctrine of Abstract Ideas, the idea that corresponds to “animal” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See supra p.9; and, surpa n. 56. 
68 I realize that this use of "idea" does not accord with Berkeley's, as we are speaking of "ideas" of complex 
everyday objects, rather than mere fleeting sensations.  We could read this, perhaps, as being a compound or 
complex idea of imagination/memory.  In any case, we are not currently addressing Berkeley's own philosophy, but 
the prevailing view of meaning during Berkeley's time, so we must allow some latitude here in the use of "idea" if 
only to fully comprehend the view of meaning Berkeley was attacking.   
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would be the abstract idea of animal.  On Berkeley’s account, this was necessary, at least in part, 
because of the following problem:  “in the proposition we have instanc’d, it is plain the word 
animal is not suppos’d to stand for the idea of any one particular animal.  For if it be made stand 
for another different from that is marked by the name [Lassie], the proposition is false and 
includes a contradiction; and if it be made signify the very same individual that [Lassie] doth, it 
is a tautology."69   
 In other words, according to the prevailing account of meaning, the statement, “Lassie is 
an animal” should involve two important ideas:  one corresponding to “Lassie” and the other 
corresponding to “animal” and some kind of actual mental comparison of these two ideas allows 
one to judge the truth or falsity of the statement.  The idea that corresponds to “Lassie” is an idea 
of a particular sable and white Collie named “Lassie.”  However, if the idea that corresponds to 
“animal” is an idea of some particular animal, then it will either be the exact same idea/animal 
that corresponds to “Lassie” (in which case the statement amounts to the tautology, "Lassie = 
Lassie"), or it will be an idea of an animal that is not-Lassie (in which case the statement 
amounts to a contradiction, "Lassie = not-Lassie").  Thus, if the idea annexed to “animal” is an 
idea of some particular animal, the statement is either a tautology or a contradiction.         
 To make matters worse, consider the following statement:  “Lassie and Shamu are 
animals,” and note that “Shamu” is the name of the Orca, or ‘killer whale,’ beloved for many 
years by audiences at SeaWorld.  If the prevailing account of meaning is correct, there should be 
at least three operative ideas involved in anyone being able to understand and judge this 
statement to be true or false:  (1) an idea of a sable and white Collie (“Lassie”); (2) an idea of a 
black and white Orca  (“Shamu”)’ and, (3) an idea that corresponds to “animal” and that 
somehow “agrees” with each of the first two ideas while also being not identical with either one 
(for, in that case, the statement would amount to, e.g., “Lassie and Shamu are Shamu” or "Lassie 
and Shamu are Lassie").  Thus, according to the prevailing account of meaning, there must be 
some idea that corresponds to “animal” and that shares some feature(s) with Lassie and Shamu, 
while also being an idea of something that is not any particular animal (or, a particular thing of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Fraser, Works, V.I, p. 428. Of course, Berkeley did not refer to “Lassie” anywhere in his writings.  Instead, he 
used the mythological dog, Melampus, in the statement, “Melampus is an animal.”  I prefer to use the more familiar 
“Lassie” as I imagine most readers would form no idea whatsoever that would correspond to “Melampus.”  While 
this would make the ultimate point – that no ideas at all need be called to mind to comprehend any given statement – 
it would detract from the more immediate point regarding the role that abstract ideas were meant to play in the 
prevailing account of meaning.     
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any kind).  Notice also that I could make this conjunction as long as I pleased (e.g., Shamu and 
Lassie and Benji and Elsa and Mr. Ed and George Berkeley are animals…), including in the 
subject clause as many particular and diverse “animals” as I please, and the idea ‘annexed to’ 
“animal” would have to share some feature(s) with each and every particular thing named in the 
subject clause, while also being not identical with any one of them, i.e., it must be “all and none 
of them at once.”70        
 According to Berkeley's analysis in the Draft Introduction, “[i]t remains therefore that the 
word animal stands for the general abstract idea of animal” and, “[i]n like manner we may be 
able with a little attention to discover how other general [i.e., abstract] ideas of all sorts might at 
first have stolen into the thoughts of man.”71  According to Berkeley's diagnosis, then, "abstract 
ideas" were invented to solve this 'a=b' problem.  The cost, however, is that these newly minted 
“abstract ideas” must now do a tremendous amount of work to keep the prevailing account of 
meaning intact.  For, any general term will now be said to correspond to some underlying 
abstract idea, and every such “abstract idea” must share (or, at least, be consistently/coherently 
said to share) features with any particular thing of which the corresponding general term can be 
predicated, while also being not identical with any such particular thing.  For, while we may 
forego any consideration of whether or not such ideas actually exist (i.e., whether anyone ever 
actually becomes aware of such ideas), if we are going to maintain this prevailing account of 
meaning, then we must find some way to describe the situation wherein the “abstract idea” of 
“animal” can be compared with other ideas, e.g., the ideas of “Lassie” and “Shamu” etc.  Hence, 
it becomes necessary to describe abstract ideas as having “all and none” of the features exhibited 
by the unlimited set of particulars that can be predicated by a general term.                 
 Not surprisingly, Berkeley argued, in the Draft Introduction, that one need only make the 
following “easy tryal” to see for one's self the vacuity of this prevailing theory of meaning:   “Let 
him but cast out of his thoughts the words of the expression, and then see whether two clear and 
determinate ideas remain whereof he finds one to be conformable to the other.”72  As I have 
stated above, I shall re-examine this in more detail in Chapter III, but we can at least admit that 
Berkeley did seem to be in the stages of developing an alternative account of meaning, one that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 The operative type of abstract idea, here, would be the third type, described by Berkeley in §9 of the Introduction 
to the Principles, e.g., the idea of a billiard ball in general, or of a man in general, etc. 
71 Fraser, Works, V. I, p. 428. 
72 Fraser, Works, V. I, p. 427. 
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would allow for an "emotive" or "non-cognitive" use of words, i.e., a use of words designed not 
to communicate ideas but to influence the action or behavior of one's audience. 
  
2.2 MATERIAL SUBSTANCE 
 
 Berkeley opens Part I of the Principles by setting out his basic ontology, whereby the 
world can be divided into two categories:  Passive Idea or Active Volition/Spirit.  He begins, in 
the very first line of §1 by conducting a survey of the various different kinds of ideas:  "It is 
evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either 
ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions 
and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination, either 
compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways."   
 Now, an attentive reader will notice the line, "such as are perceived by... attending to the 
operations of the mind."  Thus, my claims above, in Chapter I, that Berkeley rejected any 
suggestion that we could form ideas of reflection of the operations of the mind, seem to be 
directly contradicted by this opening sentence.  However, this opening line is the only instance 
where Berkeley even hinted that there could be ideas of the operations of one's mind; every other 
instance where this issue arises, Berkeley maintains his position - that there can be no ideas of 
active spirit, or volition.  In fact, Luce & Jessop have explained this line in their edition of the 
Principles, by pointing out that "such as" is to be read, in this context, not as "such ideas" but as 
"such objects."73  Moreover, Berman has argued that both A. A. Luce and M. R. Ayers were 
correct to argue that Berkeley's ambiguous wording of the opening line of §1 of Part I was a 
tactical decision to "appear at the outset to accept Locke's ideas of reflection" when, in fact, he 
accepted no such thing.74  Moving on, then, we find Berkeley describing the other category of his 
ontology in §2: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See Luce & Jessop, Works, V. 2, p. 41, fn. 1. 
74 Berman, George Berkeley, Idealism and the Man, p. 23, citing Luce, "Is there a Berkeleian Philosophy?", 
Hermathena 25 (1936), 200-1.  See also J.L. Stocks, "What Did Berkeley Mean by Esse is Percipi?"Mind, New 
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can have his syntactic point.   
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 But, beside all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise 
something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, 
imagining, remembering, about them.  This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, 
spirit, soul, or myself.  By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing 
entirely distinct from them.75  
   
 With his ontology announced, Berkeley then proceeded to make his strikingly brief 
argument that the existence of anything that is not active volition, i.e., anything that we are aware 
of via ideas, lies entirely in its being perceived, or being an object of perception.  Thus, "the 
various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that 
is, whatever objects they compose) cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them." (§3).   
Berkeley claims that any opposing view, i.e., "what is said of the absolute existence of 
unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived," is "perfectly unintelligble." (§3).  
 Accordingly, to predicate "exists" of anything other than spirit/volition76 is synonymous 
with predicating "is perceived."  Hence, with regard to all things that are not active spirit, which 
in Berkeley's ontology includes only the various types of ideas:  "[t]heir esse is percipi, nor is it 
possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive 
them."  Hereinafter, I shall refer to this as Berkeley's "EEP thesis."  In §6, Berkeley goes on to 
draw a very curious conclusion from this thesis:   
 
 all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which 
compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that 
their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually 
perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must 
either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit. 
  
 The "eternal spirit" referenced here is, of course, "God."  Melissa Frankel has 
summarized this argument – which is known as the "continuity argument" – as follows:   
 
 In the continuity argument, we begin with the idealist claim that physical objects are just 
sets of ideas, which exist only when perceived by some mind; on the assumption that 
these physical objects exist continuously, and do not wink in and out of existence in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75  See also Notebook entry 362a:  “Qu:  whether I had not better allow Colours to exist without the Mind taking the 
Mind for the Active thing which I call I, my self.”  See also Alciphron VII, §8:  “I understand what is signified by 
the term I, or myself, or know what it means, although it be no idea, or like an idea, but that which thinks, and wills, 
and apprehends ideas, and operates about them.”  (stated by Euphranor).  
76 Recall Berkeley's statement in §142 of Part I of the Principles:  "spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, 
that when we say 'they exist,' 'they are known,' or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything 
common to both natures." 
45	  
	  
accordance with whether some finite mind is perceiving them, it arguably follows that the 
ideas that constitute them also exist continuously.  But then they must not be perceived 
by finite minds:  so they are perceived by the Divine Mind.  The claim that objects persist 
over time is thus supposed to entail God's existence.77   
 
 Advancing this argument for God as the eternal spirit who maintains the continued 
existence of objects when not perceived by a finite mind was a tragic mistake on Berkeley's part.  
I shall discuss why this argument cripples Berkeley's philosophy, in Chapter III, after I have set 
forth and expanded upon Berkeley's New Theory of Vision.   
 For now, we may shift our focus to passages where Berkeley wrote of "exists" as being 
synonymous with "perceivable" rather than "perceived."  For example, in §3 of Part I of the 
Principles, Berkeley wrote:   
 
 The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I 
should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that 
some other spirit actually does perceive it.78 
  
 Presently, we are only concerned with the emphasized portion of that text, which we may 
compare with §58 of Part I of the Principles, wherein Berkeley addressed a possible-counter 
argument to his EEP thesis:  "the motion of the earth is now universally admitted among 
astronomers, as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons; but on the 
foregoing principles, there can be no such thing.  For motion being only an idea, it follows that if 
it be not perceived, it exists not; but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense."79  
Berkeley's responded as follows:  "whether the earth moves or no, amounts in reality to no more 
than this, to wit, whether we have reason to conclude from what hath been observed by 
astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a position 
and distance, both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the 
choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of them."80  We may also consider 
Notebook entry 98:  "The Trees are in the Park, that is, whether I will or no whether I imagine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Melissa Frankel, "Berkeley and God on the Quad", Philosophy Compass 7/6 (2012), 388-396, p.390 
78 Luce & Jessop, Works, V. 2, p. 42, my emphasis. 
79 ibid, p. 65.  Note that the last line – "the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense" should be read as meaning 
only that we who are actually standing on the surface of the earth cannot perceive the earth as an object moving 
through space.   
80 ibid, pp. 65-66.   
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any thing about them or no, let me but go thither & open my Eyes by day & I shall not avoid 
seeing them."   
 It should be acknowledged that Berkeley's EEP principle is not equivalent to his rejection 
of material substance; for, a materialist could accept Berkeley's EEP principle with regard to 
ideas while still claiming that Material Substance exists.  Berkeley brings several arguments to 
bear against Material Substance and I have no wish to catalog them all here.  Instead, I shall 
address only two points.  The first is a common misconception of Berkeley's EEP principle; 
namely, that it entails that objects cease to exist or 'wink out of existence' when I turn my back 
on them, i.e., when I no longer perceive them.  The second is the common claim that Berkeley's 
"Master Argument" commits him to solipsism.  We have already seen the first point illustrated 
by the "continuity argument" described above.  Therefore, I shall pass over this argument for 
now, as I will address it in the closing section of Chapter III.      
 The "Master Argument" can be found in §§22-23 of Part I of the Principles.  In §22, 
Berkeley stated that he was "content to put the whole upon this issue; if you can but conceive it 
possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general, for any one idea or any thing like 
an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause."  This is 
certainly a stunning challenge on Berkeley's part, and as one commentator has observed, "[i]t is 
hard to see it as anything but sheer hubris when, after outlining his considerations in favour of 
the stunning doctrine that nothing exists outside the mind, Berkeley announces that he is willing 
to set these aside and rest his case entirely on a single argument."81  The argument in question is 
presented in §23: 
 
 But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or 
books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive them.  I answer, you may so, there 
is no difficulty in it:  but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind 
certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the 
idea of any one that may perceive them?  But do not you your self perceive or think of 
them all the while?  This therefore is nothing to the purpose:  it only shows you have the 
power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew that you can 
conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind: to make out 
this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which 
is a manifest repugnancy.82 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Zoltán Gendler Szabó, "Sententialism and Berkeley's Master Argument" The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 55, 
No. 220 (Jul., 2005), pp. 462-474, at pp. 464-5. 
82 Luce & Jessop, Works, p. 50.  A version of this same argument is also presented in the First Dialogue between 
Hylas and Philonous, but the version presented in Part I of the Principles will suffice for my purposes. 
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 There have been many arguments leveled against this bit of text.83  To narrow our focus 
here, I only wish to address the claim that this argument commits Berkeley to solipsism.84  
Specifically, I shall focus on the arguments advanced by George Pitcher.  Pitcher's complaint 
was that the argument is "unacceptable" because it is "far too strong."85  He explained that 
"several commentators have remarked, Berkeley's argument, if valid, would also prove that one 
cannot conceive of anything that does not exist in one's own mind – i.e., that is not an idea of 
one's own.  Indeed, it would prove the even stronger proposition that one cannot conceive of 
anything that does not exist in one's own mind now.  These consequences would be as 
unacceptable to Berkeley as they are to the rest of us.  So something is wrong with the 
argument."86 
 As Pitcher argued, Berkeley confused "an idea and what an idea is of."87  Pitcher claimed 
that Berkeley's argument is analogous to saying that a public performance of a play about a man 
alone on an island is not possible because if the members of the audience are present, then it is 
not a play about a man who is all alone.  Similarly, Berkeley is attacking, not what a person can 
form an idea of (an object existing unperceived), but the idea itself.   
 In response to this line of attack, I contend first that Berkeley was well aware of the 
difference between "idea" and "idea of."  Recall, for example, Notebook entry 660:  "[t]he 
referring Ideas to things which are not Ideas, the using the Term, Idea of, is one great cause of 
mistake, as in other matters so also in this." (my emphasis).  In order to fully explain this, 
however, we must first examine and extend Berkeley's New Theory of Vision, which is the 
subject of Chapter III.  Meanwhile, it must be admitted that Pitcher has a good point regarding 
solipsism; for, it does seem that if this master argument is successful, then I can only conceive of 
anything insofar as I have perceived it, or can recollect and recombine it in imagination.  Thus, it 
sets a limit on what I can know or meaningfully talk or think about.  If so, then I can only know 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 As Janice Thomas wrote:  "What is the so-called Master Argument and does it result in Berkeley's springing the 
solipsism trap on himself? Like so much in Berkeley's philosophy this is a topic about which there are almost as 
many opinions as there are authors."  Janice Thomas, "The Solipsism Trap, the So-Called Master Argument, and the 
Pleasant Mistake" History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct., 2006), pp. 339-355, p. 339. 
84 See e.g., Dancy:  "Whatever one's interpretation of the... [Master Argument] about conceiving an unconceived 
tree, one is likely to end up saying that it commits Berkeley to solipsism."  Dancy, Berkeley, an Introduction (Basil 
Blackwell, 1987), p. 154. 
85 Pitcher, p. 112. 
86 ibid, pp. 112-113. 
87 ibid, p. 113. 
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or understand or think about whatever passes in my own mind.  Indeed, if the only ideas I can 
ever entertain or be privy to are my own (which seems beyond argument), and if ideas constitute 
the sum total of my possible knowledge, then solipsism seems unavoidable.  Surely, then, there 
must be something wrong with this argument. 
 As I shall argue at the close of Chapter III, ideas are not the only thing I can have 
knowledge or awareness of; or, rather, ideas are not all there is.  For, Berkeley's ontology also 
includes Spirit, or active volition; unfortunately, Berkeley failed to fully develop any coherent 
doctrine of spirit/volition.  However, he did lay the groundwork for such a doctrine, and it can be 
found in his 1709 Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, to which I shall now turn my 
attention.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
VISION, LANGUAGE, AND ACTIVE AWARENESS 
 
  
3.1 BERKELEY’S NEW THEORY OF VISION 
 
 To understand Berkeley's New Theory of Vision, we need to understand a supposed 
perceptual-volitional phenomenon, or "prejudice" as Berkeley simply called it.  I say "supposed" 
because Berkeley did not prove that such a "prejudice" is operative in normal perception, but he 
did offer a theory, and good reasons, for accepting that it is.  Berkeley's 1709 Essay Towards a 
New Theory of Vision was devoted to explaining "the manner wherein we perceive by sight the 
distance, magnitude, and situation of objects" (§1); I shall attempt to show, in this section, how 
the “prejudice” in question plays a central role in that explanation.   
 Before I explain the nature of this "prejudice", recall that Berkeley treated physical 
objects as existing independent of perception in the 1709 Essay on vision, and he explained this 
in §44 of Part I of the Principles by stating that it was "beside my purpose to examine and refute 
it in a discourse concerning vision."88  It is important that we recognize this because it may go 
some way to explaining why Berkeley did not capitalize on some of the more powerful 
implications of his New Theory of Vision.  I am not suggesting that Berkeley had or had not 
fully embraced the immaterialism he argued for in the Principles when he drafted and published 
his 1709 Essay; I am merely acknowledging that the 1709 Essay was written against the 
background assumption that physical objects exist independent of perception, and this seriously 
limited the extent to which Berkeley could develop the implications of his New Theory in that 
1709 publication.  Thus, in what follows, I will attempt to explain Berkeley's basic theory of 
vision, as he presented it; and then, I shall see how it may be further developed or extended, 
while remaining consistent with what Berkeley presented.       
 Now, to introduce this "prejudice," albeit in a non-visual context, conduct the following 
simple experiment:  say the word "apple" out loud, and then keep saying it, over and over again 
until it loses its meaning and you hear it as mere noise(s).  It should only take about ten to twenty 
repetitions before this perceptual shift, this apparent loss of meaning, takes place.  According to 
the approach Berkeley put forward in his 1709 Essay, we could describe this transition from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See supra p. 23. 
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meaningful term to meaningless noise as the temporary disablement or removal of the prejudice 
in question.  In other words, the fact that one may come to perceive a mere noise as something 
else - as a meaningful word - was treated by Berkeley as a "prejudice."                
 He treated the perception of a noise qua word as a kind of prejudice because while it may 
be a natural, unavoidable, and even greatly advantageous psychological phenomenon, it 
nevertheless represents a transformation or distortion of immediate perception.89  It may seem 
that the apparent loss of meaning that occurs when a word is continually repeated represents an 
aberration or distortion of perception because it deviates from what has grown all-too-familiar.  
The truth is, however, that when, after repeated utterances, you begin to hear “apple” as a 
meaningless pair of noises (e.g., “ahp-ull” or “ah-pull”), you are actually hearing that noise/word 
for what it is, with no “prejudice” influencing your perception.  For, any word is, in and of itself, 
just a noise (or sequence of noises), and nothing more.                   
 According to the arguments Berkeley put forward in his 1709 Essay, this perceptual 
“prejudice” occurs when one comes to habitually treat some element of sensory experience as a 
sign.  I shall discuss this in detail in a moment; at the outset, however, it is important to 
acknowledge that we are concerned with something that affects us at a very basic level of 
perception:  once a noise is established in one's mind as a sign/word, it is simply heard as such.90   
 According to this approach, no conscious judgment is required to determine whether one 
is hearing a familiar word or a meaningless noise.  Instead, we simply perceive sounds as 
meaningless noises, or alternately, as meaningful words.  Moreover, once a noise comes to be 
habitually perceived as a word, it is very difficult to hear it any other way.  While there must 
have been a time during early infancy when the words of one's native tongue were perceived as 
the mere noises they are, I would wager that no adult can actually recall such early experiences.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 When I say that the prejudice "transforms" or "distorts" perception, I do not mean to suggest that new ideas of 
sense are somehow injected into one's stream of experience by this prejudice.  The stream of sense-data remains 
unchanged, much in the same way that a person can look at a Necker Cube and observe perspective shifts, such that 
the cube seems to be oriented in space one way or the other.  Alternatively, the famous "duck-rabbit" picture 
illustrates the same principle; namely, that we can experience the same quanta of sensory data in different ways. 
90 David Berman has described this aspect of Berkeley's New Theory as "a powerful synesthesia."  Berman, 
Berkeley (Routledge 1999) at p. 34.  "Synesthesia" is a term used to describe a condition where sensory stimulation 
in one sense modality produces or evokes sensory awareness in a different sense modality, e.g., a certain audible 
note evokes a certain color, or a certain flavor evokes ideas of shape.  A good account of the history of our 
knowledge of this condition is presented in Dr. Richard Cytowic's The Man Who Tasted Shapes (MIT Press: 2003).  
In the Foreword to that book, Dr. Johnathon Cole suggests that synesthesia "may be a normal process but one hidden 
below consciousness in all but a few of us." (p. xiii).  If Berkeley's New Theory of Vision is correct, then Cole's (and 
Cytowic's) suggestion that synesthesia may be a normal process in all of us must also be correct.  This will become 
clear by the end of this section. 
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The constant repetition of a word will offer us a brief glimpse into this alternate perception, and 
one cannot help but perceive the words of a foreign language as mere noises; however, the fact 
that we cannot simply will ourselves to hear the sounds that make up our own native tongue as 
anything other than meaningful words illustrates just how powerful this synesthetic “prejudice” 
can be.  As Berkeley observed, in §159 of his 1709 Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision: 
 
…consider how hard it is for any one to hear the words of his native language, which is 
familiar to him, pronounced in his ears without understanding them.  Though he 
endeavour to disunite the meaning from the sound, it will nevertheless intrude into his 
thoughts, and he shall find it extreme[ly] difficult, if not impossible, to put himself 
exactly in the posture of a foreigner that never learnt the language, so as to be affected 
barely with the sounds themselves, and not perceive the signification annexed to them. 
 
 As its title indicates, however, the 1709 Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision was not 
directly concerned with spoken words and their meaning.  Instead, that work was devoted to 
answering the following question:  given that "what we immediately and properly see are only 
lights and colors in sundry situations and shades and degrees of faintness and clearness, 
confusion and distinctness" (§73), how is it that we come to see relatively distant objects of 
varying shape and size?  Berkeley answered this by arguing that visual data (i.e., "lights and 
colors in sundry situations…") are employed by humans, and presumably all sighted creatures, as 
a system of signs for the purpose of regulating behavior in the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance 
of pain; and, a byproduct of such use is that the same "prejudice" that turns mere noises into 
meaningful words also operates in visual experience to transform mere patterns of light and into 
relatively distant objects of varying shape and size, i.e., tables, chairs, trees, mountains, etc.  
Seeing a staircase, for example, rather than a haphazard patchwork of light and color91 is on a par 
with hearing meaningful words rather than mere noises.  In both cases, the sensory data does not 
change, but the use of that data qua sign(s) transforms one’s immediate perception of the data.  
Hence, sounds are heard differently and light and color is seen differently, once a certain use of 
these sensations becomes habitual and familiar (or, “second nature”). 
 Now, with regard to distance, Berkeley began by acknowledging that "[i]t is. . . agreed by 
all that distance of itself, and immediately, cannot be seen."  (§1).  The reason for this is that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91  I realize that "color" is just another "variation of light"; I employ the redundant expression "light and color" to 
refer to visual data, i.e., to what we immediately perceive by sight alone, only to remain consistent with Berkeley's 
mode of expression, as he commonly referred to what we immediately or literally see as "variations of light and 
color."   
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"distance being a line directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in the fund of the 
eye - which point remains invariably the same, whether the distance be longer or shorter." (§1).  
Accepting arguendo that distance cannot be immediately perceived by sight, if it can be visually 
perceived at all, it must be a "mediate" visual perception, i.e., if we can become aware of 
distance through vision, it must be because it is suggested to us by something that is, in fact, 
visually perceived.  To put this more generally, "when the mind perceives an idea, not 
immediately and of itself, it must be by the means of some other idea." (§9).  From here, 
Berkeley's method was fairly straight-forward:  "it being already shewn that distance is suggested 
to the mind, by the mediation of some other idea which is itself perceived in the act of seeing, it 
remains that we inquire what ideas or sensations there be that attend vision, unto which we may 
suppose the ideas of distance are connected, and by which they are introduced into the mind."  
(§16). 
 The experiences "that attend vision" and "unto which we may suppose the ideas of 
distance are connected" that Berkeley listed included, inter alia, the kinesthetic feelings of eye-
strain that accompany changes of focus, the relative blurriness or clarity of visual images, 
whether some portions of one’s visual field seem to occlude others, and the relative sizes and 
positions of the various visual shapes or patterns that make up one's visual field.  Consequently, 
in §45, Berkeley explained: 
 
 Having of a long time experienced certain ideas perceivable by touch - as distance, 
tangible figure, and solidity - to have been connected with certain ideas of sight, I do, 
upon perceiving these ideas of sight, forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are, by the 
wonted ordinary course of nature, like to follow.  Looking at an object, I perceive a 
certain visible figure and colour, with some degree of faintness and other circumstances, 
which, from what I have formerly observed, determine me to think that if I advance 
forward so many paces, miles, &c., I shall be affected with such and such ideas of touch. 
 
 It may seem strange that Berkeley identified distance as an idea "perceivable by touch."  
The reason for this is that distance, for Berkeley, reduces to motion, or rather, to locomotion.  
Margaret Atherton has provided a good account of what Berkeley had in mind here: 
 
 His claim is we are able to apprehend distance kinesthetically.  I have an idea of the 
distance something is from me when I perceive how long and at what speed it takes me to 
get to it, or how long and with what effort I reach for it and what it will feel like when I 
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have touched it. . . That it will take a great deal of time for me at one location to get to an 
object in another location is what being very distant means.92 
 
 While this may sound relatively simple, acquiring a sense of distance by sight alone is a 
very complex skill that takes a great deal of time and practice to master.  Berkeley's presumption, 
here, is that those people who are sighted from birth learn this skill in infancy.  Thus, after some 
time spent engaged in interactive experimentation with these various visual and kinesthetic cues, 
one can become so adept at making distance judgments by sight alone that, upon perceiving any 
given visual patterns, one will immediately acquire an expectation of the relative time and effort 
required to experience whatever tactile sensations have come to be associated with those visual 
patterns.    
 Thus, according to Berkeley's theory of vision, we use visual data as signs, or as 
behavioral cues, and we continue practicing and refining this skill every moment of our sighted 
lives.  To return to Berkeley's analogy with spoken language, people "who from their birth have 
grown up in a continued habit of seeing" (§43, Essay) are unable to visually perceive variations 
of light and color as anything other than relatively distant objects of varying shape and size 
because this visual system of signs is universal, i.e., there is no visual analog of a "foreign 
language."93  Thus, the system of visual signs is every sighted person's native visual tongue (so 
to speak).  According to Berkeley, it is because this visual system of signs is universal, learned 
from birth, and continually reinforced every moment of one's (visual) life that we are so prone to 
claim/believe that our visual sense lets in more than mere variations of light and color.  By the 
same token, "if there was one only invariable and universal language in the world, and that men 
were born with the faculty of speaking it, it would be the opinion of some, that the ideas in other 
men's minds were properly perceived by the ear, or had at least a necessary and inseparable tie 
with the sounds that were affixed to them."  (§66, Essay).     
 Before exploring this in more detail, we should consider a serious methodological 
difficulty attendant with Berkeley's claims here.  For, even if Berkeley was correct to claim that a 
“prejudice” distorts our visual perception so that sighted adults no longer perceive visual 
sensations for the mere variations of light and color that they are, how could he have hoped to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92  Margaret Atherton, Berkeley’s Revolution in Vision (Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 100.    
93  To find a visual analog of a foreign language, one would have to travel to a region of the universe where light 
'behaved' in fundamentally different ways than it does on Earth, e.g., in the vicinity of a black-hole (though, I would 
not recommend this). 
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empirically vindicate such a claim?  For, according to Berkeley's own arguments, we are all held 
in the grip of this perceptual distortion, with no "foreign" visual language to consider by way of 
comparison, and with no ability to break the spell we are all supposedly under, as it has been 
inculcated in us since birth and is reinforced each and every time we use what we see to regulate 
our actions, i.e., when we use what we see as signs.               
 It would seem that the only way of empirically vindicating these claims would be to 
interview a sighted infant, in an attempt to discover whether the child was immediately aware of 
a mere patchwork of light/color or, alternately, distant objects of varying size and shape.  Of 
course, interviewing an infant would be futile; and, as we have already seen, people "who from 
their birth have grown up in a continued habit of seeing" (§43, Essay) will be of equally little 
use, since the prejudice in question would be intractably riveted into their perceptual experience.   
 Despite these inherent difficulties, twenty-four years after his original 1709 Essay 
Towards a New Theory of Vision, Berkeley published a follow-up piece entitled The Theory of 
Vision or Visual Language Vindicated and Explained (1733).  The obvious question is:  what 
happened between 1709 and 1733 that led Berkeley to feel that his earliest arguments, 
concerning the presence of this prejudice in the visual realm, had been “vindicated”?       
 The answer can be found in 1728, when Dr. William Cheseldon performed one of the 
earliest recorded cataract removal operations, successfully restoring sight to a thirteen year old 
boy who had been virtually blind since birth.  Cheseldon compared the boy's vision before the 
procedure to seeing through "a glass of broken jelly."94  Thanks to the procedure, the boy was 
allowed to see the world clearly for the first time.  While the experiences reported by the boy 
may seem surprising to most people, they were not surprising to Berkeley; in fact, they were as 
he had predicted, back in 1709.         
 "When [the boy] first saw," reported Cheseldon, "he was so far from making any 
judgment about distances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as he express'd 
it) as what he felt did his skin."  Cheseldon also reported that the boy, using his newly restored 
vision, "knew not the shape of anything, nor any one thing from another, however different in 
shape or magnitude."  As might have been expected, the boy also had difficulty learning to apply 
names that he had previously learned in a purely tactile context to this new flood of visual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Fraser, Works, Vol. 1, Appendix C, p. 444; from An Account of some observations made by a young gentleman, 
who was born blind, or who lost his sight so early, that he had no remembrance of ever having seen, and was 
couched between 13 and 14 years of age, by Dr. William Chesseldon. 
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sensations.  For example, Cheseldon related the following story:  "having forgot which was the 
cat and which the dog, he was asham'd to ask; but catching the cat (which he knew by feeling) he 
was observ'd to look at her steadfastly, and then setting her down, said, 'So, Puss! I shall know 
you another time.'"  Moreover, it took several months of using his newly restored vision before 
the boy understood that pictures were representations of other things, rather than being mere 
"party-colour'd planes or surfaces diversified with variety of paint."  Even after grasping the 
concept of a representative picture, "he was no less surpris'd, expecting the pictures would feel 
like the things they represented, and was amaz'd when he found those parts, which by their light 
and shadow appear'd now round and uneven, felt only flat like the rest; and ask'd which was the 
lying sense, - feeling or seeing?"95 
 In the final section of The Theory of Vision or Visual Language Vindicated and 
Explained (1733), Berkeley cited lengthy passages from the Cheseldon case and then concluded:  
"Thus, by fact and experiment, those points of the [1709] theory which seem the most remote 
from common apprehension were not a little confirmed, many years after I had been led into the 
discovery of them by reasoning."  To understand how Berkeley could have specifically 
anticipated such strange results of a novel medical procedure years in advance, we need to go 
further back, to 1688, when Dr. William Molyneux posed what was then a purely hypothetical 
question to his friend, John Locke.  In a letter from Molyneux to Locke, dated July 7, 1688, 
Molyneux asked Locke whether a man born blind but later made to see would be able to identify 
and distinguish, by sight alone, a cube from a sphere.  So, when Berkeley wrote his 1709 Essay, 
he was well-aware of this question, which in 1709 had been a mere thought-experiment, and 
which had come to be known as “The Molyneux Problem."   
 Berkeley addressed The Molyneux Problem several times in his 1709 Essay Towards a 
New Theory of Vision, and he made it clear that if his theories were correct, the answer to 
Molyneux's question would have to be negative.  According to Berkeley's arguments, a person 
born blind and then made to see (or, a "Molyneux Man") would not, at the outset, be able to 
identify the shape, magnitude, or distance of anything by sight alone.  For example, concerning 
distance, Berkeley wrote the following in §41 of his 1709 Essay: 
 
From what hath been premised, it is a manifest consequence, that a man born blind, being 
made to see, would at first have no idea of distance by sight:  the sun and stars, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Fraser, Works, Vol. 1, p. 445. 
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remotest objects as well as the nearer, would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his 
mind.  The objects intromitted by sight would seem to him (as in truth they are) no other 
than a new set of thoughts or sensations, each whereof is as near to him as the perceptions 
of pain or pleasure, or the most inward passions of his soul.  For, our judging objects 
perceived by sight to be at any distance, or without the mind, is entirely the effect of 
experience, which one in those circumstances could not yet have attained to.  
 
Similarly, in §95 of the Essay, Berkeley explained why a person with newly restored sight would 
not immediately know how to apply terms learned in a purely tactile context to the new stream of 
visual data:   
 
The objects to which he had hitherto been used to apply the terms up and down, high and 
low, were such only as affected, or were some way perceived by his touch.  But, the 
proper objects of vision make a new set of ideas, perfectly distinct and different from the 
former, and which can in no sort make themselves perceived by touch.  There is, 
therefore, nothing at all that could induce him to think those terms applicable to them.  
Nor would he ever think it, till such time as he had observed their connexion [sic] with 
tangible objects, and the same prejudice began to insinuate itself into his understanding, 
which, from their infancy, had grown up in the understandings of other men.96 
 
 This passage from §95 is important for many reasons, not the least of which is Berkeley's 
reference to the "prejudice" that must "insinuate itself into the understanding" before a newly 
sighted person can begin to perceive visual data in the same manner as those "who from their 
birth have grown up in a continued habit of seeing" (§43).   
 According to Berkeley's new theory of vision, there are two fundamental reasons for this 
prejudice in the visual realm.  These are:  (1) we become aware of tactile possibilities or 
expectations that have become habitually associated with any given visual cues in the same 
instant as the visual cues themselves; and, (2) our volitional regulation is informed, not by the 
visual cues themselves, but by whatever tactile expectations may have become (synesthetically) 
fused with those visual cues.         
 First, then, is the claim that we become aware of any behaviorally relevant sensory-motor 
expectations that we have come to habitually associate with some pattern of visual sensations in 
the same instant that we perceive the visual sensations themselves. When Berkeley explained 
how we come to associate the kinesthetic sensations that are felt whenever we strain our eyes so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96  My emphasis.  Recall that when Berkeley speaks of the "set of ideas" that constitute objects of vision or touch, he 
is speaking of day-to-day visual and tactile sensations.  So, for example, Berkeley would refer to what an apple 
looks like as a "set of visual ideas," while referring to what an apple feels like in one's hand as a "set of tactile 
ideas."   
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as to change our point of focus with various degrees of distance (from ourselves), he summarized 
this as follows:   
 
 …because the mind has by constant experience found the different sensations 
corresponding to the different dispositions of the eyes to be attended each with a different 
degree of distance in the object, there has grown an habitual or customary connexion 
between those two sorts of ideas, so that the mind no sooner perceives the sensation 
arising from the different turn it gives the eyes, in order to bring the pupils nearer or 
farther asunder, but it withal perceives the different idea of distance which was wont to 
be connected with that sensation; just as upon hearing a certain sound, the idea is 
immediately suggested to the understanding which custom had united with it.  [§17, 1709 
Essay, My emphasis] 
 
He went on to argue, in §20, that "[i]f we had not constantly found certain sensations arising 
from the various disposition of the eyes, attended with certain degrees of distance, we should 
never make those sudden judgments from them concerning the distance of objects" (my 
emphasis).  
 Notice that Berkeley did not refer to the perceptual transformation from mere variations 
of light and color to relatively distant objects as a form of perceptual "distortion."  Instead, he 
referred to it as a "suggestion of sense" and, in other places, as a "sudden judgment" or an 
"immediate suggestion."97  As Berkeley explained in §42 of his 1733 Theory of Vision 
Vindicated and Explained: 
 
 To perceive is one thing; to judge is another.  So likewise, to be suggested is one thing, 
and to be inferred another.  Things are suggested and perceived by sense.  We make 
judgments and inferences by the understanding.  What we immediately and properly 
perceive by sight is its primary object - light and colours.  What is suggested, or 
perceived by mediation thereof, are tangible ideas - which may be considered as 
secondary and improper objects of sight. 
 
 In this same passage from his 1733 work, Berkeley identified the primary aim of his 
whole Theory of Vision:  "But, how comes it to pass that we apprehend by the ideas of sight 
certain other ideas, which neither resemble them, nor cause them, nor are caused by them, nor 
have any necessary connexion with them? - the solution of this problem, in its full extent, doth 
comprehend the whole Theory of Vision."  The answer to this question rested on exposing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97  See e.g., §17 ("immediately suggested"); §24 ("…the sudden judgments men make of distance"); §45 
("suggestions of sense"); and, §53 (various patterns of light and color "do not first suggest distance, and then leave it 
to the judgment to use that as a medium whereby to collect the magnitude; [instead] they have as close and 
immediate a connexion with the magnitude as with the distance").        
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“prejudice” in question; for, as we have seen, this prejudice accounts for the apparent fusion of 
immediately perceived (visual) sensation and mediately suggested tactile expectation. 
   As stated above, Berkeley treated visual perception as a system of Signs, and he meant 
this quite literally.  This will be of paramount importance in the analysis to follow.  Perhaps the 
most direct expression of this comparison between visual data and spoken language can be found 
at §73 of the 1709 Essay, where Berkeley wrote:  "Faintness, as well as all other ideas or 
perceptions which suggest magnitude or distance, does it in the same way that words suggest the 
notions to which they are annexed."  A more detailed account can be found at §51:   
 
 No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language pronounced in our ears, but the 
ideas corresponding thereto present themselves to our minds:  in the very same instant the 
sound and the meaning enter the understanding:  so closely are they united that it is not in 
our power to keep out the one, except we exclude the other also. . . So likewise the 
secondary objects, or those which are only suggested by sight, do often more strongly 
affect us, and are more regarded the proper objects of that sense; along with which they 
enter into the mind, and with which they have a far more strict connexion, than ideas 
have with words.98  
 
 In §40 of Berkeley’s 1733 publication, The Theory of Vision or Visual Language 
Vindicated and Explained, Berkeley made it clear that he treated vision as a literal language: 
 
 A great number of arbitrary signs, various and opposite, do constitute a Language.  If 
such arbitrary connexion be instituted by men, it is an artificial Language; if by the 
Author of Nature, it is a Natural Language.  Infinitely various are the modifications of 
light and sound, whence they are each capable of supplying an endless variety of signs, 
and, accordingly, have been each employed to form languages; the one by the arbitrary 
appointment of mankind, the other by that of God Himself.  A connexion established by 
the Author of Nature, in the ordinary course of things, may surely be called natural, as 
that made by men will be named artificial.  And yet this doth not hinder but the one may 
be as arbitrary as the other.  And, in fact, there is no more likeness to exhibit, or necessity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98  We may also consider the following, from §11 of the Fourth Dialogue of Berkeley’s 1732 Alciphron, or the 
Minute Philosopher, concerning the visual experiences of a Molyneux Man: 
 
 …such a one would never think of men, trees, or any other objects that he had been accustomed to 
perceive by touch, upon having his mind filled with new sensations of light and colours, whose various 
combinations he doth not yet understand, or know the meaning of; no more that a Chinese, upon hearing 
the words man and tree would think of the things signified by them.  In both cases, there must be time and 
experience, by repeated acts, to acquire a habit of knowing the connection between the sign and things 
signified; that is to say, of understanding the language, whether of the eyes or of the ears. 
 
It is also worth noting that Mike May, a contemporary “Molyneux Man,” described his own difficulties in learning 
to use and understand his newly acquired stream of visual sensations by saying that “trying to see feels like trying to 
speak a foreign language.”  Robert Kurson, Crashing Through (Random House, N.Y.: 2007), p. 183.   
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to infer, things tangible from the modifications of light, than there is in language to 
collect the meaning from the sound.  But, such as the connexion is of the various tones 
and articulations of voice with their several meanings, the same is it between the various 
modes of light and their respective correlates, or, in other words, between the ideas of 
sight and touch. 
 
 I shall return to this point in the following section; for now, let us return to the first factor 
that gives rise to this "prejudice" - that tactile expectations that have become habitually 
associated with visual ideas qua signs will "enter the understanding... in the very same instant" as 
the visual ideas/signs themselves.  It is because of this, Berkeley argued, that "we find it so 
difficult to discriminate between the immediate [visual] and mediate [tactile expectations] 
objects of sight, and are so prone to attribute to the former what belongs only to the latter."  (§51, 
Essay).  "They are," he went on to explain. "most closely twisted, blended, and incorporated 
together.  And the prejudice is confirmed and riveted in our thoughts by a long tract of time, by 
the use of language, and want of reflexion." (§51). 
 Now, the second factor that contributes to this "prejudice" is the fact that, for the most 
part, we are not concerned with perceiving visual patterns for their own sake.  On a purely 
aesthetic level, one may seek out certain visual experiences for the sheer pleasure of the 
experience (although, even this is debatable); nevertheless, when using one’s visual sense to 
regulate, say, one’s locomotive volition, a chief concern will be avoiding pain and/or injury.  
Thus, any tactile expectations that are ‘suddenly suggested’ upon perceiving any given 
variation(s) of light and color will command one’s attention, leaving the perceiver relatively 
indifferent to the specific 'content' of the visual patterns themselves.  After all, it is the tactile 
sense, and not the visual, that is immediately associated with pain and injury.  As Berkeley 
explained at §59 of his 1709 Essay:   
 
 We regard the objects that environ us in proportion as they are adapted to benefit  or 
injure our own bodies, and thereby produce in our minds the sensations of  pleasure and 
pain.  Now, bodies operating on our organs by an immediate application, and the hurt and 
advantage arising therefrom depending altogether on the tangible, and not at all on the 
visible, qualities of any object - this is a plain reason why those should be regarded by us 
much more than these. 
 
 According to Berkeley's 1709 Essay, as one grows accustomed to using visual sensations 
as behavioral cues, one's attention is proportionally drawn away from the visual patterns 
themselves and comes to focus, instead, on whatever tactile expectations may have become 
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associated with those visual sensations.99  This occurs because tactile expectations, rather than 
the visual cues themselves, will inform one's volitional regulation, as behavior will be altered so 
that one may either experience or avoid those tactile possibilities, in the pursuit of pleasure and 
avoidance of pain.100  Thus, not only do we become suddenly aware of various tactile 
expectations upon perceiving familiar visual patterns, but we also become proportionally 
indifferent to the visual patterns themselves, since these are only relevant to our behavior insofar 
as they reliably indicate those tactile possibilities with which we are so intensely, if not 
desperately, concerned.  This fact, coupled with the immediacy with which any sensory-motor 
expectations enter our awareness, leads us to eventually “see” these various tactile possibilities.     
 A helpful analogy may be to consider the chess-player whose attention is always focused 
a few moves ahead of the present board positions.  For any chess-player, the present positions of 
the pieces are only valuable or significant insofar as they indicate possible future moves, and 
these future possibilities will command the attention of the experienced chess-player, since 
possible future moves are everything to the experienced player, and any currently executed move 
will be made according to the player's knowledge of those future possibilities.  Thus, a move in 
chess is as much a manifestation of a player's "expectations" as is a runner's dodge or jump to 
avoid an obstacle.  Indeed, just as future possible moves are everything to the experienced chess-
player, so are future possible moves everything to the experienced sighted human, who seeks 
above all else to avoid pain and injury.  Moreover, presently experienced visual patterns are as 
significant to the experienced sighted human as are the present positions of chess pieces to the 
experienced chess-player:  if there are no moves to be made, the present positions mean nothing; 
in fact, without a game in progress (i.e., no future moves), there would be no board "positions" at 
all, but only pieces meaninglessly scattered around the board.  Likewise, if the value of visual 
information is entirely, or at least predominantly, behavioral, then visual data is only meaningful 
or significant insofar as it can actually be used to regulate one's actions in anticipation of future 
(tactile) possibilities.  As Berkeley explained, at §59 of the Essay: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 See also §12 of the Fourth Dialogue of Alciphron:  "…signs, being little considered in themselves, or for their 
own sake, but only in their relative capacity, and for the sake of those things whereof they are signs, it comes to pass 
that the mind overlooks them, so as to carry its attention immediately on to the things signified." 
100 With regard to the role played by pain and pleasure in this system, See Katherine Dunlop, "The Role of Visual 
Language in Berkeley's Account of Generality" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 83, No. 3, Nov. 
2011, pp. 525-559. 
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 And for this end chiefly101 the visive sense seems to have been bestowed on animals, to 
wit, that, by the perception of visible ideas (which in themselves are not capable of 
affecting or anywise altering the frame of their bodies), they may be able to foresee (from 
the experience they have had what tangible ideas are connected with such and such 
visible ideas) the damage or benefit which is like to ensue upon the application of their 
own bodies to this or that body which is at a  distance. . .  Hence it is that, when we look 
at an object, the tangible figure and extension thereof are principally attended to, whilst 
there is small heed taken of the visible figure and magnitude, which, though more 
immediately perceived, do less sensibly affect us, and are not fitted to produce any 
alteration in our bodies.102 
 
  What has been presented up to this point represents Berkeley's basic theory of vision, as 
set forth in his 1709 Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision.  At this point, then, I wish to 
explore some of the implications of this basic theory, implications Berkeley did not explore but 
which are consistent with what has just been put forward.  Most importantly, I wish to highlight 
the important role played by active volition in this theory. 
   To begin, we must first acknowledge that sensations experienced in one sense modality 
are distinct and independent from sensations experienced in any other sense modality.  In other 
words, "[t]hat which is seen is one thing, and that which is felt is another."  (Essay, §49).  This 
claim (often called Berkeley's "heterogeneity thesis") amounts only to this:  we cannot, strictly 
speaking, see sounds or hear colors or taste shapes, etc.103  Instead, what we see (light) is distinct 
from what we hear (sound) and feel (tactile sensations), etc.  As Warnock has argued, this is 
practically a tautology, and "in his own terms Berkeley's contention is certainly, even 
necessarily, correct."104   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Note that "chiefly" was omitted from the last edition of the Essay.   
102 My emphasis.  We may also consider Berkeley's critique of the claim that a microscope gives us a clearer or 
more accurate view of the world we live in.  According to Berkeley, a microscope "brings us, as it were, into a new 
world."  (§85, 1709 Essay).  The difference between seeing the world through a microscope and seeing the world 
with the naked eye is that "whereas the objects perceived by the eye alone have a certain connexion with tangible 
objects, whereby we are taught to foresee what will ensue upon the approach or application of distance objects to the 
parts of our own body - which much conduceth to its preservation - there is not the like connection between things 
tangible and those visible objects that are perceived by the help of a fine microscope."  (§85).  Thus, were we to be 
granted microscopic vision with the naked eye, "[w]e should be deprived of the aforementioned advantage we at 
present receive by the visive faculty, and have left us only the empty amusement of seeing, without any other benefit 
arising from it."  (§86).      
103  Even in cases of synesthesia, we would not say of a person who experiences a certain color accompanying each 
noise that such a person "heard a color."  Instead, we would say that a person heard a sound and also experienced a 
(visual) color.  Indeed, that's the whole point of synesthesia:  that sensations from different sensory modalities are 
evoked by stimulation from one sensory mode. 
104 Warnock, Berkeley, p. 39. 
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A point of confusion may arise over this claim, given that Berkeley announces it in the 
context of discussing a person who hears a coach approaching outside his/her window, in §§46-
49 of his 1709 Essay on vision.  Thus, one may be tempted to interpret Berkeley's claim that 'we 
see one thing but feel another' to mean that we see one coach, but feel another coach (and, by the 
same argument, hear yet a third coach).  However, as Margaret Atherton has made clear, this was 
not Berkeley's intended meaning.  "The one and the same object," Atherton explains, "we never 
both see and feel is not a physical object, a coach, but an object of sense or way of 
perceiving."105   
Now, to draw out some more important implications of Berkeley's basic theory, let us 
assume that each stream of sense-data (e.g., vision, touch, hearing, etc.) constitutes a completely 
independent stream of data, with no inherent or necessary relation to any other stream of sense-
data.  Let us also assume the position of a staunch empiricist.  Given these starting points, the 
question to consider is this:  how could a correlation be established between elements from two 
or more distinct and independent streams of sense-data?  Moreover, how could sense-data from 
one modality be correlated with sense-data from other modalities in such a way that would result 
in the apparent perception and/or cognition of a medium-sized object that we would describe as 
'having' various sensory 'properties' or 'qualities'?   
One answer, of course, is that independent streams of sense-data are representative of the 
same external (material) object.  Thus, I see that a plate is round and feel that it is round and even 
though these are independent sense modalities, data from each reflects, references, represents, or 
are generated by, the same round object.  The particular nature of the relationship is not relevant 
here, hence my long list of possibilities in the preceding sentence.  What is important is only that 
one may claim that it is the external object itself that is responsible for correlating ideas from one 
sense modality with those of another.  This answer, however, would seem to fly in the face of 
our strict empiricism, so we shall reject this answer, unless no viable alternative can be found. 
Another answer, of course, would be to say that it is due to the Divine Wisdom and Benevolence 
of God that sense-data from one sense modality can correlate or 'agree' with data from other 
modalities.  This would certainly appeal to Berkeley, since he treated visual ideas as elements of 
a language that is authored by God.  However, this would, once again, seem to fly in the face of 
our strict empiricism.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Atherton, Berkeley's Revolution in Vision, p.101. 
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There is an alternative, and it can be derived from Berkeley's theory of vision, with 
special attention paid to the "prejudice" discussed above:  it is the active volitional regulation of 
the perceiver that allows for, or makes possible, the correlation of ideas from one sense modality 
with ideas from another sense modality.  For, while two streams of sense data may hold no 
inherent relation to one another, as long as each stream of sense-data changes (in some 
noticeable way) in direct correlation with the manner in which I modify or regulate my own 
active volition, then I will be able to correlate the changes in one stream of data with the changes 
in the other, according to how each stream changes in relation to changes in my own active 
volition.  So, there are actually two factors involved here:  (1) changes in the active volition of 
the perceiver; and, (2) reliably recurring changes in streams of sense-data that correlate with 
changes in the perceiver's active volition.   
Before proceeding, it must be acknowledged that Berkeley's overall philosophy does 
seem to drastically limit the impact that one's volition can have on the world.  Berkeley asserted, 
in §147 of Part I of the Principles, "the will of man hath no other object, than barely the motion 
of the limbs of the body."  Similarly, in Notebook entry 548, Berkeley wrote:  "We move our 
Legs our selves.  'tis we that will their movement."  However, there is good reason to argue that 
even this is not, strictly speaking, true, according to Berkeley's overall philosophy, since 
Berkeley insists (and rightly, I think) that we are not the cause of any ideas of sense we may 
experience at any given time.  Berkeley argues that it is some other volition that is responsible 
for any ideas of sense we may experience, and he calls this other volition "God."  Whether or not 
we attempt to identify any cause of our sensations, the fact is that we ourselves cannot simply 
will ideas of sense into our awareness.106   
According to Berkeley's division of the world in Active Volition and Passive Idea,  the 
experience of "moving a limb" consists of some relatively specific active regulation or 
modification of volition (what I must do in order to, e.g., expect my toe to move rather than, say, 
a finger), and any sensory 'feedback' (ideas of sense) that may be experienced in conjunction 
with that relatively specific active regulation or modification of volition, but the specific content 
of this sensory feedback is not something I can directly cause or influence.  So, I regulate my 
volition in some relatively specific way and my arm moves, but I do not have any way of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Only in a "lucid dream" can we even come close to this, but this is, of course, not a case of willing ideas of sense 
into existence, into awareness, since such control only occurs in a dream.   
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determining exactly what that event will look like or feel like – that is beyond my control.  My 
extension of Berkeley's New Theory of Vision may nevertheless proceed without any difficulty 
from this fact, because it only requires:  (1) that there is some meaning to "active regulation or 
modification of volition"107; and, (2) that streams of sense-data do, in fact, change in direct 
correlation with such active changes or regulations of volition.   
First, we can easily give meaning to "active regulation or modification of volition" 
because I am clearly aware that there is something different that I do in order to, say, expect my 
arm to move rather than expecting my foot to move, etc.  I may not be able to explain this any 
further; in fact, I cannot.  This is an area where language fails us.  However, I know it to be the 
case, and I can only presume that this is also true of anyone reading this, i.e., you know how to 
read, and you know how to move parts of your body, etc.  So, whatever the ultimate explanation 
for this fact, it is a fact; namely, that I am volitionally, or actively, aware of the difference 
between moving my arm and walking, between talking and jumping, etc.  Indeed, if I was not in 
some way aware of such differences, I could not reliably perform these actions.   
So, if I modify or regulate my volition in a particular way, I experience changes in visual 
data that I may describe (as a sighted adult) as “I see my right arm extending.”  Attendant upon 
that same modification of volition, I also experience changes in kinesthetic and tactile sensations 
that likewise correlate with the manner in which I modify or regulate my volition, and I may 
describe these sensations as “I feel my right arm extending.”  The important point is this:  two 
utterly distinct streams or sets of sense data may be correlated to one another, insofar as they 
each change, in their own way, in direct correlation with the rate and manner in which I regulate 
my own volition.  For, there is a relatively unique and discrete regulation of volition that must be 
executed in order to extend my right arm, as opposed to, say, extending my left arm, or lifting a 
leg, or speaking, or closing my eyes, etc.  That same regulation of volition (what I do in order to 
extend my right arm) directly correlates with changes in visual sensations, and also with changes 
in tactile/kinesthetic sensations; thus, these independent streams of sense-data can acquire a 
relation to one another (for me), but only relative to my own changing volition.   
By contrast, if I were a mere perceiver, fixed in place and with no ability to do anything 
but perceive, i.e., endowed only with a natural receptivity for ideas of sense, then the "prejudice" 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 I use the terms "modify" and "regulate" with regard to active volition because:  (1) volition is continuous as long 
as one is conscious; and, (2) it makes no sense, according to Berkeley, to say one "executes" or "exercises" one's 
volition since one simply "is" one's volition.   
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would never be able to "insinuate itself into my understanding."  For, as Berkeley observed, a 
man born blind and suddenly made to see would not be able to judge a person that he saw before 
him as being erect or inverted until "turning his head or eyes up and down to the right and left, he 
shall observe the visible objects to change... and those that he perceives by turning up his eyes he 
will call upper, and those that he perceives by turning down his eyes he will call lower."  (Essay, 
§97).  Thus, a perceiver must act in order to even allow for the possibility of noticing changes in 
streams of sense-data that correlate with (or 'respond to') changes in the perceiver's own volition.  
One must be able to notice changes in sense-data that "track" or "map onto" changes in one's 
own volition, and thus, one must be able to actually change, or modify, or regulate one's volition.  
Indeed, not only must one be able to regulate volition, one must actually regulate or modify one's 
volition in some way in order to make possible, or allow for, the 'prejudice' to 'insinuate itself' in 
one's understanding.  Moreover, since patterns of sensation from multiple, independent 
modalities (e.g., kinesthetic, tactile, visual, auditory, etc.) simultaneously track one’s changing 
volition, a perceiver will be able to anticipate a complex multitude of possible sensory 
experiences based on sensations from a single sense modality, and there is no reason to limit this 
to vision; data from any sense modality can be used as a sign for expected data from any other 
modality, provided a correlation between the two modes and the perceiver's active volition has 
been established (through experience).108   
Returning to vision for the moment, evidence for the claim that active volitional 
regulation is essential to mastering the use of one’s visual sense can be found in the results of a 
1968 experiment, conducted by Richard Held and Alan Hein, at MIT.  The experiment and its 
results have been summarized by Robert Kurson, as follows:     
 
[Held and Hein] raised two kittens in total darkness.  For a short period during each day 
the kittens were placed in baskets that hung just above the ground from opposite ends of a 
pole.  Holes were cut in one basket to allow one kitten's paws to reach the ground, but not 
in the other.  The apparatus was constructed such that when one basket moved, the other 
moved identically.  When the lights were turned on, the kitten in the basket with holes 
was allowed to run along the ground, causing its basket and its mate's basket to move 
identically, and giving each of them an identical visual experience.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Indeed, Berkeley did not limit his theory to vision.  Consider, for example, §46 of his 1709 Essay:  "Sitting in my 
study I hear a coach drive along the street. . . By the variation of the noise, I perceive the different distances of the 
coach, and know that it approaches before I look out.  Thus, by the ear I perceive distance just after the same manner 
as I do by the eye." 
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At the end of the experiment, only the kitten that had been allowed to actively move the 
basket could move around the world using vision.  The passive kitten - thought it had 
exactly the same visual experience - was functionally blind.  Seeing the world passively 
was not enough; interaction with the world was essential for vision to be useful.109 
 
We may also consider the recent work of J. Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë, regarding the 
role of what they call "sensorimotor contingencies" in visual perception.110  According to 
O'Regan and Noë, the "rules governing the sensory changes produced by various motor actions" 
are termed "sensorimotor contingencies."111  To put this in Berkeley's terms, a "sensorimotor 
contingency" would be an expectation of certain tactile possibilities contingent upon some active 
regulation of volition.  O'Regan and Noë have also argued that each sensory modality has its own 
unique set of sensorimotor contingencies, because each sensory modality changes in its own way 
relative to the changing behavior/volition of the perceiver.  So, for example, while we can expect 
certain changes in our visual experience if we open or close our eyes or change the focus of our 
eyes or turn our head in various directions, the changes we come to expect in, say, auditory 
experience take on a different “structure,” e.g., there is no auditory equivalent to closing or 
blinking one's eyes, and head rotation changes the nature of auditory experience in a way that is 
quite different from how the motion of one's head changes visual experience.112 
O'Regan and Noë have also argued that "[f]or a creature (or a machine for that matter) to 
possess visual awareness, what is required is that, in addition to exercising the mastery of the 
relevant sensorimotor contingencies, it must make use of this exercise for the purposes of 
thought and planning."113  Translated into my extension of Berkeley's theory of vision:  to 
visually perceive, or become aware, of an object of varying size, shape, and/or distance, we must 
actually use what we see as signs to regulate our behavior.  O'Regan and Noë also argue that:  
"among all previously memorized action recipes that allow you to make lawful changes in 
sensory stimulation, only some are applicable at the present moment.  The sets that are 
applicable now are characteristic of the visual attributes of the object you are looking at, and 
their being currently exercised constitutes the fact of your visually perceiving that object."114 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109  Robert Kurson, Crashing Through (Random House, N.Y.: 2007), pp. 238-239. 
110 See e.g., “A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, (2001), 
V.24, pp. 939-1031.   
111 ibid, p. 941. 
112 ibid, pp. 940-941. 
113 ibid, p. 944. 
114 ibid, p. 945, emphasis in original. 
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According to O'Regan and Noë, visual awareness of an object cannot reasonably be 
characterized as an internal or mental "representation" or "reproduction" of the external world; 
instead, it reduces to a form of know-how.  That is, our visual awareness of objects existing 
around us in three-dimensional space reduces to our ability to predict or expect what we will 
experience in either visual or tactile/kinesthetic experience, should we act in one way or the 
other, and these predictions are based on whatever is currently being seen115, coupled, of course, 
with an available repertoire of sensory-motor contingencies, which are forms volitional 
regulation, or just, know-how.  O'Regan and Noë have described this as follows:   
 
Under the present theory, visual experience does not arise because an internal 
representation of the world is activated in some brain area.  On the contrary, visual 
experience is a mode of activity involving practical knowledge about currently possible 
behaviors and associated sensory consequences.  Visual experience rests on know-how, 
the possession of skills.116                     
 
Thus, just as a chess-player knows how to play chess if and only if the player knows, 
based on the present positions of the pieces on the board, what moves he/she can expect to make 
and the results of those possibilities, so do I know of my surroundings, while I sit here typing, if 
and only if I know what to expect, should I regulate my volition in some way or another.  In 
Berkeley's terms, the chess-player treats the present positions of the pieces as signs of what to 
expect, in terms of possible future moves and the results of those moves; and, likewise, one treats 
whatever one sees as signs of what to expect, in terms of possible modifications of volition and 
the expected sensory results of those possible ‘moves.’     
Borrowing, then, the terminology of O'Regan and Noë, I shall refer to changes in sense-
data that correlate with changes in active volition as "sensory-motor contingencies" or "sensory-
motor expectations."  Such an expectation could be described in the form of  “In the presence of 
sensation(s)-X, I expect to experience sensation(s)-Y, if I do Z.”  So, for example, I am currently 
seated in my apartment, and based on what I see as I look straight ahead, I expect to see other 
familiar sights if I turn my head to the left or right, etc.  Moreover, because patterns of 
experience from each sense simultaneously track my changing volition, I also expect to 
experience various tactile sensations, should I exercise my will in certain ways, based only on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Note that O'Regan and Noë's account theory is limited to vision.  According to my extension of Berkeley's theory 
of vision, however, data from any sensory modality can serve as volitional cues, provided the requisite correlations 
have been established, so we can extend O'Regan and Noë's account to apply to any and all sensory modalities. 
116 ibid, p. 946. 
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what I currently perceive through my visual sense alone.  For example, based on what I am 
presently seeing, I expect to experience relatively specific tactile sensations, should I extend my 
right arm in a particular manner, and I could describe this sensory-motor expectation by saying, 
“if I extend my right arm, I expect to feel my coffee cup (with/on my fingers),” or simply:  "I see 
that my coffee cup is within reach of my hand.”         
 Likewise, the kinesthetic feelings that attend a certain movement of my eyes and/or a 
change in the shape of the ocular lens, coupled with the variations of light and color that I 
perceive as this happens, might collectively lead me to expect a certain tactile experience should 
I exercise my will in some way and for some relatively specific duration.  I could express this by 
saying, "I see that a smooth solid object [my coffee cup] is within reach of my right hand," or in 
another situation, "I see a sharp object a few paces away from me," or perhaps, “Seeing what I 
take to be a sliver of ocean on the horizon leads me to expect that it will take hours of walking 
before I will arrive at the beach.”  Notice that, according to this approach, any sense of distance 
that I acquire upon perceiving some visual pattern(s) will be reducible to the amount and degree 
of volition/effort that I expect to endure in order to experience whatever tactile sensations may 
have been signified or suggested by those visual pattern(s).  This is, of course, consistent with 
Berkeley's arguments from his 1709 Essay.   
 It is also worth considering that using visual data as volitional cues in this way is what 
allows us to use our visual sense to quickly navigate through experience in the pursuit of 
pleasure and avoidance of pain.  Recall that Berkeley's "prejudice" is akin to a form of 
synesthesia; once an association has become familiar and habitual the "sudden suggestions" of 
sense 'transform' our perception so that we "see" various non-visual sensory-motor 
contingencies, e.g., tactile contingencies.  This enables an acting perceiver to make rapid changes 
in volition because no conscious judgment or inference would be required to become aware of 
the relevant expectations and, thus, to regulate volition according to those expectations. 
 To better understand this, consider what it takes to run anywhere without injuring one's 
self.  To do this, one must quickly negotiate obstacles, and the visual sense is uniquely useful in 
this regard.  It allows us to forecast tactile possibilities and, thereby, modify our behavior so as to 
avoid them.  To do this quickly, however, we cannot afford to pause and deliberate over what to 
expect from a given visual pattern; instead, we simply see tactile (or "physical") objects of a 
various sizes, shapes, and at varying distances from ourselves.  Of course, we do not literally 
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"see" any of this, since all we ever see is a changing patchwork of light and color.  However, we 
do expect various tactile possibilities based on what we see, and we come to expect these 
possibilities with such an immediacy and level of certainty that we can unhesitatingly act upon 
them. 
 Thus, if I am running and I notice an obstacle in my path, I modify my behavior so as to 
avoid tactile/tangible collision, and this alteration can take place so quickly as to preclude the 
possibility of serious thought, or inferential deliberation.  At the same time, though, it need not 
be a mindless reflex:  I can consciously notice an obstacle and deliberately (albeit, very quickly) 
decide how to modify my behavior so as to avoid it, e.g., I am being pursued and I am running at 
top speed, I notice an obstacle and quickly decide whether to dodge around it or jump over it, 
taking into consideration whatever I may expect regarding which action might best distance me 
from my pursuer, etc., and all of this deliberation can happen in an instant.  To make such an 
instant but deliberate decision, and then successfully execute either action (dodging or jumping), 
I must have immediately at hand some sense of the relative size and shape of the obstacle (to 
execute the proper motions that would get me around or over the obstacle) and I must have some 
sense of the relative distance of the obstacle (to execute the dodge/jump at the proper time).   
 Accordingly, seeing how to avoid an obstacle just is seeing the size, shape, and relative 
distance of the obstacle.  Thus, as soon as I perceive various visual patterns, I am also made 
immediately aware of various behavioral options and how to carry them out (or, at least, how to 
try), and this incredibly advantageous ability is made possible because I have learned how to see, 
or rather, I have become fluent in using visual sensations as Signs of various sensory-motor 
expectations.  Accordingly, the “prejudice” has insinuated itself into my understanding and I no 
longer perceive a meaningless patchwork of light and color; instead, I perceive objects of 
varying distance, size and shape, as various tactile-volitional expectations have become 
synesthetically fused with the relevant host of operative visual cues.   
 Moreover, because Berkeley treated visual data as elements of a language, we can also 
conclude that a visual idea or pattern of ideas will only acquire meaning if it is actually used as a 
sign.  Thus, as soon as I recognize a correlation between certain visual patterns117 and my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 For this to work, we must assume that we have an ability to recognize sensory patterns at one time as being "the 
same as" sensory patterns (from the same sensory modality) perceived in the past.  This need not be an objective 
'sameness', however; we only need to have the ability to make that 'recognition' – we can assume that if making that 
recognition turns out to be beneficial to the actor/perceiver, then it will become reinforced; if not, it will be ignored.   
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behavior, and a correlation between, say, certain tactile sensations and that same behavior on my 
part, then I can correlate the visual with the tactile, i.e., I can now use those visual patterns as 
signs to expect those tactile patterns, should I regulate my volition in a certain way.  Hence, the 
signs of Berkeley's Natural Language only acquire their meaning by serving as cues for the 
regulation of volition/behavior.  I shall return to this very important point in the next section.               
 To return to our runner who jumps over or runs around obstacles - the particular 'look' of 
an obstacle is only relevant to the runner insofar as it informs the runner of how to modify 
his/her volition so as to avoid tactile expectations/possibilities, and according to the synesthetic 
"prejudice," this know-how should manifest itself in the runner's visual experience as the 
apparent size, shape and distance of an obstacle.  Thus, the runner does not, strictly speaking, 
“see” the size, shape and distance “of” some thing, X, where X can be called “the obstacle” and 
where X has, in and of itself, various ‘properties’ of size, shape, and distance, etc.  Instead, the 
runner simply sees a changing patchwork of light and color, but the runner’s visual perception is 
distorted by the prejudice born of a long tract of interactive experience and resultant know-how.  
That is, the runner makes "sudden judgments" or receives "immediate suggestions of sense" 
concerning tactile-motor possibilities, based on what is presently seen.  As a result, the visual 
patterns that the runner sees and the various sensory-motor possibilities the runner becomes 
immediately aware of "are so blended and confounded together as to be mistaken for one and the 
same thing - out of which prejudice we cannot easily extricate ourselves."  (1709 Essay §79). 
   We should keep in mind that when Berkeley speaks of extricating ourselves from this 
prejudice, he does not mean that we could, or even should, actually do this.  For, doing so would 
render a person functionally blind; without the “prejudice” in place, we would be in the position 
of a Molyneux Man, and while this would certainly be a revelatory experience for the truly strict 
empiricist, it would also make life exceedingly difficult.  Consider, for example, the following 
account of "Virgil," a 50 year old man whose sight was restored through a pair of cataract 
removal operations: 
 
 …he said that in general he found walking "scary" and "confusing" without touch, 
without his cane, with his uncertain, unstable judgment of space and distance.  
Sometimes surfaces or objects would seem to loom, to be on top of him, when they were 
still quite a distance away; sometimes he would get confused by his own shadow (the 
whole concept of shadows, of objects blocking light, was puzzling to him) and would 
come to a stop, or trip, or try to step over it.  Steps, in particular, posed a special hazard, 
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because all he could see was a confusion, a flat surface, of parallel and crisscrossing 
lines; he could not see them (although he knew them) as solid objects going up or coming 
down in three-dimensional space.  Now, five weeks after surgery, he often felt more 
disabled than he had felt when he was blind, and he had lost the confidence, the ease of 
moving, that he had possessed then.118   
 
 Berkeley’s point was not that we should rid ourselves of this incalculably valuable 
“prejudice,” but only that philosophers must take this phenomenon into account when inquiring 
into the nature of the world around us and the apparent multitude of “physical objects” we (seem 
to) see around us; otherwise, we are bound to draw the wrong speculative conclusions.  For, 
while this prejudice may be wonderfully advantageous on a purely practical level, it is just as 
pernicious at a purely speculative or philosophical level, insofar as it represents a distortion of 
visual perception.  As Berkeley explained, in §35 of his 1733 The Theory of Vision or Visual 
Language Vindicated and Explained: 
 
 There hath been a long and close connexion in our minds between the ideas of sight and 
touch.  Hence they are considered as one thing – which prejudice suiteth well enough 
with the purpose of life; and language is suited to this prejudice.  The work of science and 
speculation is to unravel our prejudices and mistakes, untwisting the closest connexions, 
distinguishing things that are different; instead of confused or perplexed, giving us 
distinct views; gradually correcting our judgment, and reducing it to philosophical 
exactness.  And, as this work is the work of time, and done by degrees, it is extremely 
difficult, if at all possible, to escape the snares of popular language, and the being 
betrayed thereby to say things strictly speaking neither true nor consistent.  This makes 
thought and candour more especially necessary in the reader.  For, language being 
accommodated to the praenotions of men and use of life, it is difficult to express therein 
the precise truth of things, which is so distant from their use, and so contrary to our 
praenotions. 
 
 Now, any modification in my behavior (e.g., deciding whether to jump or dodge an 
obstacle) will be based only what I see, and I cannot collide with any visual sensation(s).  Thus, I 
alter my behavior to avoid painful tactile sensations that I will not actually experience/perceive if 
my avoidance behavior is successful.  That is, I act as if certain relevant tactile-motor 
possibilities were, in fact, present and actual.  Thus, to say one regulates one’s volition 
“according to” various sensory-motor expectations is just to say that one acts as if those sensory-
motor possibilities were actually existent/present.  Indeed, with the “prejudice” fully in place, I 
will “see” those possibilities as present actualities, insofar as I will see more than a mere 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118  Oliver Sacks, An Anthropologist on Mars (Vintage Books, New York: 1995), pp. 120-121. 
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patchwork of light and color, i.e., I will perceive my visual field as a world of three-dimensional 
objects of varying size and shape and at various distances from me.     
If my avoidance behavior is successful, one could reasonably say that there really were 
no tactile sensations to avoid, since no such sensations were ever actually experienced, and an 
unexperienced sensation is no sensation at all.  We might avoid this apparent paradox by saying 
that the anticipated tactile sensations existed in potentia.  However, it would be more accurate to 
say that there never were any painful tactile sensations, since my avoidance behavior was 
successful, but that there were certain expectations of tactile possibilities, and the modifications 
of volition that constitute my successful “avoidance behavior” just are those "expectations."   
In any case, we should be able to see that, however useful this "prejudice" may be to practical 
existence and our continued survival, it also leads us to associate two quite different elements so 
closely with one another that they become fused, as it were, in our thoughts and perceptions.  If 
this is true, then philosophers must take this into account before setting out to say anything about 
perception, reality, the ontological status of "objects" etc., since what we think we immediately 
see (e.g., tables, chairs, etc.) is not, strictly speaking, what we immediately see (e.g., light and 
color).  As Berkeley explained, in §36 of his 1733 Theory of Vision or Visual Language 
Vindicated and Explained: 
 
 In the contrivance of Vision, as that of other things, the wisdom of Providence seemeth to 
have consulted the operation rather than the theory of man; to the former things are 
admirably fitted, but, by that very means, the latter is often perplexed.  For, as useful as 
these immediate suggestions and constant connexions are to direct our actions; so is our 
distinguishing between things confounded, and as it were blended together, no less 
necessary to the speculation and knowledge of truth. 
 
 Evidence for this synesthetic 'prejudice' can also be found in the way we casually 
describe certain objects.  For example, if I see a certain visual pattern that has habitually led me 
to expect that, were I to reach out my hand, I would feel a smooth surface, I do not consciously 
infer this; instead, I (seem to) see a smooth surface, and accordingly, I might say, "I see that it is 
smooth" or that "it looks smooth."  Strictly speaking, however, either description would be 
absurd, since "smooth” describes a purely tactile experience, and not a visual one.  How could 
something literally look smooth?  We might as well say that a certain sound looks sour.  And, 
yet, we commonly report our visual experiences by saying that what we see with our eyes "looks 
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like" whatever tactile experiences we expect to encounter, should we exercise our will in one 
way or the other, e.g., "that knife looks sharp" or "that stove looks hot" etc.   
According to Berkeley, the fact that we talk this way merely reflects and reinforces the 
underlying prejudice in question.  As he explained, at §35 of his 1733 Theory of Vision or Visual 
Language Vindicated and Explained, “[t]here hath been a long and close connexion in our minds 
between the ideas of sight and touch.  Hence they are considered as one thing – which prejudice 
suiteth well enough with the purpose of life; and language is suited to this prejudice.”  Thus, we 
do not simply speak this way while nevertheless perceiving a mere patchwork of light and color; 
instead, we literally seem to see qualities like sharpness or heat, despite the undeniable fact that, 
literally or strictly speaking, these are not visual qualities at all.   
According to my extension of Berkeley’s Theory of Vision, when visual sensations are 
perceived as ‘having’ tactile properties, the “prejudice” has fully “insinuated itself into our 
understanding.”  In other terms, the “prejudice” occurs when we perceive a fusion or union of the 
"mediate object" of perception (e.g., a tactile-motor expectation) with the "immediate object" of 
perception (e.g., a pattern of light and color).  Berkeley summarized this at §66 of his 1709 
Essay:   
 
We are nevertheless exceedingly prone to imagine those things which are perceived only 
by the mediation of others to be themselves the immediate objects of sight, or at least to 
have in their own nature a fitness to be suggested by them before ever they have been 
experienced to coexist with them.  From which prejudice every one perhaps will not find 
it easy to emancipate himself, by any the clearest convictions of reason. 
 
 This passage identifies the essential nature of this "prejudice."  We strictly or literally 
perceive, by sight, only various patterns of light and color, and these are the "immediate objects 
of sight."  For, "what we immediately and properly see are only lights and colors in sundry 
situations and shades and degrees of faintness and clearness, confusion and distinctness" (Essay, 
§73).  We could also say that we see visual "shapes" and/or visual "patterns" but we must keep in 
mind that these shapes or patterns are entirely and absolutely visual, i.e., they are shapes or 
patterns of light and color in our visual field, and nothing else.  We must be vigilant in this 
regard because it is the very nature of this prejudice that we form the contrary belief:  that we 
immediately see something that is not visual (or, that we see more than we can see).    
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 Since those of us sighted since birth have lived with and operated according to this 
prejudice for longer than we can remember, its operation in the visual realm will doubtless be 
difficult to appreciate.119  However, people who have been sighted since birth can still be made 
aware of this, as Berkeley pointed out in §43 of the Essay:  "And, perhaps, upon a strict inquiry, 
we shall not find that even those who from their birth have grown up in a continued habit of 
seeing are irrevocably prejudiced on the other side, to wit, in thinking what they see to be at a 
distance from them."120  In this regard, Berkeley was adamant that the key to appreciating the 
active presence of this prejudice in the visual realm was to carefully consider the situation of a 
"Molyneux Man":           
 
In order to disentangle our minds from whatever prejudices we may entertain with 
relation to the subject in hand, nothing seems more apposite than the taking into our 
thoughts the case of one born blind, and afterwards, when grown up, made to see.  And - 
though perhaps it may not be a task altogether easy and familiar to us, to divest ourselves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119  It may be helpful here to recall the analogy to the noises/words of a spoken language.  Since I am writing in 
English, imagine English was the only language you had ever heard, and that no amount of repeating a familiar word 
would ever make it sound any different.  In that case, you would never have reason to think that, say, "apple" could 
ever be heard as anything other than the meaningful word that you hear it to be.  Thus, you would not even be able 
to imagine what the "mere noise of ‘ahp-pull’" referred to, since you could never repeat the word enough times to 
experience that perceptual transformation.  Its status as a meaningful word would be riveted into your thoughts and 
perceptions.  However, the fact would remain that mere noise is all the audible sense ever hears.  Nevertheless, 
whenever we hear "apple" as a word rather than a mere noise, we do seem to be hearing something more than a mere 
noise.  In just the same fashion, when we seem to see non-visual properties, and/or when we claim to see non-visual 
“objects” that only 'have' visual qualities, e.g., a desk, a chair, a tree, etc., we certainly seem to be seeing more than 
what our visual sense can actually provide.  To fully accept this, it is imperative that one take into account and 
carefully consider the reports of any 'Molyneux Men.'                 
120 Note that when Berkeley claims that it is a prejudice to believe that what we see is at a distance from us, we must, 
once again, keep in mind that what we see is just visual data.  That is, we see patterns or shapes of color in our 
visual field, and as actually experienced immediate sensations it would not make sense to say they existed at some 
‘distance’ from the perceiver.  Of course, as signs, the sensations are perceived right along with a host of sensory-
motor expectations, including those kinesthetic-motor expectations that are, or can be, described in terms of 
“distance.”  By the same token, if I hear a distant train whistle, the noise that I actually hear is not any "distance" 
from me.  However, the quality and context of the noise leads me to expect, based on past experience with such 
noises and with hearing in general, that I could find various sensations that I call "train" if I exercise my will so as to 
move myself in the appropriate direction for an appropriate amount of time.  One could attempt to refute this by, 
e.g., shining a beam of light onto a far wall to prove that we can, in fact, see a mere patch of light/color as being at a 
distance from us.  The problem with such a demonstration is that it would take place under the influence of the very 
prejudice in question.  So, the response to such a ‘demonstration’ should be:  of course you see the light on that far 
wall as being at a distance, but that's only because you’ve grown up in the “continued habit of seeing.”   That is, 
you've become fluent in using visual signs; so, you cannot see things any other way (just as you cannot hear the 
words of your native tongue as anything but meaningful words).  But, a "Molyneux Man" would not see the splotch 
of light on the far wall as being at any distance, much less as “a beam of light projected onto a far wall.”  Instead, a 
Molyneux Man would simply see a splotch of color in his visual field, and one that is not distinguishable from any 
other in any distance-relative way; only after a great deal of interactive practice with his new visual sense would he 
perceive this as a beam of light projected onto a far wall, as it is perceived by those who have been sighted since 
birth.     
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entirely of the experiences received from sight, so as to be able to put our thoughts 
exactly in the posture of such a one's - we must, nevertheless, as far as possible, 
endeavour to frame true conceptions of what might reasonably be supposed to pass in his 
mind.121 
   
 So, to return to the Molyneux Problem, we may consider the case of a nine year old boy 
whose sight was restored, several years after the Cheseldon case.  Upon being presented with a 
cube and a sphere, the boy could immediately perceive a difference in their visual shape, but 
could not say what that difference was.  "It was not until they had many times been placed in his 
hands that he learnt to distinguish by the eye the one which he had just had in his hands, from the 
other placed beside it.  He gradually became more correct in his perception, but it was only after 
several days that he could or would tell by the eyes alone, which was the sphere and which the 
cube; when asked, he always, before answering, wished to take both into his hands; even when 
this was allowed, when immediately afterwards the objects were placed before the eyes, he was 
not certain of the figure."122  This account went on to say of the boy that, "[o]f distance he had 
not the least conception," and that "[h]e said everything touched his eyes, and walked about most 
carefully, with his hands held out in before him, to prevent things hurting his eyes by touching 
them."123   
 Since 1728, there have been several other cases like this, wherein a person born blind is 
made to see, and the results are invariably the same:  the person seeing the world for the first 
time does not understand much, if any, of what he/she sees (or, certainly not in any way 
comparable to a normally sighted adult); and, a great deal of interactive practice is required if the 
person is to make sense and/or use of this new flood of visual information as would an adult who 
had been sighted since birth.  Moreover, as Berkeley had predicted in 1709, the most profound 
difficulties seem to arise when making judgments of distance and magnitude by vision alone.  
For example, recall "Virgil," the  man who had been “virtually blind since childhood” but who, 
at the age of 50, had his sight restored through a pair of cataract removal operations.  Dr. Sacks 
recounted that, following the restoration of his sight, Virgil would jump if he perceived birds 
coming too close.  The birds did not actually come close to Virgil but, as Dr. Sacks reported, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 1709 Essay, §92. 
122  Fraser, Works, Vol. 1, p. 447-448, citing from Nunnely's The Organs of Vision:  their Anatomy and Physiology 
(1858).   
123  Fraser, Works, Vol. 1, p. 447-448, citing from Nunnely's The Organs of Vision:  their Anatomy and Physiology 
(1858). 
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“Virgil simply had no idea of distance.”  (p. 119).  Sacks also tells us that while Virgil enjoyed 
the “uncluttered views” of rolling hills of green grass, “it was difficult for him. . . to connect the 
visual shapes of hills with the tangible hills he had walked up, and he had no idea of size or 
perspective.”  (p.119).   
We might also consider the case of patient "H.S." whose vision had been completely lost 
at the age of fifteen, and then restored twenty-two years later through a corneal transplant.  H.S. 
described his experiences after the surgery:  "During these first weeks [after surgery] I had no 
appreciation of depth or distance; street lights were luminous stains stuck to the window panes, 
and the corridors of the hospital were black holes." (p. 121).124  In fact, according to Dr. Sacks, 
drastic misapprehensions of distance are not limited to those who have had their sight restored: 
 
Sensation itself has no “markers” for size and distance; these have to be learned on the 
basis of experience.  Thus it has been reported that if people who have lived their entire 
lives in dense rain forest, with a far point no more than a few feet away, are brought into 
a wide, empty landscape, they may reach out and try to touch the mountaintops with their 
hands; they have no concept of how far the mountains are.125   
 
 The 1728 Cheseldon case represented the first empirical evidence that could be brought 
to bear on the "Molyneux Problem," and the results Cheseldon reported were just  as Berkeley 
had predicted in 1709; hence, Berkeley's "vindication."  Moreover, if anyone doubted the initial 
assumption of Berkeley's argument described above - that distance is not directly or immediately 
perceived by vision alone - the consistent results of these cases should remove any such doubt.  
For, if distance were immediately perceived by vision alone, we should expect a person who has 
just been bestowed with a fully functional visual sense to acquire a sense of distance right along 
with their newly restored vision.  Even if such a person was unsure how to describe their newly 
acquired visual sense of distance, they should nevertheless have it, i.e., they should be able to use 
their new visual sense to avoid bumping into things while they walk or run.  In fact, as we have 
already seen, people with newly restored sight have extreme difficulty using their newly acquired 
visual sense to navigate through the world and a great deal of interactive practice is required 
before the "prejudice" will "insinuate itself" into their understanding, such that they come to see 
the world as most sighted adults, i.e., a world of tables and chairs, etc. 
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  Sacks, An Anthropologist on Mars, pp. 108-152.	  	  	  
125 ibid, p. 119, fn. 6. 
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 The world presents us with multiple and independent streams of sense-data (vision, 
hearing, touch, etc.) and the only fact of final importance, for Berkeley, is that these streams of 
data remain to some degree consistent and reliable.  As he explained in §160 of Siris, “[W]ithout 
a regular course, nature could never be understood; mankind must always be at a loss, not 
knowing what to expect, or how to govern themselves, or direct their actions for the obtaining of 
any end.”  That nature remains “on a regular course” or “consistent and reliable” only means that 
it will be possible to form sensory-motor expectations that will continue to 'hold true', or just 
work (relative to any subject’s particular goals/plans) over time.  Thus, so long as these multiple 
streams of sense-data reliably change in some way that is in direct correlation to changes in a 
perceiver's volition, the formation of sensory-motor expectations will be possible, and the 
particular 'content' of these data streams becomes an arbitrary matter.  For, any bit of sense-data 
is just a point of behavioral reference that allows for the formation of general rules of behavior, 
and the only requirement for such a perceptual-volitional system is that changes in sense-data 
correlate with changes in the perceiver's volition.  Exactly what those changes are is not finally 
important.  Thus, just as the particular noises that make up a given human language can be 
perfectly arbitrary, provided they are spoken or written with some requisite degree of 
consistency, so to is the particular 'content' of sensory experience equally arbitrary. 
 This means that what an object looks like is not, by itself, what allows us to visually 
recognize and identify the object.  Recall, for example, the conclusion drawn by O'Regan and 
Noë:  "among all previously memorized action recipes that allow you to make lawful changes in 
sensory stimulation, only some are applicable at the present moment.  The sets that are 
applicable now are characteristic of the visual attributes of the object you are looking at, and 
their being currently exercised constitutes the fact of your visually perceiving that object."  (p. 
945, emphasis in original).  Accordingly, being able to visually identify something as, say, a 
"staircase" rather than, say, "a confusion, a flat surface, of parallel and crisscrossing lines"126 
requires that the "prejudice" be "insinuated" into one's understanding, and that requires some 
inter-active practice with one's visual sense.  Moreover, since the particular visual patterns are an 
arbitrary matter, provided they change with the requisite level of consistency to allow for the 
formation of sensory-motor contingencies, I need only expect that a certain form of volitional 
regulation (what we might call stair-relative behavior) is currently applicable.  So, I know that I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 See supra n. 119 and accompanying text (the case of "Virgil"). 
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am in the presence of stairs when I am prepared to unhesitatingly act in a stair-relative way.  
That is, my (volitional) certainty in this regard is what passes for my knowledge, or belief, that I 
am in the presence of stairs.127  The visual patterns I see may 'suddenly suggest' this to me, but 
the point is that these patterns could have been anything; the specific 'content' of the visual 
patterns is not what drives this process forward.   
 Before applying this extension of Berkeley's theory of vision to understanding Berkeley's 
partially developed approach to human language, I shall briefly re-examine Berkeley's tragic 
argument for God as the "eternal spirit" that maintains the continuity of objects when not 
perceived by finite minds.  For, we should now be in a position to see the fatal flaw in that 
argument.  In fact, John Stuart Mill's criticism of this argument perfectly identified this fatal 
flaw.   
 Mill argued that Berkeley "did not see clearly that the sensations I have to-day are not the 
same as those I had yesterday, which are gone, never to return; but are only exactly similar; and 
that what has been kept in continuous existence is but a potentiality of having such sensations, 
or, to express it in other words, a law of uniformity in nature, by virtue of which similar 
sensations might and would have recurred, at any intermediate time, under similar conditions."128  
He went on to argue that "[t]hese sensations, which I did not have, but which experience teaches 
me that I might have had at any time during the intermission of my actual sensations, are not a 
positive entity subsisting through that time: they did not exist as sensations, but as a guaranteed 
belief; implying constancy in the order of phenomena, but not a spiritual substance for the 
phenomena to dwell in when not present to my own mind."129 
 Mill was correct.  For, according to what has been advanced above, there is nothing that 
God needs to perceive in order to maintain the uniformity and reliability of our experiences.  We 
may illustrate this by considering any modern "first-person" computer game, or computer 
generated virtual reality.  In the course of playing a game, a player sees on-screen, e.g., an enemy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Curiously, there is some slight indication that Berkeley may have been developing something along these lines.  
See e.g., Notebook entry 776:  "Agreeable to my Doctrine of Certainty.  He that acts not in order to the obtaining of 
eternal Happyness must be an infidel at least he is not certain of a future judgment.”  Thus, one may proclaim his/her 
fervent belief in the tenets of, say, Christianity, but if this person does not actually modify his/her volition according 
to those beliefs (i.e., does not act “in order for the obtaining of eternal Happyness”), Berkeley would say that this 
person is still not “certain” of those beliefs and, thus, “must be an infidel.”  Unfortunately, a few notebook entries 
are all we have regarding Berkeley's nascent "doctrine of certainty."    
128 J.S. Mill, "Berkeley's Life and Writings" The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. vii, p. 451. 
129 ibid. 
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soldier crouching behind cover.  The player moves the mouse, or presses a button on a game-
controller, and the view on the screen shifts, i.e., the player's 'avatar' "turns around" (within the 
game-world, that is; not the actual human player).  When the player "turns back around" (within 
the game-world), the enemy soldier is still seen to be crouching in the same place.  Berkeley's 
argument regarding God's continued perception of objects amounts to saying that the enemy 
soldier the player sees at one moment (which is nothing more than changing pixels of light and 
color on the computer screen) must somehow persist in that same form even when the player 
looks away (within the game-world).  Berkeley's argument here would be tantamount to arguing 
that the computer's hardware and software must continue to 'perceive' the enemy soldier 
whenever a player turns away (in the game-world).  In fact, however, the computer hardware and 
software need only be able to regenerate the appropriate patterns of light/color at the appropriate 
times, in relation to the actions of the player, in order to produce a seamless 'virtual reality' such 
that a player may turn back around and see the "same" enemy soldier.130 
 This argument was a tragic mistake on Berkeley's part because it is inconsistent with the 
powerful implications of his New Theory of Vision, implications that Berkeley himself may or 
may not have fully appreciated.  Moreover, as Mill pointed out, "[t]his illogical side of 
Berkeley’s theory was the part of it to which he himself attached the greatest value; and he 
would have been much grieved if he had foreseen the utter neglect of his favourite argument for 
Theism."131 
 
3.2 BERKELEY AND LANGUAGE 
 
 In Chapter II, Berkeley's "emotive" theory of meaning was introduced, in the context of 
discussing Berkeley's rejection of abstract ideas in Introduction to the Principles.  In this section, 
I shall examine Berkeley's partial development of that theory of meaning, in light of what has 
been advanced thus far.   
 Recall that Berkeley treated visual perception as the comprehension of a Natural 
Language.  That sensory experience could be treated literally as a form of language was 
important to Berkeley because, inter alia, it enabled him to advance an argument for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 David Berman has suggested that modern readers of Berkeley can greatly benefit by considering such 'virtual 
reality' scenarios.  See Berman, Berkeley (Routledge 1999), pp. 25, 35.  In fact, I am currently drafting an article 
wherein I consider various arguments advanced by Berkeley in the context of such virtual realities. 
131 J.S. Mill, "Berkeley's Life and Writings" The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. vii, p. 451. 
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existence of God, as the Author of this Natural Language.132  The argument, in very brief 
summary, was this:  if being in the presence of language is a sure sign that one is in the presence 
of another “spirit” (i.e., volition/mind); and, if sensory experience is literally a kind of Natural 
Language; then, sensory experience provides as much (if not more) evidence for “God” (an 
arbitrary name for the author of this natural language) as spoken language provides for the 
existence of other (finite) minds.133  As intriguing as this argument may be, it will not be 
explored any further in this dissertation. 
 What should concern us, however, is the other direction of this comparison; for, just as 
Berkeley was able to borrow a feature of artificial (human) language and apply it to the “Natural 
Language” that is sensory experience in order to advance his theological argument; he was 
likewise able to borrow features of his theory of vision and apply them to his understanding of 
artificial (human) languages, and based on Berkeley's partial development of his theory of 
language and meaning, it would appear that Berkeley did just that.  For, as we have seen, 
Berkeley's theory of vision entails that sensory ideas become meaningful Signs only by an acting 
perceiver making use of them as cues for volitional regulation according to various sensory-
motor expectations.  Thus, based on that theory, Berkeley should have been able to extend that to 
artificial language in order to realize, e.g., that words may be meaningful without calling to 
mind, or being ‘annexed to’ any underlying ideas whatsoever, provided those artificial signs are 
used as signs for the regulation of volition.   
 In fact, this is precisely what we find Berkeley arguing in various places in his published 
works.  The most direct instance of this can be found in the Seventh Dialogue of Alciphron, §11, 
where Euphranor states:  “signs may be significant, though they should not suggest ideas 
represented by them – provided they serve to regulate and influence our wills, passions, and 
conduct.”  Likewise, in a letter to Johnson dated March 24, 1730, he wrote:  “words...  as often 
terminate in the will as in the understanding, being employed rather to excite, influence, and 
direct action, than to produce clear and distinct ideas.”  And, again, in §17 of the Seventh 
Dialogue of Alciphron:  "the true end of speech, reason, science, faith, assent, in all its different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See e.g., Robert J. Baum, "The Instrumentalist and Formalist Elements of Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics" 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 3 (1972) no. 2, 119-134, p. 121:  "One of the conclusions of the Essay 
Towards a New Theory of Vision was that the visible world is not only a system of signs which man can use for 
anticipating tactile sensations, but that it is in fact the language of God, the Author of Nature." 
133 This argument is advanced by Euphranor in the Fourth Dialogue of Alciphron. 
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degrees, is not merely, or principally, or always, the imparting or acquiring of ideas, but rather 
something of an active operative nature.”134   
 That Berkeley could have arrived at this conclusion – that the true end of artificial signs 
is "something of an active operative nature" - should come as no surprise, given his Theory of 
Vision, and his claim that visual ideas constitute a Natural Language.  More importantly, we 
know from the Theory of Vision that any (patterns of) idea of sense will only acquire meaning in 
virtue of the "prejudice" which can only become operative relative to active volitional regulation 
(of the perceiver).  That is, only when we perceive ideas of sense as signs will the prejudice 
insinuate itself into our understanding, thus giving meaning to those ideas of sense; and, to say 
we perceive ideas of sense as signs is simply to say that we use them as cues for the active 
regulation of volition/behavior.   
 Thus, with regard to mathematics, Berkeley wrote, in §122 of Part I of the Principles:  
“In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things but the signs, which nevertheless are not 
regarded for their own sake, but because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and 
dispose rightly of them.”  And again, in §8 of the Seventh Dialogue of Alciphron:  “though it 
seems neither you nor I can form distinct simple ideas of number, we can nevertheless make a 
very proper and significant use of numeral names.  They direct us in the disposition and 
management of our affairs, and are of such necessary use, that we should not know how to do 
without them."  
 We have already seen Berkeley's claim, in §20 of the Introduction to the Principles, that 
“the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is 
commonly supposed.”  Recall also that Berkeley went on to explain that “[t]here are other ends, 
as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in 
some particular disposition – to which the former [imparting ideas] is in many cases barely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134  §17, Alciphron VII.  For a look at Berkeley's developing thoughts in this regard, we may consult the following 
three Notebook entries.  First, entry 661:  "Some words there are which do not stand for Ideas v.g. particles Will 
etc."  Note that a 'particle' is a word like 'but' or 'and' or 'not'.  Now, entry 661a:  "particles stand for volitions & their 
concomitant Ideas."  And, finally, entry 667:  "Tis allow'd that Particles stand not for Ideas & yet they are not said to 
be empty useless sounds.  The truth on't is they stand for the operations of the mind, i.e., volitions."  Tipton has 
noted that this accords with Locke's treatment of particles:  "In a chapter which is for some unaccountable reason 
usually cut from abridged editions of the Essay Locke had conceded that particles (words such as 'if', 'but and 'not') 
do not stand for ideas, and Berkeley seizes on this in PC 661 and 667... Berkeley follows Locke in supposing that if 
such words do not stand for ideas then they must stand for something, and he agrees with Locke that they stand for 
operations of the mind."  Tipton, Berkeley, The Philosophy of Immaterialism, p. 153. 
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subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think 
does not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language.”  We also saw that, in the Draft 
Introduction, Berkeley was willing to claim that "names, significiant names, do not always stand 
for ideas, but that they may be and are often used to good purpose [tho’ they are] without being 
suppos’d to stand for or represent any idea at all."   
 We may also consider a pair of letters that Berkeley wrote to Samuel Molyneux in 1709.  
In a letter dated Dec. 8, 1709, in response to a question from Molyneux as to whether we can 
“reason without ideas,” Berkeley wrote:  “We may very well, and in my Opinion often do, 
reason without Ideas but only the Words us’d, being usd [sic] for the most parts as Letters in 
Algebra, which tho they denote particular Quantities, Yet every step do not suggest them to our 
Thoughts, and for all that We may reason or perform Operations intirly [sic] about them” (my 
emphasis).  Eleven days later (Dec. 19, 1709), Berkeley wrote another letter to Molyneux: 
 
 You tell Me that if, as I think, Words do not at every Turn suggest the respective Ideas 
they are supposed to stand for it is purely by Chance Our Discourse hangs together, and 
is found after 2 or 3 hours jingling & permutation of Sounds to agree with our Thoughts.  
As for what I said of Algebra, You are of Opinion the Illustration will not hold good 
because there are no Set rules except those of the Syllogisms whereby to range & 
permute [our] Words like to the Algebraic Process.  In Answer to all which I observe 
first, That if We put Our Words together any how and at Random then indeed there may 
be some Grounds for what You say, but if people lay their Words together with Design 
and according to Rule then there can be no Pretence so far as I can see for your Inference.  
Secondly. I cannot but dissent from what You say, of there being no Set Rules for the 
Ranging and Disposition of Words but only the Syllogistic, for to Me it appears That all 
Grammar & every part Logic contains little else than Rules for Discourse & 
Ratiocination by Words.  And those who do not expressly set themselves to study those 
Arts do nevertheless learn them insensibly by Custom. 
 
 Notice that, by rejecting the view that words are merely vehicles for underlying ideas, 
Berkeley arrived at the only conclusion possible:  that we reason and ratiocinate not about any 
non-existent underlying ideas, but about the words themselves, i.e., we “reason or perform 
Operations [entirely] about them.”  Again, this would not have been a terribly difficult leap for 
Berkeley to make, since words are just patterns of visual or audible ideas, and Berkeley had 
already accepted that such (patterns of) ideas function as signs in a Natural Language.    
 To illustrate the point that we use the words themselves as signs (rather than any 
underlying ideas), Berkeley pointed, in these 1709 letters to Molyneux and in the 1710 
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Introduction to the Principles, to Algebra as an example.  In §19 of the Introduction to the 
Principles, Berkeley wrote:  “And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in 
the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, 
excite in the understanding the ideas they are meant to stand for – in reading and discoursing, 
names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which, though a particular 
quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each 
letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.”     
 To better understand this, consider the manner in which Algebra is actually learned:  
most people learn Algebra in a classroom and, in that context, students are only expected to 
provide appropriate spoken and/or written responses when called upon to do so.  In fact, for 
those students who do not pursue careers that require the use of Algebra, providing answers on 
tests and quizzes will likely be the only use to which they will ever put their algebraic skills.  
Thus, these students need never associate the signs of algebra with anything other than the signs 
of algebra.  For, what a student learns in an Algebra classroom is only how to regulate his or her 
volition so as to write down (or speak) the appropriate symbols and characters at the appropriate 
time.  For example, a student may learn how to “solve for x, if 3x + 6 = 15” by carrying out a 
series of steps (or, by carrying out various algebraic ‘action recipes’) and eventually arriving at 
the expected solution.  Thus, in the statement 3x + 6 = 15, ‘x’ denotes “3”, but this will not be 
known unless and until the requisite steps are carried out; therefore, one must be able to execute 
those steps without associating ‘x’ with anything other than itself.  Thus, “though a particular 
quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each 
letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.”  (Intro, 
§19). 
 This does not mean that the activities we collectively call “algebra” serve no purpose 
beyond burdening high-school students with skills that most of them will never expressly use 
outside the classroom.  It does mean, however, that the only immediate purpose of algebra is 
simply more algebra.  That is, regardless of how one may apply the results of algebraic behavior 
to regulate non-algebraic behavior and, thereby, perform some non-algebraic task(s), one need 
never do this in order to successfully perform algebra.  To illustrate this, consider the following.  
A lawyer is tasked with dividing the assets of a trust according to the last wishes of a recently 
deceased head of household.  In the decedent’s will it was decreed that the assets of the trust 
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shall be divided equally among the decedent’s surviving children, but that the youngest child 
shall only receive half of what the other children receive.  Assume the assets of the trust total 
$78,500.00, and that there are four surviving children:  Roger, Alison, Mary, and Mark (in order 
from oldest to youngest).  Now, in the course of performing his duties as an attorney, the lawyer 
may call upon previously learned algebraic skills to arrive at an answer with relative ease.  If ‘x’ 
is the amount that the oldest three will receive, then x/2 will be the amount given to the youngest 
(Mark), and 3x + x/2 = 78,500.  By “solving for x” the lawyer determines that x = 22,428.57 and 
x/2 = 11,214.29.   
 The point of this example is that in order to arrive at these answers, one need not think of 
money or trusts or people at all.  One need only have the relevant algebraic know-how that 
allows one to “solve for x” in any given statement(s).  Indeed, students in a classroom may have 
been called upon to “solve for x” in that very same equation (3x + x/2 = 78,500) by sheer 
coincidence, and those students may think of whatever they please, provided they arrive at the 
expected answer(s).  The undeniable fact is that we do not require that students have specific 
ideas when writing out the answers to algebra problems; we only require that they write the 
correct answers, i.e., that they consistently behave according to our (algebraic) expectations.   
 Even the lawyer in our scenario need not think of 78,500 as representing or signifying the 
assets of a trust in order to “solve for x.”  Of course, if this algebraic behavior is to be of any 
further use to the lawyer, the lawyer must call upon other non-algebraic skills to get the 
appropriate amounts of money to the right people, e.g., the lawyer must contact the 
administrators of the trust and inform them that checks for $22,428.57 must be drawn and made 
payable to Roger, Alison and Mary, and that a check for $11,214.29 is to be paid to Mark.  Thus, 
the lawyer applies the results of his algebraic calculations to regulate further (non-algebraic) 
behavior and it is in doing so that his algebraic behavior becomes something more than the mere 
game, if you will, that was learned in the classroom.135      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135  In 1707, Berkeley invented “the algebraic game” which was just what its name implies:  a game to be played by 
moving pegs around a board and, thereby, constructing arbitrary algebraic equations to be solved by the player(s), 
with the option of betting along the way.  Having observed friends engrossed in playing chess for the better part of a 
day, the young Berkeley set out to create a game that would afford as much mental exercise as chess but that would 
also leave the players with skills that could be applied beyond the gaming board; hence, the algebraic game.  After 
describing the rules to his game, Berkeley entreated his fellow students:  “You see what a mere game is algebra, and 
that both chance and science find place in it.  Why should you not, then, come to this gaming table?”  (Mathematical 
Miscellanies, On the Algebraic Game, p. 56).          
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 Notice also that our lawyer may successfully carry out these further non-algebraic tasks 
without having ever met any of the people involved.  In that regard, as far as the lawyer is 
concerned, the names “Mary” or “Mark” function in much the same way as “x” in his algebraic 
calculations.  That is, to properly employ these words and thereby regulate his own linguistic 
behavior and, thereby, the behavior of the trust administrators, and, consequently, fulfill his 
lawyerly duties relative to a particular client, the lawyer need never think of any particular 
people with regard to “Mary” and “Mark” – he need only supply these names at the right point(s) 
in his conversation with the trust administrators and/or at the appropriate places on various 
forms, documents, etc.  Thus, “though a particular [person] be marked by each [name], yet to 
proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each [name] suggest to [our lawyer’s] thoughts 
that particular [person] it was appointed to stand for.”   
 In §8 of the Seventh Dialogue of Alciphron, Berkeley illustrated this general point about 
language – that we can and often do ‘perform operations entirely about words’ – by comparing 
words to “counters” at a card table (i.e., poker chips):     
 
Euphranor: Say now, Alciphron, is it necessary every time these counters are used   
  throughout the progress of a game, to frame an idea of the distinct sum or   
  value that each represents? 
 
Alciphron: By no means; it is sufficient the players first agree on their respective   
  values, and at last substitute those values in their stead. 
 
Euphranor: And in casting up a sum, where the figures stand for pounds, shillings, and  
  pence, do you think it necessary, throughout the whole progress of the   
  operation, in each step to form ideas of pounds, shillings, and pence? 
 
Alciphron:   I do not; it will suffice if in the conclusion those figures direct our actions   
  with respect to things. 
 
Euphranor:   From hence it seems to follow, that words may not be insignificant,   
  although they should not, every time they are used, excite the ideas they   
  signify in our minds; it being sufficient that we have it in our power to   
  substitute things or ideas for their signs when there is occasion.  It seems   
  also to follow, that there may be another use of words besides that of   
  marking and suggesting distinct ideas, to wit, the influencing our conduct   
  and actions; which may be done either by forming rules for us to act by, or  
  by raising certain passions, dispositions, and emotions in our minds.  A   
  discourse, therefore, that directs how to act or excite to the doing or   
  forbearance of an action may, it seems, by useful and significant, although  
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  the words whereof it is composed should not bring each a distinct idea   
  into our minds.136 
 
 The point of these analogies – between words and algebraic variables and between words 
and poker chips – is simply this:  we use artificial signs in the same way that we use natural 
signs; namely, to regulate volition according to various complex sensory-motor expectations.  
When a poker player surveys her remaining chips, she is attempting to decide how to go about 
playing (and presumably winning) a hand of poker, i.e., she is using visual cues to regulate her 
poker-playing behavior, and the game of poker will proceed according the same rules of success 
or failure regardless of whether the chips are ever exchanged for money, and regardless of 
whether they are even thought of as representing specific amounts of money.  For, the successful 
poker-player need only know how the chips themselves are used in the course of that particular 
game.  That is, she need only know that, say, one blue chip can be exchanged for ten red chips, 
or that one white chip must be thrown into the pot before each hand, and that running out of 
chips means she is out of the game, etc.  Treating the chips as representing specific monetary 
amounts is an arbitrary addition to the game; it is not required to successfully play the game of 
poker. 
 Algebraic equations will likewise be solved according to the same rules regardless of 
how (or even whether) one goes on to apply the results of those calculations to regulate his/her 
non-algebraic behavior.  Thus, to solve an algebraic equation, one need not think of anything 
other than the symbols and rules of algebra itself.  In like manner, any linguistic behavior will 
proceed according to the same local rules of grammar and syntax regardless of how – or even 
whether – one goes on to apply the results of that linguistic behavior to regulate one’s non-
linguistic behavior.  For, as Berkeley observed, in §17 of Alciphron VII, “what is true of 
algebraic signs is also true of words or language – modern algebra being in fact a more short, 
apposite, and artificial sort of language.”   
 We must not read too much into Berkeley here, because he did write, in §20 of the 
Introduction to the Principles, that "[a]t first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that 
were fit to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that when language is 
once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately 
attended with those passions, which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 My emphasis. 
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ideas, that are now quite omitted."  In the context of mathematical language, Robert Baum has 
explained this as follows:   
 
 In so far as mathematics as a language deals with propositions which are denotatively 
meaningful, i.e., in so far as it functions as a system of signs, once certain signs have 
been assigned and rules for their manipulation have been established on the basis of 
empirical observation of the relations of their significates, it is possible (as with any 
system of signs) to manipulate the signs without taking their significates into 
consideration at all.137 
 
 If we combine these various statements with Berkeley's Theory of Vision, we may 
conclude that it becomes clear that Berkeley was committed to the position that ideas are never 
ends in themselves, but only available means, qua signs, to some volitional end.  Consider, for 
example, the opening line of the Preface to his 1713 Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous:  
“it seems the general opinion of the world, no less than the design of nature and providence, that 
the end of speculation be Practice, or the improvement and regulation of our lives.”138  More to 
the point, Berkeley wrote that “the human mind” is “designed, not for the bare intuition of ideas, 
but for action and operation about them,”139 and, just as ideas are merely available signs for the 
regulation of volition, so are words “instruments to direct our practice”140  
 By comparison, if our philosophical methodology is built upon the “grand mistake” of 
treating all operations of mind and/or regulations of active volition as being, in the final analysis, 
some kind of idea(s), then we will naturally assume that the point of any communicative 
behavior is only to impart ideas to one’s audience, with the behavior of one’s audience being 
treated as an incidental byproduct of those ideas.  Consequently, by committing the "grand 
mistake" we shall treat “means and instruments as ultimate ends, and [labour] to attain precise 
ideas which [we] suppose indiscriminately annexed to all terms.”141   
 As Baum recognized, regarding Berkeley's treatment of formal mathematical systems in 
The Ananlyst, "[Berkeley] warned that pure mathematics is a waste of time and effort if it does 
not keep some ultimate application in mind while developing a system."142  Thus, once a 
convention has been established, we may ‘perform operations entirely about words and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Baum, p. 127. 
138 Fraser, Works, V.I, p. 258. 
139 Seventh Dialogue, §14. 
140 Seventh Dialogue, §17. 
141 Seventh Dialogue, §18. 
142 Baum, p. 129. 
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symbols,’ which is just to say that artificial words and symbols serve as signs for various 
grammatical/linguistic expectations according to which we regulate our linguistic behavior (i.e., 
how we converse with others).143  Likewise, philosophical discourse may also proceed based 
entirely on the customary conventions of discourse without any possible application to non-
linguistic behavior.  In fact, talk of "material substance" necessitates just that, since "material 
substance" is defined as being not part of the phenomenal world.  Therefore, there is no way 
anyone can possible act relative to material substance, since we can only regulate our behavior 
relative to whatever we currently and actually perceive (i.e., ideas).  Since it is only the manner 
in which we go on to apply linguistic behavior, i.e., to use the results of our ‘operations entirely 
about words’ to regulate further non-linguistic behavior, that allows this purely linguistic 
behavior to become something more than a mere game and acquire a “reference” to anything 
outside itself, the term "material substance" must be deemed meaningless in this regard.  As 
Berkeley announced, in §15 of Alciphron VII, “all sciences, so far as they are universal and 
demonstrable by human reason, will be found conversant about signs as their immediate object – 
though these in the application are referred to things.”144  Hence, "material substance" cannot 
possibly 'refer' to anything. 
 As David Berman has argued, "the actual meaning of the word 'matter' is emotive: it 
makes certain men act as if the cause of their sensations were material rather than spiritual."145  
For, as Berkeley argued in §54 of the Principles:  "Strictly speaking, to believe that which 
involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impossible... In one sense indeed, men may 
be said to believe that matter exists, that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, 
which affect them every moment and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless 
unthinking being." (my emphasis).  Unfortunately, the only way to "act as if" matter exists is to 
speak about it, to assert its existence and to incorporate such assertions into the conventions of 
philosophical discourse, and the only thing this has produced, according to Berkeley, is "a 
forlorn skepticism" (§1, Introduction to the Principles), and atheism.146       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 See e.g., §49 of Part I of the Principles:  “to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those 
qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word die.”   
144 Recall Alciphron's acknowledgment, with regard to symbols for pounds, shillings, pence, etc., that "it will suffice 
if in the conclusion those figures direct our actions with respect to things."   
145 Berman, Berkeley, Idealism and the Man, p. 150. 
146 Why Berkeley thought that talk of 'matter' and 'material substance' encouraged or at least supported atheism is not 
important to the present analysis.  Berkeley's claim that talk of 'matter' leads to a "forlorn skepticism" should be 
obvious to any philosopher – incorporating 'matter' into philosophical discourse requires that we also talk of the 
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3.3 ACTIVE AWARENESS 
 
 Recall, from Chapter I, Berkeley's insistence on the toto coelo difference between our 
awareness of our own active selves, as opposed to our awareness of any idea(s).  Recall also 
Berkeley's admonition in §142 of Part I of the Principles that, "[s]pirits and ideas are things so 
wholly different, that when we say 'they exist,' 'they are known,' or the like, these words must not 
be thought to signify anything common to both natures."  Thus, our knowledge of our own active 
selves, of how to do anything, e.g., how to move a toe rather than a finger, or how and when to 
say "house" rather than "apple" etc., is a toto coelo different kind of awareness than our 
awareness of, say, a pattern of light, or a sound, etc. 
 Since Berkeley did not develop this line of thought, concerning the different kind of 
awareness we have of our own active selves, I suggest that our awareness of how to do 
something, of how to regulate our own volition, is an active awareness; and, by this, I should not 
be taken to mean anything in common with, say, one's "awareness" of a patch of color or a 
sound.147  Indeed, expressing this is extremely difficult, but this should not come as a surprise to 
the Berkeleyan since, as Berkeley stated, "language & knowledge are all about ideas."148  In fact, 
I can think of no way to express any specific know-how, without reference to the expectations 
according to which such volitional regulation occurs, e.g., what I do in order to expect my leg to 
move, or what I do in order to expect to start walking forward, etc.  Indeed, volitional regulation 
becomes differentiated into relative specific 'action-recipes' or sub-routines as new sensory-
motor contingencies are developed; thus, know-how is sculpted (as it were) around these 
sensory-motor contingencies.  Hence, I can only describe various action recipes or protocols, 
etc., with reference to the patterns of ideas around which regulations of volition have been 
formed, e.g., what I do to move a toe, or drive a car, or eat a sandwich, etc.   
 The salient point, however, is just that my knowledge or awareness of how to regulate my 
volition in some relatively specific way is an active awareness, which is toto coelo different from 
my awareness of any ideas.  Thus, my awareness that I am in the presence of, say, a staircase, is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
world as being divided into two metaphysical realms, the realm of matter and the realm of 
experience/phenomena/ideas, with human knowledge being limited to the latter while ultimate reality/truth resides 
in the former.        
147 J.L. Stocks has observed that Berkeley's doctrine of Spirit "was in fact never fully developed" but Stocks opined 
that "Part II of the Principles, in which he says he had made 'considerable progress' before he lost the manuscript 
during his travels in Italy, would have developed this side of his thought."  (p.319).   
148 Notebook entry 312. 
90	  
	  
only partly ideational (I must, at some point, experience some sensory cues if a specific form of 
volitional regulation is to be formed), but also partly volitional, and my awareness that I can 
regulate my volition in a certain way in a given situation with the expectation that certain results 
will follow is an active awareness.  Alternatively, we may say that my awareness that I am in the 
presence of a staircase is based on sensory cues, and also my certainty that some form of 
volitional regulation is applicable to my present situation.  We may consider in this regard 
Berkeley's Notebook entry 777:  “To be sure or certain of what we do not actually perceive (I say 
perceive not imagine) We must not be altogether Passive, there must be a disposition to act, there 
must be assent, which is active, nay what do I talk There must be Actual Volition.” 
 Based on all that has been advanced thus far, the common misconception regarding 
Berkeley's immaterialism that was introduced in the last section of Chapter II can now be 
conclusively dispelled; namely, the claim that Berkeley's philosophy commits him to the position 
that objects cease to exist when we turn our backs on them, i.e., when we no longer perceive 
them.  As Berkeley recorded in Notebook entry 777 (cited just above), our certainty regarding 
the existence of the world around us, whether we immediately perceive that world or not, is 
based not on perception alone, but as much, if not more so, on Active Volition and the 
'insinuation' of the "prejudice" in our understanding.  Thus, my knowledge of the vast world of 
possibilities that I inhabit extends far beyond the world of my immediate sensory environment at 
any given moment.  Indeed, my immediate sensory environment is merely a host of signs that 
indicate to me, through a vast repertoire of sensory-motor expectations, the presence of this 
larger world.  Therefore, my awareness of this larger world is, at least in part, an active 
awareness of how to regulate my volition according to a host of presently applicable sensory-
motor expectations. 
 Moreover, the sensory-motor expectations or contingencies according to which I am 
currently regulating my volition, at any given time, need not be correlated with presently 
perceived sensory signs; in fact, this is often not the case.  Consider, for example, that you find 
yourself in a room with a gaping hole in the floor, and you can see, through this hole, that a fatal 
fall awaits you if you step or fall into the hole.  Imagine wind whistling up through the hole and 
that you see the tops of trees far below.  Once you see that yawning abyss, you will continue to 
take it into account in the manner in which you move (tentatively, no doubt) about the room, 
even if you are not looking directly at the hole (or hearing the wind whistling beyond the hole).  
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You will adopt a posture, a way of behaving, that is triggered, if you will, by the various sensory 
signs that indicated to you the presence of this fatal fall.  This behavior posture, then, just is your 
active awareness of the existence of that hole, whether you continue to perceive it or not, as you 
move cautiously about the room.   
 A table is less dramatic than a fatal fall, but the principle is still the same; for, both 
descriptions (“a table” and/or “a gaping hole”) are merely shorthand names for a host of sensory-
motor possibilities (in a given, specific context).  Standing in a room and seeing what you take to 
be a table and then turning off the lights will simply remove the operative visual signs from 
existence, but you have learned, over the course of your life, that turning off the lights does not 
negate the import or relevance of those visual signs, i.e., you have learned to continue to regulate 
your behavior according to the same expectations that were suddenly suggested by the visual 
signs when the lights were on, just as when they are turned off.  Thus, it is the manner in which 
one regulates one’s volition that constitutes one’s certainty of the continued existence of any 
given “object” regardless of whatever sensory signs are being experienced at any given moment.  
 Of course, our expectations and attendant volitional regulation must actually work for the 
“object” to be said to “actually continue to exist,” regardless of anyone’s apparent certainty or 
knowledge of such continued existence.  For example, if I see what I take to be a table before me 
and then turn around and walk quickly backwards, I would expect to experience tactile 
sensations that I would refer back to the table, e.g., “what it feels like when I back into the table.”  
However, if I do not encounter such tactile sensations, if I walk backwards unhindered (despite 
my expectations to the contrary), then I would say/think, e.g., “I only thought there was a table 
there, but apparently, I was mistaken” or, e.g., “somehow that table went away when by back 
was turned” etc.   
 That expectations hold good, or just work over time, is dependent on the ultimate cause 
of our sensations and I will not presume to answer such a question.  In any case, we can know 
that our expectations will hold good, or just work, over time, because we do not acquire fully 
formed expectations to the point where they are “suddenly suggested” (thus insinuating the 
prejudice into our understanding), and then go on to find out whether they work or not; instead, 
we form expectations as they work, or insofar as they work.  That is, the more frequently and 
regularly certain sensory-expectations hold good, the more firmly they will become ingrained 
into our actions and thinking, such that they will eventually reach the point of ‘certainty’ where 
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they become “suddenly suggested” and thus the operative prejudice “insinuates itself into our 
understanding.”  Thus, when we act with certainty of our surroundings (which equates to a 
certainty regarding the “continued existence” of various “objects” in one’s environment), we are 
acting according to expectations that have achieved the status of “sudden suggestions” only 
because they have worked so well (relative to whatever goals we may have, but most generally, 
we can just say, relative to the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain).   
 We may also apply this notion of an active awareness to a (brief) re-examination of 
Berkeley's arguments against abstract ideas.  Recall that Berkeley relied upon the psychological 
impossibility of framing such ideas, and he also relied upon his readers to perform a candid 
introspective examination of what passes in our minds to determine the truth of his claim that no 
such ideas can possibly exist because we simply cannot become aware of them.  Recall also that 
this argument was not very well received, in part because of the criticism that Berkeley was 
being too imagistic in his thinking.  Recall, for example, Pitcher's insistence on "purely 
intellectual non-sensuous ideas."   
 Had Berkeley developed this notion of an active awareness that is toto coelo different 
from our awareness of ideas, he could have responded to Pitcher's criticism, and others like it, by 
arguing that what Pitcher is calling for in the form of a "purely intellectual non-sensuous idea" is, 
in actuality, an active awareness of how to speak, or how to use and comprehend an artificial 
sign in a 'general' way.149  Recall that Berkeley claimed that "language and knowledge are all 
about ideas."150  If this is true, then it should be no wonder why so many philosophers are so 
deeply unsatisfied with Berkeley's call to introspection to deny abstract ideas.  For, a philosopher 
may reasonably argue that something must be going on when we comprehend the meaning of a 
term, so even if we cannot frame a specific abstract idea, they must be there, or something like 
them must be at work here.  However, if what is really driving our ability to comprehend and use 
terms in a general way (or, in any way, for that matter) is our active awareness of how to 
regulate our volition so as to converse meaningfully with others (i.e., to produce noises in such 
an order so as to achieve whatever short-term or long-term goals prompted us to converse in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 In the Introduction to the Principles, Berkeley offered a brief account of how words become general in their use 
without the intervention of abstract ideas, but exploring the details of this account is beyond the scope of the present 
argument. 
150 Notebook entry 312. 
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first place, in some particular situation), then it will be something that cannot be readily 
discussed and analyzed through philosophical discourse.   
 Moreover, if we are operating according to the "grand mistake" of ignoring this active 
awareness and the role played by active volition in cognition and meaning, then we will insist 
upon the presence of some kind of idea(s) where, in truth, it is our active awareness that is 
operative, and this is a toto coelo different kind of awareness than that of any idea.   
 The same argument can be brought to defend the "Master Argument."  For, again, one 
who is skeptical of the merits of this argument could argue, "look, I know that things exist when 
I don't perceive them – I know that, and I fully understand what is meant by that, so your 
argument, Berkeley, cannot possibly be correct."  Once again, Berkeley could have employed 
this notion of an active awareness that is toto coelo different from our awareness of ideas to 
respond, "of course you know that; but it's a different kind of knowledge (or awareness).  You 
can imagine anything you like, but that's nothing to the purpose; for, that is not what constitutes 
your knowledge of unperceived objects.  In fact, it cannot be, since whatever you can imagine 
will be based on what you have actually perceived, at some point, and so, it will not be an idea 
(of imagination/memory) of something existing unperceived."  Berkeley could have responded in 
this way and still won his point, since the operative active awareness (of, say, books in the closet 
or trees in the park) is clearly something that cannot exist independent of spirit, since it simply is 
spirit/volition.   
 Moreover, this appeal to active awareness would have explained why Berkeley was 
committed to being so "imagistic" in these two thought experiments (abstract ideas and the 
Master Argument).  The reason is simple:  if you are not becoming aware of some concrete and 
particular 'image'151 through your efforts at recollection/imagination, but you are certain that you 
are, nevertheless, aware of something, then according to Berkeley's ontology (Passive Idea vs. 
Active Volition), that something can only be some form of active awareness (e.g., of how to 
converse with others using terms in a general way, or how to find, say, books in the closet, or 
trees in the park, etc.).  It is that active awareness, then, that is being mistaken for some kind of 
idea; thus, we could say that it was Berkeley's fervent desire to avoid the "grand mistake" of 
replacing active know-how with passive ideas that forced him to adopt an "imagistic" approach 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 And note that I use 'image' here loosely; for, obviously, our powers of imagination and recollection are not 
limited to visual recall and imagination. 
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to these thought experiments.  Again, had Berkeley developed his doctrine of Spirit as I have 
attempted, he would have had these arguments at his disposal. 
 Berkeley could have also used this notion of an active awareness to respond to any 
charges of solipsism.  For, just as we know that we are in the presence of any object according to 
both sensory signs and our active awareness of how to regulate our volition accordingly, so we 
are aware of the presence of other minds/spirits in the same way, i.e., when acting in an 'other-
mind-relative-way' works, and an apt example of such behavior is, of course, conversing or 
speaking, i.e., if I can converse with it, then it deserves the appellation, "other mind."152  Once 
again, then, our knowledge of other minds is an active awareness, and so will defy careful 
linguistic analysis and, thus, the attention of the philosopher, especially if the "grand mistake" is 
firmly entrenched in the conventions of philosophical discourse. 
 Finally, Berkeley could have capitalized on this line of reasoning regarding our active 
awareness of volitional regulation according to sensory-motor expectations in order to better 
explain those instances wherein Berkeley equated "exists" with "is perceivable" rather than "is 
perceived."  For present purposes, we may focus on Berkeley's statements in §3 of Part I of the 
Principles:  "The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my 
study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it."  
Based on all that has been advanced thus far, we can now re-interpret this claim.  First, we 
should acknowledge that no one, outside of philosophical discourse, really ever says simply that 
something "exists."  If a person walked into a room full of people, pointed at a table and said 
"that table exists!" that person would be met only with a sincere concern for his/her mental 
health.  However, we do use the verb "is" quite frequently, so this will suffice for present 
purposes.  So, for example, I may say to someone who is looking for their car keys that "they are 
in the next room" or I may inform someone that "there is a fountain in the park" etc. 
 Now, according to Berkeley's undeveloped view of the "active operative" nature of 
language, wherein meaning "as often terminate in the will as in the understanding, being 
employed rather to excite, influence, and direct action, than to produce clear and distinct 
ideas,”153 we can interpret any statement to the effect that some object, X, "exists" (or just "is") 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152  I list linguistic behavior as other-mind-relative-behavior because Alciphron makes the argument, in the Fourth 
Dialogue of Alciphron, that the surest sign of being in the presence of another intelligence is that other's ability to 
converse, i.e., use language. 
153 letter to Johnson dated March 24, 1730. 
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beyond the scope of whatever is presently perceived as a series of (emotive) signs being offered 
up (by the speaker) to be used as signs for the regulation of (the listener's) volition.  Hence, 
existential statements such as "your keys are in the next room" or "the books are in the closet" 
can be restated in the form of:  "should you regulate your volition in some particular way, you 
should expect to find/perceive X" where "X" is the subject of the statement in question.   
 It is truly unfortunate that Berkeley abandoned his originally planned Treatise, as it 
would have been quite interesting to have seen what he might have had in mind with regard to 
any 'doctrine of spirit/volition.'  I have attempted to extend Berkeley's incomplete writings on the 
subject in the hope of shedding new light on Berkeley's revolutionary views.  Whether Berkeley 
himself ever entertained any of the thoughts I have presented in this attempted extension, we 
shall probably never know, but we can at least re-examine what he did complete and publish, and 
we can begin to take seriously his warning that "[u]nless we take care to clear the first principles 
of knowledge, from the embarras [sic] and delusion of words, we may make infinite reasonings 
upon them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be never the 
wiser."154       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Introduction to the Principles, §25. 
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